Conservative Practice versus Conservative "Values": Gottfried on the Decline and Fall of American Conservatism

Since the collapse of the Bush Administration, which began with the takeover of the House of Representatives and Senate in 2006 by the Democratic Party and culminated in the election of Barack Obama in 2008 and again in 2012, journalists and public intellectuals have been engaged in an extended debate about the state of American conservatism, and they, for the most part, identify with the Republican Party. Most have suggested that the American conservative movement is, at best, moribund. Some have written gleeful obituaries celebrating its long overdue demise, while others have suggested that the movement ought to be revived and offer their advice about how this should be done.[1] In Paul Gottfried's recent book, *Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right*, he makes the more controversial claim that there was never an authentic American conservatism to begin with and that its apparent success was largely a mirage.[2] This represents a significant alteration of the argument in his earlier work, *The Conservative Movement*, that the American conservative movement was, for the most part, a positive development in contemporary American politics and was corrupted by its takeover by non-conservatives.[3]

The key to the change in Gottfried's argument lies in the trilogy on the emergence of the modern managerial/therapeutic state that Gottfried wrote between his two books on American conservatism.[4] Gottfried claims that a radical alteration in the character of the modern state took place during the twentieth century. The older bourgeois liberal state identified primarily, but not solely, with the Anglophone states of Great Britain, and the United States

was slowly and subtly transformed, first into the twentieth century managerial state and second into the late twentieth and early twenty-first century therapeutic state. As these transformations took place, the older social order—which was connected with traditional gender roles, Protestant Christianity, and limited government—disintegrated and was replaced by a new relation between government and citizen in which the citizen first became an employee or client of a managerial government and second a patient or pupil of the contemporary therapeutic state.

Gottfried derives several conclusions about the American conservative movement from these earlier arguments. First, he suggests that in such circumstances as currently prevail in the United States, there is no social base for a conservative movement, and thus, modern American conservatism, despite its avowals to the contrary, has no connection to any form of traditional conservatism, which derived its strength from its connection to an actual and ongoing form of life. Second, he argues that since the American conservative movement has no social base to connect it to a current form of life which might be conserved, the movement has resorted to claiming that so-called 'universal values' are the core of American conservatism. That is, American conservatives have constructed an ideology or armed doctrine and called it 'conservative.' Finally, Gottfried claims that since 'values conservatism' is one form of modern ideological politics and ideological politics are inherently anti-traditional, the conservative movement has been easily co-opted by non-conservative ideologues who call themselves neoconservatives and share a commitment to managerial and therapeutic politics with the contemporary political Left.

Gottfried's book on the American conservative movement is part history, part sociology, and part polemic. At the same time, it is a story of personal disappointment, especially when read alongside his earlier book on American conservatism and his most recent autobiographical account of his intellectual influences.[5] However, despite the personal tone the book often displays, it remains first and foremost an academic examination of an episode in the history of contemporary American political thought. Thus, my primary

focus in reviewing Gottfried's work will not be on the more polemical aspects of it, other than to suggest that that he has chosen the right enemies. Instead, I will offer an examination of his account of the failure of modern American conservatism, which places it within the context of his work on the managerial/therapeutic state. I will suggest that Gottfried's conclusions concerning both the discontinuity of contemporary American conservatism with any traditionalist account of conservatism and the inherent incoherence of neoconservatism as a form of conservatism are quite convincing. However, though I share his conclusions, I differ with the trajectory of Gottfried's argument at several points and have specific misgivings about his sociological conception of the social basis of political movements and several reservations concerning the novelty of the managerial/therapeutic state and its complete obliteration of an older liberal version.[6]

The Managerial State and the Therapeutic State

Gottfried's analysis of the American conservative movement takes place within a larger intellectual project that involves an examination of the emergence of the managerial and therapeutic state in the twentieth century. Gottfried correctly observes that there has been a radical change in the nature of liberalism over the course of the last 100 years, and that, in the twentieth century, a new managerial and therapeutic conception of the state eclipsed the older classical conception of constitutional or limited government. In making this claim, he joins other thinkers like Michael Oakeshott and Friedrich Hayek who have made similar distinctions, specifically between what they both call teleocratic and nomocratic views of the political community.[7] However, unlike these two thinkers, Gottfried maintains that the managerial and therapeutic conceptions of the state are recent developments and these forms of teleocracy have completely eclipsed the nomocratic alternative. Gottfried's argument about the novelty and ubiquitous power of the modern managerial/therapeutic state is important because it informs his critique of American conservatism, suggesting, for example, that, in order to gain power,

American conservatives have been forced to speak the language of managerial and therapeutic politics.

So, what does Gottfried mean by these terms and what type of change does he describe as central to the creation of this novel contemporary political community? First, Gottfried contrasts the meaning and practice of liberalism in the twentieth century with its meaning and practice in the nineteenth century. According to Gottfried, the old form of liberalism emphasized "distributed powers, the need to protect traditional civil society from an encroaching state, [and] bourgeois moral standards."[8] Limitations on the power of central governments were especially important regarding property rights, which were understood to be central to the liberal ethos. Gottfried connects this nineteenth-century version of liberalism with the rise of a bourgeois social structure and a capitalist economy. He also notes correctly that the older form of liberalism was not directly connected with any form of democratic rule but was instead quite often hostile to democracy as the enemy of limited government and private property. Gottfried refers to the work of various thinkers such as William Lecky, François Guizot, and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen as exemplary liberals who opposed the rise of mass democracy.[9] Finally, according to Gottfried, the old liberalism disclaimed any aspiration to universal application, limiting citizenship to those from within a specific traditional political community and relying on the rigidity of Protestant bourgeois morality to hold that community together.

This older liberalism was eclipsed and eventually its basis in the existing social structure was destroyed by a radically discontinuous new liberalism which emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Gottfried attributes many of the malign tendencies of the new liberalism to thinkers like T. H. Green in England and John Dewey in America, who appropriated the term 'liberal' for their own non-liberal purposes.[10] The characteristics of the new liberalism included an emphasis on expertise and planning, an uncritical belief in the inevitability of progress, a plebiscitary conception of democracy based upon some sort of egalitarian ideal, and a commitment to the universal relevance of the ideology.

Though he is not always consistent with his use of terms, Gottfried identifies this new democratic liberalism with the rise of the administrative or managerial state. In its initial iteration, this managerial state was primarily concerned with the production and distribution of material benefits within a particular society.

Gottfried argues that liberal "democracy has become synonymous with economic policy, usually signifying the distribution of entitlements or allowances, and services, and at least some public managements of national resources, key industries, and corporate wealth."[11] This identification of liberalism with dirigiste government is not the only mark of the radical discontinuity between the old and the new liberalisms but is the most salient. The new managerial liberalism was a form of teleocratic government, conceiving the political community as fellow workers or comrades in an economic development corporation and understanding the government as the manager of the production and distribution of the wealth of the community. This view is in stark contrast with the nomocratic character of the old liberal tradition which understood the political community as a group who chance and choice brought together and who shared certain beliefs, ideas, and institutions but did not share substantive purposes. The government was understood as an umpire, making rulings but not directing the game or dictating its outcome.

In order for the new managerial liberalism to function properly, what was needed were experts or managers who could convincingly make the case that they could be trusted to 'prime the pump' at appropriate times, manage the appropriate supply of money, or predict the number of engineers needed in 10 years time.[12] The defenders of managerial liberalism relied upon a faith in science to do their job for them. As Gottfried notes, "liberal collectivists … appealed to a science of public administration and to the ideals of a national welfare state" in order to defend the creation of managerial liberalism.[13] The assumption of the managerial liberals was that the state was a large corporate entity and the citizens and territory of the state were objects of the proprietorial interests of the government which, of course, ran the corporate

state. According to such an assumption, it made perfect sense to disrupt the traditional character of society and alter the traditional understanding of property rights in order to further the grand purposes of the state. Gottfried observes correctly that "encroachment on property in the name of industrial planning and social equity became the icebreaker for the state's continuing invasion of society."[14] In thinking of the state as an enterprise association, the new liberals were actually operating within the same idiom of political thought as their more explicitly collectivist contemporaries, the communists and fascists. A common result of the modern managerial state has been the creation of a vast network of citizens completely dependent upon government, either as its employees or clients. Gottfried does not, however, blame some elusive and shadowy conspiracy but instead insists that "liberal democratic welfare state gained vast power because it gave to most people what they wanted."[15] Thus, concerns about limitations on government or hand-wringing about the desuetude of the rule of law become irrelevant matters compared with, as Lasswell put it, who gets what, when, and how.

According to Gottfried, this managerial state, which has characterized most political communities in the Western world since the early part of the twentieth century, has undergone a radical transformation of its own. However, the managerial character of the state has not changed so much as the object or purpose of management has. Gottfried argues that, beginning almost coevally with the managerial state, a therapeutic version of the state has increasingly overshadowed the earlier productivist/redistributionist version of the managerial state, bringing with it a new set of increasingly intrusive government actions meant to 're-educate' or even 'cure' the citizens of a particular political community. He writes that "in the postwar period … the administrative state, most plainly in the United States, has come to define itself through a struggle against social pathology. In this struggle the distribution of entitlements has not been the sole or even major justification for extensive political control. More essential have been 'fairness,' 'caring,' 'openness,' and other ideals attached to behavioral policies."[16] According

to Gottfried, the primary characteristics of the managerial/therapeutic state are its commitment to a radical alteration of the conscious self-conceptions of the citizens of particular political communities in terms of a remedial curative ideal and its use of bureaucratic administration to accomplish what are, in fact, the dictates of a new pseudo- or quasi-religion.

This new form of therapeutic politics involves a much more explicit rejection of what Gottfried refers to as bourgeois values than the older redistributionist model because the older model, in fact, often held out the promise of the elevation of less fortunate to the level of bourgeois affluence. Indeed, therapeutic politics has even accepted, for the most part, capitalist forms of wealth accumulation insofar as they contribute to the furtherance of the goals of social engineering and cultural re-education. As Gottfried notes, "social control by the state does not presuppose a socialized economy, and government intervention into child rearing, spousal relations, and intergroup dynamics can now go forward in conjunction with market forces.[17] Instead, the therapeutic state is more interested in creating a new set of cultural valuations than in mere material equality.

Whereas the old redistributionists were concerned with the body of the citizenry, the new therapists are concerned with their soul, psyche, and mind. The most prevalent policy pursuits of the managerial/therapeutic state concern the education and treatment of the mental maladies of traditional communities within the state, most often by making general distinctions between abstract classes of victims who deserve not only material benefits but special ontological status as symbols of past and present evil and victimizers who need not only offer reparations to the victims but must also make public confessions designed to seal their guilt in perpetuity.[18] Gottfried quotes Paul Piccone approvingly as arguing that administrators create a "politically homogeneous community by reducing a normally recalcitrant population marked by group particularities to a clientele of abstract, manipulable individuals dependent on the state."[19] Thus, multiculturalism and the support of various forms of diversity are not extended to the traditional communities that

actually comprised the historic character of a particular state but instead are reserved for those engaged in 'unconventional lifestyles' or immigrants believed to have suffered at the hands of imperialism, prejudice, or the other innumerable sins perpetrated by members of the traditional political community. The primary manner of dealing with dissenters is by treating them as either mentally ill or evil.[20] The consensus on these issues has emerged not from any form of democratic deliberation or popular demand but instead from the unelected sociologists and other social scientists who staff the vast governmental bureaucracies that control Western states.

For Gottfried, one of the most ironic aspects of the therapeutic state is that, despite its overt hostility to Christianity, it relies upon a quasi-religious kind of politics to sustain itself. He writes that "the managerial state emerges as redeemer-reformer through its role in social engineering and its work as a moral instructor."[21] Indeed, therapeutic politics is a secularized Gnostic version of liberal Protestantism, maintaining that sect's focus on moral purity, social guilt, and Manichean public judgments while shifting the telos of human action from a conception of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God to an imminent and perfectible community of the elect. The need for a change of consciousness, emphasis on public confessions of guilt concerning slavery and the mistreatment of women and minorities, and the division of the world into blameless victims and wicked victimizers are all characteristic of therapeutic politics. This new pseudo-religion provides moral support for the modern managerial/therapeutic state and also defines the limits of dissent and parameters within which normal politics operate in the contemporary Western world. Gottfried writes that the "state rests its power upon a multitiered following: an underclass and now middle-class welfariate, a self-assertive public sector, and a vanguard of media and journalistic public defenders."[22] The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the picture that Gottfried paints of the managerial/therapeutic state is that opposition from traditionalist conservatives or classical liberals is likely to be unsuccessful because such opposition lacks any real social constituency and

because it is likely to be adjudged as outside of the bounds of appropriate political discourse.

However, is Gottfried's picture an accurate one and does he, following his own advice, "avoid tendentious parallels, which arrange past figures and past movements in accordance with current appetites for a usable past"?[23] Like his books on American conservatism, Gottfried's work in the trilogy on the managerial/therapeutic state is part history, party sociology, and part polemic. Insofar as he is offering a diagnosis of the current crisis in Western politics, his work has much in common with the reverse-Whig usable pasts offered by Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt. However, Gottfried's story is not anti-modern like those of most theorists of decadence, and his account of the radical discontinuity between the older form of liberal polity and new managerial liberalism portrays an historical reality that cannot be reduced to questions of mere practicality. The primary problems with Gottfried's account are not related to this distinction but instead to the narrowness of his historical vision and lack of any systematic explanation of why the radical change from the old liberalism to the new occurred.

Gottfried is certainly correct in focusing attention on the changing character of liberalism in the twentieth century and connecting this change with the ascendancy of managerial and therapeutic politics. However, neither the managerial nor therapeutic conceptions of the state are as novel as he claims. For example, the cameralists and the 'enlightened' despots of the eighteenth century make arguments both about the need for the scientific management of the state and for understanding the government as an educator/healer of the populace, and such ideas have never really disappeared since then.[24] Further, as a manifestation of a teleocratic understanding of the state, managerial/therapeutic politics was initially a reaction to a conception of the state as a non-purposive nomocratic association, and, thus, was also and remains a derivative and parasitic style of politics, often relying on appeals to a moral individualism foreign to teleocratic or managerial politics. Therefore, while it is certainly true that the

managerial/therapeutic style of politics has become dominant in the last century, such a dirigiste conception of government has never represented the sole tradition of politics in the Western world, and it is likely that the alternative nomocratic tradition of politics has survived in opposition.

Further, though Gottfried connects the rise of a liberal notion of the state with the nineteenth-century emergence of the bourgeoisie as the most powerful social class, the moral practices connected with liberalism and the nomocratic understanding of the state, which is a political manifestation of these moral practices, are also a good deal older than he suggests. In fact, the conditions of the modern nomocratic, or old liberal, polity have been dated back to at least the thirteenth century.[25] This tradition is older and much more firmly rooted in the common moral vocabulary of the modern West than its teleocratic and collectivist counterpart. In addition, since the nomocratic tradition predates the rise of the bourgeoisie as a dominant social class, it is not necessarily fated to end if, as Gottfried suggests, the era of bourgeois dominance ends or has already ended.

The narrowness of Gottfried's historical horizon is not the only difficulty with his three books on the rise of the managerial state, however. In these works, Gottfried provides a sociological description of some of the doctrines and dispositions of both the old and new versions of liberalism but does not provide any systematic explanation for why the old was eclipsed by the new.[26] He does offer some very convincing suggestions as to why the change occurred. He writes that "urbanization, struggles for universalizing the franchise and for broader distribution of material wealth, and the growing identification of popular government with public administration have all contributed to the reconstruction of political identities."[27] Gottfried also attributes a great deal of influence to what has been called 'the new class' of administrators, academics, public intellectuals, and media personalities who influence the way policies are presented to the public. All of these play some role, but Gottfried does not spend a great deal of time explaining why any of these alterations in the social, political, and intellectual

landscape of modern Western polities made sense. The problem that Gottfried's limited historical horizon produces then is a lack of consideration of the conditions that were already in place, which encouraged the creation of 'the new class,' along with contributing to the growth of mass democracy and teleocratic conceptions of the state.

In the American example (and the Americans were not exceptional here), there were at least three obvious conditions that promoted such developments. First, there was the Puritan inheritance, which conceived of America as a religious experiment whose purpose was to create or re-create the rule of the Saints. Gottfried's understanding of the religious dimension of therapeutic politics offers a keen insight into this version of teleocratic politics, and a secularized version of Puritanism is central to American exceptionalism and the quasi-messianic politics associated with it. Second, it must be remembered that Britain's American colonies were indeed colonies and were understood as resources to be exploited. From the beginning, America had the experience of thinking of itself as a large manorial and corporate operation designed to maximize wealth. However, the most powerful force promoting the managerial conception of the state both in America and the rest of the Western world has been the almost constant presence of war-fighting and war-preparation among Western states in the past several hundred years, especially since the French Revolution. Gottfried recognizes this but does not give enough attention to the connection between constant mobilization for war-fighting and the appeal of martial metaphors in peacetime. Indeed, all of the major transformations of the American polity have taken place in the context of war. The first American republic under the Articles of Confederation appeared during the American War of Independence (or the First American War of Secession); the second American republic under the antebellum federal Constitution emerged under the shadow of Shay's Rebellion; the third postbellum unitary Constitution resulted directly from the War Between the States (or the Second American War of Secession); and the fourth, which has been ringing the changes in

the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, emerged during the long European Civil War that began in 1914 and ended 1989, and, in the United States, witnessed the creation a centralized warfare/welfare state with a teleocratic constitution.

American Conservatism in the Era of the Managerial/Therapeutic State

Despite the shortcomings of Gottfried's works on the managerial/therapeutic state, his conclusions are still compelling and inform his critique of the American conservative movement. Before writing his trilogy, Gottfried had written a brief historical monograph on American conservatism, but, in his most recent work on the subject, he significantly revises his earlier position.[28] In the newer work, Gottfried makes three distinct arguments about what he calls the American conservative movement. First, he observes that American conservatism is completely discontinuous with the traditional European conception of conservatism, especially its nineteenth-century version, and, thus, the very name of the movement is fundamentally misleading. Second, Gottfried argues that conservatism in America was doomed from the outset because it did not and still does not represent any significant constituency or have any connection with the existing social order. Third, he claims that since American conservatism was disconnected from the social reality of American political life and thus had no set of actual practices or institutions to conserve, it had to create an abstract ideological account of itself based upon a dubious appeal to universal values, and the use of such ideologically based 'values' language allowed the movement to be captured by a more ideologically fluent Left, which subsequently appropriated the name conservative or neoconservative while offering a defense of the managerial/therapeutic state.

Gottfried's first argument is reasonable, but its ultimate importance for his later arguments is not clear. He claims that traditional European conservatism was initially a reaction against the French Revolution. It was defined by certain commonly held doctrines and composed "a conceptually distinctive school of thought."[29]

Gottfried's exposition of the conservative school of thought relies heavily on Karl Mannheim's notion of ideology and his characterization of conservatism. According to Gottfried's reading of Mannheim's work, the conservative mind emphasized "concreteness, particularity, vitalism, hierarchy, historicity, and collective consciousness."[30] Conservatives rejected bourgeois rationalism, appeals to natural rights, and other forms of abstract universalism, while extolling the values of hierarchy, tradition, place, and prescription. As Gottfried notes, "the conservatives of the past were defending established churches and social hierarchies."[31] The arguments of these conservatives, who included men like Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald, Adam Müller, Karl Albrecht von Haller, and Friedrich Stahl, focus on the conservation and defense of an existing and contemporary way of life. Ironically, as Gottfried observes, the various justifications of traditionalism made by such writers survived the demise of the social order that they were defending by being appropriated by the rising bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century to defend the new social order. Gottfried contrasts this older version of hierarchical conservatism with the American version, suggesting that "it is … dubious and perhaps impossible to fit into a common political framework various European traditionalists, who defended aristocracy, social hierarchy, and ecclesiastical establishment, and the American advocates of such concerns as a market economy, an anti-Communist foreign policy, and a global democratic crusade."[32] He is certainly correct in distinguishing nineteenth-century conservatives from contemporary American neoconservatives, but he is also suggesting something more important. Gottfried claims that since the American political tradition is predominantly liberal in the classical sense of the term, European conservatism is and always has been inherently implausible to most Americans who reject the notion of the state as an organic community, the centrality of the government as the focal point of communal identity, and the inherent necessity of social hierarchy.[33]

Gottfried's distinction between the European conservatism of the nineteenth century and the American conservative movement of

the mid- to late-twentieth century is adequate, but his claims are overstated in at least two ways. First, Gottfried underestimates the radical discontinuity between the Anglophone political tradition, which those like Burke were defending, and the Continental (especially French) situation, which clearly involved those like Maistre and Bonald not in defending an ongoing form of life but in appealing to an already dissolved social order as an ideal to be restored.[34] Contrary to sociological accounts like those of Mannheim, Burke was not creating a new ideology but merely restating and defending a traditional manner of governing that had informed English politics for several centuries.[35] Indeed, Burke was defining that tradition in explicit contrast to what he understood to be the novelty of abstract ideological politics. The Anglophone political tradition, which influenced the American political tradition in a profound and lasting way, was not solely or even primarily connected to a static, hierarchical, and organic view of the state. Instead, it was concerned with conserving Whig constitutionalism, and as M. E. Bradford, among others, has observed, the development of American constitutionalism was unthinkable outside of the context of the English inheritance.[36] So, some sort of non-ideological traditionalist conservatism could have flourished in the United States, although whether it did or not remains an open question.

Given that there was more continuity between the American and English political tradition in the nineteenth century than between the English and various Continental traditions, Gottfried also exaggerates the importance of the discontinuity between the American conservative movement and nineteenth-century European conservatism. After all, according to Gottfried's own analysis of the state of contemporary Western politics, none of the self-described conservative parties in the Western world offers a defense of a hierarchical class structure, established Church, or organic theory of the state. As Elie Kedourie has argued, contemporary conservatism in Britain has little to do with that of the nineteenth century, and neither version has anything to do with historical Toryism, though contemporary members of the Conservative Party are often called Tories.[37] However, judgments

about historical changes in institutions, beliefs, and identities, which are so radical as to constitute new institutions, beliefs, and identities, are not practically normative. Gottfried may be right in suggesting that it would have made just as much sense for Kirk, Weaver, et al., to call themselves Guelphs as conservatives, but since the usage is now common, it is a futile gesture to attempt to score polemical points by focusing on such differences as undeniably exist between the meaning or meanings of the term 'conservative' in the nineteenth century and the eccentric meaning that it has acquired in America.

Gottfried derives his second and third arguments, in part, from his initial argument concerning the irrelevance of the older conservatism to the American experience and also from his examination of the emergence of the managerial/therapeutic state. According to Gottfried, nineteenth-century conservatives derived their influence from the fact that they were defending a viable and functioning social order and had a firm social basis in the structure of political and social life. The continuing success of conservatism in that century was based upon its appropriation by bourgeois liberals who came to accept the necessity of stability and order for the maintenance of the older form of liberalism. In contrast, the American conservative movement was created, in part, as a critique of the emerging managerial/therapeutic state, but, because the older liberalism had already disappeared, American conservatives have never had a social base. Thus, they have been forced to construct an adventitious and abstract ideological justification instead of being able to appeal to the interests of a particular social base.[38] This ideology, which Gottfried terms 'values conservatism,' shared its idiom with the new managerial/therapeutic state and thus was easily compromised and appropriated by some of its opponents, including the so-called neoconservatives who subsequently managed to hijack the movement for its own teleocratic and managerial purposes.

In terms of the genesis of the American conservative movement, Gottfried argues that there was, in fact, a tradition of opposition to the emergence of the managerial state and the centralization of

power that accompanied its existence, but that the considerations that informed this 'Old American Right,' such as localism, suspicion of power, and isolationism, were swept aside by the new conservatives because of the Cold War.[39] Indeed, according to Gottfried, the new conservatism manifests a real lack of continuity with the American past and "reveals far more ideological breaks than continuities."[40] It is also, ironically, a conservatism without connection to place, class, or people. The new conservatism had and "has no social base."[41] This lack of a sense of belonging to an actual community of shared beliefs, practices, and institutions accounts for the constant efforts by the new conservatives to create mythical, legendary, usable pasts in order to justify their participation in the present. Russell Kirk provided the first of these with the publication of *The Conservative Mind*.[42] However, the construction of such usable pasts has been one of the most persistent activities of conservative academics, journalists, and public intellectuals, and it is most often from these various legendary pasts that modern American conservatives have created their peculiar form of ideological conservatism.

Before examining Gottfried's treatment of 'values conservatism,' however, it would be useful to question his emphasis on the social basis of political movements. It is not exactly clear what he means by 'social base,' although it is obvious that he is making an argument based upon some sort of sociological conception of the connection between political ideas and specific social structures. Gottfried appears to be arguing that the disappearance of a bourgeois liberal social structure has made any conservative appeals to the older form of liberalism obsolete, and, of course, since the United States has never had a neo-feudal hierarchical social structure, conservative arguments of a European kind are completely irrelevant. There are two problems with these claims. First, Gottfried's socio-historical argument is incomplete. He is certainly correct when he writes that "it is hard to think of any group that would benefit more thoroughly than self-described American conservatives from the historical-mindedness that they continue to oppose."[43] However, Gottfried is not historical enough, relying instead on static sociological

generalizations about the structure of bourgeois society and the social basis of political ideas without explaining more specifically that the American conservative movement in the 1950s not only did not have a social base but also lacked any concrete experience to be conserved.[44] Indeed, the one tradition to which they could have reasonably appealed—the tradition of opposition to centralized power and suspicion of government, especially administrative government—was ultimately rejected because of their commitment to Cold War teleology. Second, Gottfried again overstates his case when suggesting that the older form of social structure has been obliterated by the new managerial/therapeutic state. The distinction between nomocratic and teleocratic government, which was mentioned earlier, persists in the contemporary language of politics in the West generally and in the United States specifically. For example, most of the words that constitute the vocabulary of politics in America have two unrelated meanings. A constitution, understood nomocratically, is a set of procedures or conditions that define the functions and limits of government action; understood teleocratically, it is a set of aspirations that set the substantive purpose or telos of the whole political community. The persistence of this split vocabulary and its continued relevance to debates about the interpretation of the American Constitution demonstrate the continued vitality of the older nomocratic politics, despite its current eclipse by the teleocratic managerial idiom.[45]

Nonetheless, despite these difficulties, Gottfried's examination and critique of the new 'values' conservative ideology is compelling. These new conservatives began with a feeling that something had already gone horribly wrong with the practices and mores of American political and social life. In the years following World War II as American conservatism emerged as a self-conscious political movement, a miscellaneous collection of American journalists, academics, and public intellectuals were unsatisfied with the way things turned out, not only in Europe but also domestically. The Soviets had occupied Eastern and Central Europe, while socialist governments prevailed in Britain and communist movements threatened the governments of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

In the United States, President Roosevelt's depression- and war-era consolidation of power was not dismantled but instead augmented.

Under these conditions, men like Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, and Willmoore Kendall began a process of diagnosis that attempted to answer the question, 'what has gone wrong with the Western world?' Many of the initial responses to this question, especially those of political philosophers like Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, were genealogies of decline. Whether the problem was historicism or Gnosticism, the values that defined Western Civilization for centuries were endangered by modernity. Further, this conservative critique of modernity appeared to apply to America as much as Europe, and conservatives in the 1950s and 1960s often found themselves in the ironic situation of being accused of being un-American.[46] The conservative response to this critique involved the creation of a great variety of usable pasts, connecting American conservatives not only to the American tradition but also to the European one.

The first and most closely connected with the tradition of Anglophone conservatism was Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind*. Kirk's usable past is unlike those of later practitioners of this pseudo-historical craft, like Harry Jaffa, in that he actually appeals to the wisdom of authentic conservatives. What is unusual about the work is that he creates this usable past not to defend an ongoing social order but to criticize it.[47] Unlike Burke's version of the legend of English politics, which was created by Whig lawyers and politicians in the seventeenth century and was used by Burke to defend an ongoing way of life against a radical constructivist ideology, Kirk's is a novel creation which, despite his professions to the contrary, speaks the language of ideological politics.[48] His appeal to 'the permanent things' is belied by the evanescence of the issues underlining his various iterations of conservative doctrine, and it is just this appeal to universal and unchanging 'values' that Gottfried criticizes as both historically naive and un-conservative in the traditional sense of the term.[49] Indeed, Kirk's insistence on the connection between American conservatism and the larger tradition of both Anglophone and European conservatism has been the least

durable of his arguments. As Gottfried notes, "receiving an Old World genealogy was, for the would-be conservative movement, like picking up a baron's title in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was a nice thing that hurt nobody but brought those looking social status a needed lift."[50] In fact, Kirk was criticized by men like Murray Rothbard and Frank Meyer for neglecting the libertarian strain in the American tradition in order to emphasize the continuity of American conservatism with the European variety.

However, the tension between libertarians and traditionalists became a secondary issue early in the conservative movement. Indeed, from almost the beginning, Kirk's neo-traditionalism and Meyer's libertarianism were subordinated to the single substantive purpose of waging a war against Soviet communism. As Gottfried writes, "although the dismantling of the welfare state was their professed goal, the Buckleyites viewed that task as less urgent than fighting Communism."[51] Buckley's leadership of the American conservative movement coincided with a decided shift from an emphasis on limited government and a suspicion of centralized power, two traditional elements of Anglophone conservatism, to a single-minded support of the mobilized national security state. This permanent warfare state called for repeated attempts to define a set of American principles worth fighting for. It needed an ideology, and Kirk's version was too diffuse and complex to satisfy the need. Conversely, Harry Jaffa's conservative egalitarianism was appealing to Buckley precisely because it was simple, easily communicated, and universalizable, much like the Marxism that it opposed itself to.

Jaffa, who is one of the primary villains in Gottfried's story, offers an account of the American political tradition that serves as both a critique of traditionalism and a justification of the contemporary teleocratic managerial state. For Gottfried, it is the work of Jaffa and others like him that created the primary break between the original conservative movement and the neoconservative takeover of that movement. He argues that "conservative theorists [like Jaffa] have abandoned the sense of a living historical past … [instead substituting a] preoccupation, which is particularly

strong among neoconservatives, with 'abstract universals.'"[52] Gottfried suggests that, with the work of Jaffa, the American conservative movement no longer even maintains the tenuous connections to traditionalism and the Old Right's suspicion of centralized power that was present in Kirk, Meyer, Rothbard, and other leaders of the new conservatism of the 1950s. Instead, Jaffa and the neoconservatives are merely variations within the political idiom of the contemporary managerial/therapeutic state. For Jaffa, the concept of democratic equality is the telos of the American political community. Indeed, contrary to Kirk's position on placing American conservatism within a larger European tradition, Jaffa insists that the founding of the United States consisted of the radical rejection of the English or European conservative tradition, instead "establish[ing] democratic government on universal principles."[53] Jaffa writes that "the American founding … represent[s] the culmination of the attempt … to bring philosophy down from heaven."[54] Jaffa bases his argument on a highly tendentious and ahistorical treatment of the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, which he reads as a kind of promissory note for future generations of Americans. However, there is no historical evidence that the writers and ratifiers of the American Constitution intended to incorporate the first paragraph of the Declaration into the Constitution as the implicit telos of the American polity, and it is an invitation to judicial, legislative, and executive tyranny to suggest that anyone read it in that way. As Gottfried writes, "the "living constitution" proposed by the judicial Left may be a paragon of stability compared to what Jaffa and his numerous disciples are demanding as their moral agenda."[55] In fact, Jaffa's pseudo-historical story about the rise and progress of America's exceptional egalitarianism and his apotheosis of Abraham Lincoln as the martyred saint/philosopher of democratic equality resemble nothing so much as traditional progressive American legendary history.[56] This type of exceptionalism has always leant itself to quasi-religious imagery, and Jaffa's work is exemplary here as well. Gottfried notes that Jaffa's "political rhetoric has become a political religion," and that his "highest value … is an ideal in the

name of which young people are sent to war. Like Marxist-Leninism and Jacobinism, democratic equality is a revolutionary ideal that requires violent struggle to promote it."[57] Thus, Jaffa's work represents merely another form of the modern pseudo-religion of the managerial/therapeutic state, with the government understood as the leader of a political community united in their commitment to a single substantive end. For Gottfried, Jaffa, like the neoconservatives who would follow in his wake, is a modern-day Jacobin offering armed doctrines to the faithful.

Constant mobilization for war has strengthened the managerial state and weakened the residual opposition to the alternative nomocratic understanding of the state. This, in turn, has aided the takeover of the American conservative movement by neoconservatives, an explicitly non-conservative group who support almost every aspect of the managerial/therapeutic state. Gottfried writes:

> Because of their idealization of the "democratic welfare state," their pursuit of a neo-Wilsonian foreign policy, and their adulation of Martin Luther King, Jr. as a cultic figure in their version of American greatness, neoconservatives have nothing in common with the Anti-New Deal Right; nor do they bear much resemblance to those whose views were reflected in *National Review* at the time of its founding … [Instead,] neoconservatives stand closer ideologically and sociologically to the Center-Left than any other group identified with the "conservative" side.[58]

The neoconservatives, like the Buckleyites, are more concerned with maintaining a highly mobilized warfare state, and, like the Jaffaites, are intent upon defining that state in ideological, abstract, and universal terms. Gottfried argues that, "at the heart of [the neoconservative] body of beliefs and feelings is a leftist vision of the world, one in which historical nations are replaced by aggregations of individuals held together by a shared belief in equality and 'human rights.'"[59] Thus, the neoconservative opposition to control upon immigration to the United States should be understood in the

context of their rejection of the importance of traditional, historical communities in favor of some notional conception of 'propositional nations.' Such populations are inherently interchangeable, as long as they learn the appropriate democratic creed. The neoconservatives, like other proponents of the managerial/therapeutic state, understand citizens as abstractions to be manipulated, educated, and cured of dissension from the new civil religion. These neoconservatives still speak in the language of 'values,' but the values that they profess are certainly not those of Russell Kirk or Frank Meyer. As Gottfried notes, neoconservative "conflicts with the Left … are nowadays immanentist duels fought out among the would-be implementers of already agreed-on values."[60] Thus, the ascent of the modern managerial/therapeutic state has resulted in America in a two-party system in which the primary difference between the two parties concerns the emphasis on where government power should expand first and farthest. For Gottfried, there appears to be little room for voices seeking not the next philosopher-king but instead ways that we can limit, in some form, what our rulers do.

Conclusion

Gottfried's critique of the abstract and ideological character of the American conservative movement is quite compelling. He connects managerial/therapeutic politics to the contemporary manifestation of American conservatism by suggesting that, since American conservatism has no natural support among any particular social class in the United States, it is completely unconnected with the historical traditions of conservatism. Although adequate as far as it goes, Gottfried's sociological commitments often undermine the historical character of his explanation of modern conservatism and actually lend support to the fashionable notion that conservatism is merely one ideology among many, instead of representing a rejection of ideological politics. For example, it is not clear that his sociological account of conservatism in the nineteenth century really captures the diversity of the phenomenon, especially the important distinctions to be made between Anglophone conservatism and its Continental counterpart.

Because of this focus on static sociological categories, Gottfried ignores some possible areas of continuity between traditionalist Anglophone conservatism of the nineteenth century and American conservatism in the twentieth century and also misses several of the most important distinctions between these various conservatisms. For example, the internal contradictions, which Gottfried identifies with American 'values conservatism,' present a stark contrast both with Elie Kedourie's account of the historical tradition of English conservatism and with Michael Oakeshott's understanding of the conservative disposition.[61] The English conservative tradition is skeptical, particular, and practical and manifests itself in what Anthony Quinton calls a politics of imperfection.[62] Conversely, the American political tradition, as presented by Gottfried, is ideological, universalist, and methodological. Given the concerted efforts of self-described conservatives to make themselves acceptable to Americans, the conservative movement in the United States has had to adopt these characteristics. This style of rationalist politics lends itself more to a teleocratic conception of government and makes any sort of non-ideological, skeptical, nomocratic politics less likely to succeed in America.

A dispositional form of conservatism might offer an alternative which, while insisting on the inherently traditional character of politics, also broadens the range of conservatism beyond the narrow sociological description of nineteenth-century politics in Continental Europe. Oakeshott suggests that conservatism ought to be understood as a disposition toward a currently enjoyed practice, activity, or way of life. He insists that, while there are all sorts of contemporary activities in which it is perfectly reasonable to reject this disposition, a conservative manner is an appropriate attitude toward a state understood as a non-purposive nomocracy or civil association. However, Oakeshott's dispositional and traditionalist conservatism relies on the prior existence of a traditionalist nomocratic way of governing and thus comports well with neither the American conservative movement's ideological rhetoric nor with its obsession with international crusades for the export of democracy. Indeed, if Gottfried is correct about the complete desuetude of the

older form of liberalism and the practices connected with it in the United States, then his pessimism about the possible emergence of an authentic American conservatism might be well warranted. Savoring the remains of the day is a peculiar and wonderful conservative gift. Even more fortunately for conservatives, at the end of the day … dawns yet another day.

Kenneth B. McIntyre

Notes

1. See, e.g., Sam Tanenhaus, *The Death of Conservatism* (New York: Random House, 2009); and Sidney Blumenthal, *The Strange Death of Republican America: Chronicles of a Collapsing Party* (New York: Union Square Press, 2008). For advice to conservatives about how to revivify themselves and the Republican Party, see Ross Douthat and Reihan Salam, *Grand New Party: How Republicans Can Win the Working Class and Save the American Dream* (New York: Doubleday, 2008); and Mickey Edwards, *Reclaiming Conservatism: How a Great American Political Movement Got Lost–And How It Can Find Its Way Back* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
2. Paul Gottfried, *Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
3. Paul Gottfried, *The Conservative Movement, Revised Edition* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993).
4. Paul Gottfried, *After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Paul Gottfried, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002); and Paul Gottfried, *The Strange Death of Marxism: The European Left in the New Millennium* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2005).
5. Paul Gottfried, *Encounters: My Life with Nixon, Marcuse, and Other Friends and Teachers* (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2009). In his recent intellectual autobiography, Gottfried writes that "I've spent much of my adult life trying to understand those who have marginalized me, but I have done so with only limited success."
6. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 55. In an apposite description of the vicissitudes of political disagreement, Gottfried conveys the character of my agreement with his argument, writing that "it is possible for two value-ascribing and value-interpreting individuals to arrive at the

same practical position for different motives or on different moral grounds."

7. The teleocratic state is the state conceived as an association of individuals united by their pursuit of a common substantive goal or *telos*. The function of the government of the teleocratic state is to manage the pursuit of the purpose. Rules or laws are understood to be merely instrumental to the achievement of the purpose. In contrast, the nomocratic state is the state conceived as an association of citizens in terms of general conditions of conduct (laws) subscribed to when making their own choices about purposes and goals. The function of the state is to be the custodian of the conditions of conduct and thus to protect both the freedom of the individual to pursue particular goals or purposes and to preserve an adequate space for political activity within the larger society. For a discussion of the distinction between teleocratic and nomocratic conceptions of the state, see Friedrich Hayek, *Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Volume 2, The Mirage of Social Justice* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976), 38–42; and Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 185–326.
8. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, ix.
9. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 40. Gottfried quotes Stephen as writing, "I think that wise and good men ought to rule those who are foolish and bad." Despite his reputation as a proponent of democracy, Mill also favored giving the educated elite more votes than the hoi polloi and disenfranchising anyone who received government benefits. See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press World's Classics, 1991), 330–333. For a comprehensive account of nineteenth-century liberalism that stresses its opposition to mass democracy, see Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, trans. R. G. Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959).
10. Gottfried points out that "when Dewey decided to characterize his proposed social reforms as "liberal," he had already tried out "progressive," "corporate," and "organic." Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 13. For an account of the decline of classical liberalism in England, see George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (New York: H. Smith and R. Haas, 1935).
11. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 49.
12. Elie Kedourie, *The Crossman Confessions and Other Essays in Politics, History and Religion* (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1984), 70. Kedourie describes the ideal vision of the planner in this way: "Like virtuoso organists, the minister of the economy, and his learned and

expert calculists, pressing these keys, pulling those stops, and depressing those other pedals produce a happy economy and a harmonious body politic."

13. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 62. For a critique of the supposedly scientific character of social science, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1984), 88–108. MacIntyre writes, "what managerial expertise requires for its vindication is a justified conception of social science as providing a stock of law-like generalizations with strong predictive power … [However,] the salient fact about those sciences is the absence of the discovery of any law-like generalizations whatsoever." MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 88.
14. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 67.
15. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 69. Kedourie made a similar argument a quarter of a century ago, claiming that the welfare state has led "to the coming to be of a mass of clients dependent on public subventions, in whom any sense of enterprise and self-respect, any desire for self-help, rapidly disappears." Kedourie, *Crossman Confessions*, 71.
16. Gottfried, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt*, 4. The best account of the rise of therapeutic social policies can be found in Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
17. Gottfried, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt*, 25.
18. Gottfried, *Strange Death of Marxism*, 140. Of course, this chorus of self-denunciation is almost inevitably an act of perverse dishonesty. As Gottfried points out, "those who express this collective self-hatred invariably exclude themselves from the indictment. It is they who can rise above the cult of guilt by embracing it and by pointing to a future totally unlike the past."
19. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 165, note 112.
20. Gottfried, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt*, 44. For example, Gottfried claims that "more Germans are now languishing in prison for expressing (unprogressive or insensitive) opinions than there were in East Germany before the fall of the Communist regime."
21. Gottfried, *Strange Death of Marxism*, 24.
22. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 139.
23. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 36.
24. Von Justi wrote in the latter part of the eighteenth century that "a properly constituted state must be exactly analogous to a machine in which all the wheels and gears are precisely adjusted to one another; and the ruler must be the foreman, the mainspring or the soul … who

sets everything in motion." Quoted in Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, 209–300, no. 1. See also Geraint Perry, "Enlightened Government and Its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *The Historical Journal* 6 (1963), 178–192, and Andre Wakefield, *The German Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

25. Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 98. To use a hoary example, Jacob Burckhardt claims that, "at the close of the thirteenth century, Italy began to swarm with individuality; the ban laid upon human personality was dissolved; and a thousand figures meet us each in its own special shape and dress." For a more recent example of this argument, see Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 163. He writes that "the majority of ordinary people in England from at least the thirteenth century were rampant individualists, highly mobile both geographically and socially, economically 'rational,' market-oriented and acquisitive, ego-centered in kinship and social life."
26. Claes Ryn, "Dimensions of Power: The Transformation of Liberalism and the Limits of 'Politics,'" *Humanitas* 13 (2000), 4–27. Ryn also criticizes Gottfried for his reliance on sociological, rather than historical, categories, though Ryn also maintains that Gottfried fails to link his account successfully with larger philosophical issues, a critique that I would not accept as relevant here.
27. Gottfried, *After Liberalism*, 19.
28. Paul Gottfried, *The Conservative Movement, Revised Edition* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993). In Gottfried's initial account of the decline and fall of the American conservative movement, he argues that the movement, though initially committed to defending the older nomocratic version of liberalism, had been taken over by a group or groups (neoconservatives and their allies) who were center-left proponents of the managerial/therapeutic state. Thus, the divide within the older conservative movement between 'small-government' libertarians and conservative traditionalists became obsolete as neither group played a significant role in American conservative politics any longer. As a result, Gottfried concludes that contemporary conservatism is not particularly distinguishable from left-wing dirigiste technocratic politics.
29. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 32.
30. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 33.
31. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 42.

32. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 1.
33. For similar versions of this particular argument see, e.g., Bernard Crick, "The Strange Quest for an American Conservatism," *The Review of Politics* 17 (1955), 359–376; and Alan Brinkley, "The Problem of American Conservatism," *The American Historical Review* 99 (1994), 409–429.
34. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, 281–282. Oakeshott actually identifies Maistre not as a conservative at all, but as an exemplary theorist of teleocratic government. Ironically, in this context, the French thinkers actually bear a strong resemblance to Gottfried's account of such American counterparts as Russell Kirk and Richard Weaver in the 1950s pointing to an ideal social past which had already long disappeared. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 35–43.
35. For an examination of the long tradition of English conservatism, see Anthony Quinton, *The Politics of Imperfection: The Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott* (London: Faber & Faber, 1978). For an account of Hume as the first great critic of ideological politics, see Donald Livingston, *Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume's Pathology of Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
36. M. E. Bradford, *Original Intentions: On the Making and Ratification of the United States Constitution* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983), 17–33.
37. Kedourie, *Crossman Confessions*, 40. Kedourie points out that "Conservatism … is at its origin the outcome of a Whig civil war."
38. Kedourie, *Crossman Confessions*, 41. Indeed, one might even say that the term 'conservative movement' is oxymoronic, given the historical suspicion on the part of conservatives of ideological political organizations. This was the central argument that Burke was making when he wrote that "it is with an *armed doctrine* that we are at war."
39. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 3. Gottfried notes that "the social world of European conservatism was not the one favored or inhabited by the critics of FDR in 1930s and 1940s." However, despite the differences between such critics and European conservatives, the 'Old Right' offered a version of conservatism worthy of affirmation. As Peter Viereck argues, "our conservatism, in the absence of medieval feudal relics, must grudgingly admit it has little real tradition to conserve except that of liberalism." Brinkley, "Problem of American Conservatism," 415, no.18.
40. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, xi. Crick writes that the American conservative "must sound reactionary not merely conservative, for he is

attacking an established tradition of behavior, not upholding one." Crick, "Strange Quest," 365.

41. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, xiv.
42. Crick, "Strange Quest," 361. As Crick writes, "it is sometimes hard to think of such a wise English conservative as Professor Michael Oakeshott in the steel and concrete setting of the London School of Economics, but it is far harder to picture Kirk trying to carry the style and understanding of Burke to the students of Michigan State, whose fact and symbol of prosperity is the automobile, not the "fair broad acres" or even the "the small and humble plot" of well-lived land."
43. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, viii. For example, Barry Shain argues that "Straussians avoid history out of principle." Quoted in Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 54.
44. My skepticism about Gottfried's reliance on sociological categories does not involve any suspicion of the Teutonic background of those he cites as influences. Instead, it indicates my conclusion that the German historical tradition of Ranke, Dilthey, Rickert, Windelband, and Meinecke is more relevant to the discussion of the history of conservatism than the German sociological tradition. For a compelling discussion of the incompatibility of sociological and historical explanations of human actions and ideas, see Mark Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 177–218.
45. For an example of a procedural conception of American constitutionalism and a critique of the teleocratic interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, see Raoul Berger, *Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Second Edition* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997).
46. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). See, e.g., Hartz's rejection of the possibility of an authentic American conservatism because of the lack of any traditional hierarchical social order.
47. George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995). The Canadian conservative thinker George Grant offers a similar appeal to a lost past in his work, especially *Lament for a Nation*.
48. For the creation of the Whig legend of English politics, see Herbert Butterfield, *The Englishman and His History* (Hamden: Archon Press, 1970) (originally Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944).
49. For Gottfried's account of the changes in Kirk's 'permanent things,' see Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 3, 4.

50. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 14.
51. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 9. Gottfried recognized this fact in his earlier book on American conservatism as well, writing that "the movement's driving force … was an impassioned anticommunism, which could be and was paired with changing domestic agendas." Gottfried, *The Conservative Movement*, vii.
52. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, xii.
53. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 19.
54. Quoted in Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 102.
55. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 103. Jaffa's claims about equality are not that different from those made by Ronald Dworkin, except that Dworkin's arguments are a great deal more philosophically sophisticated and do not rely upon such an obviously fanciful version of the past. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); and Ronald Dworkin, "Why Liberals Should Care about Equality," *A Matter of Principle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 205–213.
56. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 105. Gottfried observes that "the historical picture drawn by Jaffa … is by no means original and is available in the works of mainstream liberal pro-New Deal historians like Arthur Schlesinger and James MacGregor Burns."
57. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 105, 106. As Kedourie notes, "equality requires … constant and detailed official intervention in the most private affairs, in order for it to be instituted and maintained—intervention which must, in turn, involve perpetual disturbance of existing relationships and expectations, and thus perpetual exacerbation of social tensions … [Further,] the equalizer must be more powerful than those whom he compels to be equal; to establish equality paradoxically demands inequality." Kedourie, *Crossman Confessions*, 74.
58. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 45.
59. Gottfried, *Encounters*, 39. As Claes Ryn writes, the neoconservative "regards America as founded on universal principles and assigns to the United States the role of supervising the remaking of the world." Claes Ryn, "The Ideology of American Empire," *Orbis* (2003), 384.
60. Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 69. Gottfried also observes that "there is … very little that can be found now in establishment conservative magazines that would have offended the post-World War II anti-Communist moderate Left." One of his most apposite examples is that of the acclaim offered by neoconservatives and other contemporary 'values' conservatives to Allan Bloom. As Gottfried writes, "Bloom's

homoeroticism … is apparently not a taboo, or at least not one that renders him ineligible to lead the war against relativism." Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*, 118, 53.

61. Michael Oakeshott, "On Being Conservative," *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*, rev. ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), 407–437.
62. Anthony Quinton, *The Politics of Imperfection: The Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott* (London: Faber & Faber, 1978). Like Gottfried, Quinton suggests that the social changes that have occurred in Western states over the past century or so have made authentic conservatism appear almost anachronistic.