The Structure of Freedom, (Stanford University Press, 1958).

"Politics and Pseudo-politics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," *American Political Science Review* 59 (1) :39-51 (1965).

Strategies of Political Emancipation (forthcoming, 1980). *

During the ascendency of behavioralism in political science, when the combined forces of value non-cognitivism and Weberian rationality threatened to inter political philosophy for all time, Christian Bay offered an alternative. While recognizing the limits of empirical research and the subjectivity of value commitments,' Bay advocated a humanist orientation for political inquiry. He suggested that social scientists eschew the protective blindness of "value neutrality" and think in terms of the political consequences of their research. Indeed, he argued that the "fundamental objective of all responsible social science ought to be the employment of increased insights into human behavior...in the service of sheltering the growth of individuality and freedom in modern society" (SF, 3). The knowledge explosion promised by the advent of improved research methodologies ought to be harnessed to the amelioration of the human condition.

In order to pursue politically significant research while adhering

1. In all of his works, Bay explicitly professes to be a value non-cognitivist. Thus he notes that "there is no such thing as an `objective' approach to basic value issues;" that all values are questions of personal choice or more accurately a "matter of faith." He also rejects the conventionalist justification for values, noting that "Neither logic nor science can establish any authoritative political value hierarchy. Even widespread agreement favoring one kind of value over another does not mean that you or I must accept the same preference or that we must favor the same priorities today that we did yesterday." See Christian Bay, "Hayek's Liberalism: The Constitution of Perpetual Privilege," *Political Science Reviewer* 1:93-124 *(1971)* especially p. 119; "Liberalism: Human Rights and Behavioral Science," *Centennial Review 4:331-353* (1960), especially p. 347; as well as SF, 4.

to a code of intellectual honesty,[2] Bay advocated the "development of a perspective on political inquiry that would relate it more meaningfully to the problem of human needs and values" (PP, 39). He suggested that,

> It is time that the notion of value-free political science be abandoned altogether. Every social problem, the proper subject matter of political inquiry, implies one value commitment or another from the moment it is perceived as such; the clarification of any social problem involves, unless we are deceiving ourselves, a further sharpening of the normative as well as the factual premises from which we wish our inquiry to proceed. (SF, xv)

For this reason, Bay offered an alternative model for the political responsibility of the social scientist. Rather than unintentionally endorsing any prevailing regime by describing it as a "given" or an immutable part of the social order, Bay advocated critical scrutiny of the possible normative consequences of one's research. He advanced two canons of rationality to guide the responsible social scientist in his empirical work.[3] The canon of formal rationality coincides with the traditional means-ends analysis used in social science. The scientist clarifies the objectives sought, indicates any possible sources of conflict or incompatibility apparent in desired ends, evaluates alternative courses by which to achieve the desired goal, and isolates the most efficient means to attain the preferred goal (PP, 41). According to the dictates of formal rationality, the role of the social scientist is that of an observer who can join logic with empirical insights in order to clarify the implications of others' choices of end values and to clarify the factual relationships among possible combinations of

2. Bay suggests that any attempt to completely dissociate facts from values in scientific research must encounter one of two unfortunate consequences: either the research is politically insignificant and as such, not worth the time invested (PP, 41); or value claims are introduced surreptitiously under the guise of "fact." ("Hayek's Liberalism," *op. cit.,* 119-120.)

3. The terminology adopted to describe these two canons, "formal rationality" and "substantive rationality" is not used by Bay. He refers to the first as "the canon of logical consistency" and to the second as the "canon of insight" (SF, 4). I believe that "formal rationality" more aptly conveys the scope of Weberian means-ends analysis which Bay intends for the social scientist than does a simple reference to logical consistency. "Substantive rationality" indicates more clearly than "insight" that Bay incorporates a substantive dimension into his conception of rationality. He suggests that all rational beings will share a commitment to certain humanist goals. This assumption is most apparent in his discussions of psychological and potential freedom. See below pages 31-33.

available means and desired ends (SF, 4). The social scientist always remains aloof from the choice of the ends themselves.

The canon of substantive rationality, on the other hand, "involves articulate attention to questions of fundamental commitment in social and political research" (SF, 4). The responsible social scientist must consider the normative port of empirical investigations. The science of politics must be viewed "as a means, not as an end in itself. The end... is a more effective politics or a more effective promotion of institutions under which all men can live according to their needs." (SF,)(xi). Hence the responsible social scientist will consider the relationship between the empirical study of political problems and the promotion of the good society, a society which fulfills human needs. According to Bay, the proper role for the social scientist is

> to be in the forefront among those who seek to articulate and approve proposals on what ought to be; it is for us to carry on a dialogue on the normative aspects of such proposals and to do continuing research in cooperation with other social scientists and psychologists on their empirical aspects. (SF, xxi)

Adherence to Bay's canon of substantive rationality requires social scientists to construct a bridge between factual knowledge and normative inquiry with the aim of creating a more humane society. Thus, Bay's image of the responsible social scientist is steeped in political activism for he also develops a conception of politics which coincides with the work of ameliorating the human condition.

Bay asserts that "politics exists for the purpose of progressively removing the most stultifying obstacles to free human development" (PP, 50). According to this conception, "politics is an instrument of reason, legitimately dedicated to the improvement of social conditions" (PP, 45). In contrast to behavioralism's equation of politics with power play, Bay draws a distinction between politics and pseudo-politics, reserving the label "political" for "activity aimed at improving or protecting conditions for the satisfaction of human needs and demands in a given society or community according to some universalistic scheme of priorities, implicit or explicit" (PP, 40). Pseudo-politics, on the other hand, "refers to activity that resembles political activity but is exclusively concerned with either the alleviation of personal neuroses or with promotion of private or private interest group advantage, deterred by no articulate or disinterested conception of what would be just or fair to other groups" (PP, 40). Bay rejects as "anti-political" any assumption that

pseudo-politics, "the counterfeit of politics," is the best that humans are capable of achieving. He denies that "politics is and must always remain primarily a system of rules for peaceful battles between competing private interests, and not an arena for the struggle toward a more humane and more rationally organized society" (PP, 44). He suggests instead that politics itself is the instrument for transforming the pseudo-political endeavors characteristic of so many modern regimes into "true" political action. In this sense, politics is the mechanism by which to transform "what is" into "what ought to be:" "Properly conceived politics is the tension between ideals and reality in so far as human collaborative action conceivably can make a difference." (SPE, Intro 3).

Bay suggests that there are certain limits to the transformative power of politics. Political action can eliminate only humanly created obstacles to individual development.

> Political problems differ from existential predicaments in that the former have historical roots and are in principle susceptible to political remedies. Political problems are problems arising from needless damage to thwarting of human lives, health or freedom. "Needless" indicates not only that it is possible to distinguish man-made or society-made (i.e., historical) problems from existential predicaments, but also that damage to human lives, etc., should in principle always be treated as political problems in so far as we are not talking about existential necessities. (SPE, Intro, 4-5)

Thus for Bay, any humanly created problem is a possible target for a political remedy. And where such a problem causes pain or suffering, then a political solution is not only possible, but mandatory. Human suffering, whether physical, psychological, or spiritual, constitutes the moral imperative underlying all political activity. "If human suffering is caused or aggravated by historical events or circumstances, then political remedies must be sought." (SPE, Intro 5) .

According to Bay, the successful achievement of politics' mission requires the active input of responsible social scientists. They must perform the intricate analyses necessary to distinguish political problems from existential predicaments, and more importantly, they must identify the universalistic scheme of priorities which establishes the agenda for the satisfaction of human needs. Bay refers to this facilitating role for social science as a "human rights approach" to politics.

He defines a human right as "a freedom demand that can, in principle, be vindicated for all human beings" (SF, 6). It is a "freedom

that without logical contradiction and without depletion of non-renewable resources can be made available to all human beings with proper political arrangements and policies" (SPE, IV-8). Bay denies that human rights are "natural in the sense suggested by the eighteenth century philosophers.

> The most basic human rights are not "natural" in any traditional sense, for they presuppose either a government able and willing to enforce them or a demand of enforcement directed at some political authority. But it is possible that they can become natural rights in a different sense, to the extent that the behavioral sciences can demonstrate that each right corresponds to a universal human need-a need actually or potentially rooted in all human beings everywhere. (SF, 372)

He also denies that human rights are "inalienable" in the traditional sense: "I do not assume that human rights are inalienable. My position is that it is the task of politics, law, and education to try to make certain human rights inalienable, in an empirical rather than a metaphysical sense." (SF, 76). Thus Bay dissociates his use of human rights terminology from its ontological and metaphysical trappings.

> As I shall be using the term, a rights is a claim, not a revealed entitlement. When I speak of human rights, I refer to' all the basic political claims that ought to be made and supported in behalf of every human being qua human....A human right includes all categories of individual claims (including claims in behalf of individuals or groups) which ought to have legal protection, as well as social and moral support, because the protection of these claims is essential to meet basic human needs. (SPE, IV-8)

For Bay, rights are associated with the immediacy of human needs and it is precisely the urgency of need fulfillment for the sustenance of human life which generates an imperative that governments fulfill individuals' needs.

> I mean to support this claim to the extent of calling it a human right, for all human beings to have their needs met and to make the connecting assertion that it is indeed that primary and the legitimating purpose of any government to enforce, make universal and expand all human rights, within the limits of ecological responsibility. I mean to affirm that human rights must be enforced and expanded according to just priorities. And that just priorities are to be determined...by the best available knowledge of biological and psychological priorities among basic human needs. (SPE, IV-8)

Bay notes that it is the task of the social scientist to determine not only the universality of a particular human need but also the probabili-

ty that the need could be fulfilled for all in light of existing resources, before the language of human rights can be introduced.

> Rights can be extended to all citizens; privileges only to some. This very criterion of "right" makes it in part an empirical question whether a certain desired value is a right or not. To the extent that the resources of an advanced science of political behavior are available, it is in principle possible to state whether a given value can be given to all....To the extent that certain freedoms have become generally recognized as more basic than others, it is for the political scientist to state whether they can be vindicated as human rights or not. If a positive conclusion is reached on the basis of solid evidence, then a free society should be committed to extend this freedom to all regardless of majority opinion. (SF, 379)

According to Bay, then, responsible social scientists certify the existence of universal human needs, verify the feasibility of fulfilling these needs for all human beings and as such, set the priorities of the political agenda. They specify which human problems are amenable to political solutions. Governments utilize this information to enact legislation which guarantees the fulfillment of these needs by subsuming them under the category of constitutionally protected rights.

By resting his human rights approach to politics upon the determination of universal human needs, Bay believes he can escape the value relativism which has plagued recent normative theory. He suggests that the identification of "needs," whether "lower order needs" which are absolutely requisite to the survival of the organism, or "higher order needs," which are essential to the growth and development of the individual, is an empirical problem. Once empirical investigations have established a comprehensive classification of human needs with priorities assigned according to their importance for human survival and growth, this hierarchy can serve as a basic criterion for the ranking of all values (SF, 11). Thus Bay suggests,

> Lines of inquiry in recent psychology and anthropology seem to offer some hope for expanding our knowledge about universal needs, beyond what we have known for a long time about biological necessities. To the extent that this knowledge is expanded, it becomes possible to make categorical statements in these terms about the comparative psychological importance of different institutional values. At the same time we are gaining some fundamental standards differentiating between more basic and less basic human rights or freedoms. (SF, 13)

For Bay, the empirically established hierarchy of human needs

engenders a "natural priority" for human rights. "The priorities among rights must be determined by the hierarchy among human needs in which existence itself must come first and then freedom from crippling violence and economic deprivation. " (LMB, 232). These priorities are so firmly grounded in the universal human condition that they provide a standard against which all political parties and governments can be measured. Thus Bay asserts that "the only acceptable justification of government, which also determines the limits of its legitimate authority, is its task of serving human needs-serving them better than would be done without any government....More precisely, human needs should be served in the order of their importance to individual survival and growth." (NWPL, 241). And this evaluative criteria need not be restricted to use in Western democracies; it provides a standard against which to measure all governments, societies, and cultures.

> Granted that one should have respect for cultural differences, it by no means follows that cultures cannot be evaluated or that standards and values are relative to each culture. For free individuals, standards and values are ideally matters of individual choice. Every person's choice is influenced by his culture, by the great men of various cultures have exhibited so much similarity in values that one must assume that there are either universal human propensities or universal cultural elements or more likely, both. (SF,377)

Bay further suggests that these universal propensities or universal cultural elements give rise to universal principles of justice which are, in principle, recognizable by all people.

> I assume that there are certain principles of justice that are potentially acceptable to all mankind. They correspond to objective requirements pertaining to certain universal human needs and can therefore be claimed as valid, potentially at least, in all cultures. (SF, 371)*

To comprehend fully Bay's vision of the responsible social scientist

4. With such as affirmation of the existence of universally valid moral principles premised upon fundamental human needs, Bay appears to abandon his allegiance to non-cognitivism and to lay the foundation for a moral ontology markedly similar to Aristotle's naturalism. Bay is aware of this alternative metaethical strain in his work, yet he refuses to openly embrace a cognitivist position (SPE, IV-9, 10). For a fuller treatment of the nexus between empirical and normative inquiry in Bay's work, see Mary Hawkesworth, "The State as Liberator: An Analysis of the Political Prescriptions of C.B. Macpherson, Christian Bay and John Rawls, " unpublished Ph. D. dissertaion, Georgetown University, 1979, pp. 107-123.

who discovers the hierarchy of human needs, sets the priorities of the political agenda, and thereby lays the foundation for a universal order of social justice, it is important to explore the substantive dimension of Bay's political theory. For, in the *Structure of Freedom* and *Strategies of Political Emancipation,* he attempts to fulfill the challenge of a human rights approach to politics. He draws upon available research in psychology, anthropology, sociology; and political science in order to construct a profile of basic human needs, to examine the necessary constraints upon individual freedom imposed by social organization and to identify unnecessary impediments to individual development which ought to be eliminated by political action.

Bay's survey of the empirical data amassed by contemporary social scientists leads him to criticize his precursors in "freedom theory" , for providing too restrictive a conception of individual freedom. Both the British Empiricists and the Continental Idealists advanced one-dimensional definitions of liberty. The empiricist approach focused solely on the absence of external restraints upon the individual's behavior; while the idealist tradition emphasized internal obstructions to individual self-determination, such as the "appetites" or the "passions." Bay suggests that neither of these conceptions alone is adequate.

> If the positive definition of freedom in terms of opportunities for individual growth and self-expression is legitimate and necessary, so is the negative definition that equates freedom with the absence of external restraints on the individual. Freedom involves the absence of obstacles inside the individual...as well as the absence of obstacles external to the individual. (SF, 57)

According to Bay, freedom entails not simply the absence of coercion but the presence of the capacity for self-expression (SF, 47-48). And the development of this self-expressive capacity requires a conception of freedom which embraces three dimensions: an internal capability of the individual; a relationship among individuals or between individuals and organizations; and the individual's grounding in a cultural milieu. Bay refers to the first dimension as psychological freedom, the individual's ability to authentically express one's self. The second dimension, which he labels social freedom, encompasses the individual's opportunity for self-expression which varies according to the degree to which others interfere with or restrict one's activity. While the third dimension or potential freedom involves the individual's incentive to express and

further develop one's self which depends upon the extent to which the individual's culture encourages or discourages self-realization (SPE, II-18).

> Psychological freedom makes the individual capable of knowing and expressing what is in him....Social freedom gives the individual the opportunity to express himself in accordance with his inclinations, in so far as they are compatible with the essential needs of others. Potential freedom rescues the individual from becoming the willingly exploited tool of the interests of others and permits him both to be concerned with the development of his own needs according to their own dynamics and with acquiring the knowledge that facilitates their optimal satisfaction. (SF, 371-372)

While elaborating upon his concept of psychological freedom, Bay notes than "an operationally satisfactory definition of `psychological freedom' is impossible at our present stage of knowledge" (SF, 85). Yet, he believes that sufficient advances have been made in depth psychology to provide general rubrics for his discussion of this critically important dimension of freedom. Thus, he explains this capacity for self-expression in terms of a "degree of harmony between basic motives and overt behavior" (SF, 83). He accepts the Freudian conception of the self as a composite of biological drives ("id"), socially conditioned drives or inhibitions ("superego") and a mediating "reality principle" ("ego") (SF, 85). And he acknowledges that every individual must confront conflicts within the self (id v. superego) and hence, devise modes of behavior which resolve such conflicts. For Bay, the psychologically free person or

> the fundamentally integrated personality is the personality in which a successful solution has been found in the conflict between biological drive and social conscience so that a minimum of self-deception by repression or other defense mechanisms has been necessary. (SF, 86)

Bay's criteria for a successful solution for conflicts arising between the id and the superego, the achievement of harmony between natural impulses and social norms, implies a belief that the impulses of the id are sufficiently benign that they need not be excessively repressed or restrained by social standards. The individual should learn to accept the legitimacy of natural inclinations rather than forcibly repressing them. Since there is nothing fundamentally wicked about one's id-originating desires, the individual should not be ashamed to recognize them and fulfill them in socially acceptable

ways. The normative thrust of Bay's discussion of the possibility of harmony between natural and socially acquired impulses implies that the standards which society promulgates ought not to be overly confining; ought not to harshly constrict the individual's natural inclinations. Thus an assumption about the innocence of natural impulses underlies Bay's conception of psychological freedom: the less constraining the social norms, the more likely that people will develop the high self-esteem which accompanies the fundamental harmony of internal interests characteristic of psychological freedom.

> Children who are induced to internalize only the norms that can be integrated with their biological needs and with each other tend to maintain a relatively high level of psychological freedom-and along with it a positive self-esteem, a realistic self-image and self-expanding identifications. (SF, 358)'

Because Bay assumes a natural goodness, he believes that an individual's judgment, informed by benign natural impulses and channeled by lenient social norms for behavior, will culminate in non-destructive behavior. If all people act out their innocent impulses in socially acceptable ways, a harmonious and cooperative pattern of behavior will likely emerge. If, on the other hand, the social norms internalized by the individual are excessively stringent, the individual may develop feelings of guilt toward some of the id's impulses. Unable to accept the legitimacy of these natural motives and unable to deal with the feelings of guilt associated with them, the individual will develop certain ego defense mechanisms which in effect eradicate the problem from the individual's consciousness. Bay refers to this process of repression as a "pseudo-solution" for while it removes the problem from the individual's consciousness, it

5. It is interesting to note that Bay's assumption of the natural innocence of libidinal impulses is not shared by all depth psychologists, although he draws on their works to uphold his argument. Indeed, Freud, the founder of psychoanalytic techniques, held just the opposite view. He asserted that "Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved and who at worst can defend themselves if attacked. Men are creatures endowed with instinctual aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture him and to kill him." *Civilization and Its Discontents, p.* 58. Given this understanding of the natural impulses, Freud endorsed stringent, "authoritarian" norms to keep each individual's instincts in check.

does so at a cost (SF, 183). The fundamental inability to accept oneself as one is (i.e., the very need for ego defense mechanisms such as repression), undercuts the individual's sense of self-worth (PAS, 86) . The resulting lack of self-esteem makes the individual excessively dependent upon the favorable appraisals of others. Hence, in addition to the ego defense needs, the individual now becomes excessively reliant upon social acceptance (PAS, 87). And both of these neurotic tendencies interfere with the individual's capacity for self-expression and self-development for both stimulate the individual to cling to inauthentic beliefs in order to protect an insecure ego and to gain acceptance from others. Rather than "being true" to oneself, the individual identifies or accepts as one's own, the needs, wants, aspirations and beliefs of others. Such "self-sacrificing identifications" enable the individual to substitute knowledge of others for self-knowledge, and to supplant fulfillment of genuine personal needs by fulfillment of neurotic impulses which benefit others rather than oneself. Bay labels this submersion of the genuine self in neurotic behavior an "authoritarian" syndrome (SF, 86).

When individuals are trapped within the demands of neurotic need fulfillment, Bay submits that they cannot see the world as it is; they are blinded to "reality." Excessive reliance upon the judgments and commands of others culminates in the complete atrophy of the individual's capacity for independent thought and action. The concommitant exacerbation of feelings of insecurity and need for approval renders the individual a willing pawn of others' will. Without the guidance of one's own benign natural inclinations, the individual possesses no internal check on destructive action; hence, the lack of psychological freedom poses grave problems for the possibility of social and potential freedom.

Bay defines social freedom as "the relative absence of perceived external constraints upon individual behavior" (SF, 88; SPE, II-23). He recognizes that "no society can give full freedom to all individuals or indeed, even to one individual. The price of social cooperation in the service of joint needs is acceptance of restraints; even a mere physical coexistence in society requires some restraints." (SF, 15). However, he suggests that the extensiveness of the restraints imposed upon the individual depends largely upon the functional requirements of social organization. Therefore, he undertakes an examination of the functional requirements of social organization in order to determine the type and extent of sanctions required for the survival of social systems. He concludes that all

social systems require institutions to insure stability, predictability, and reciprocity in social interaction (SF, 265). Legal norms or laws are required to regulate the permissible exercise of physical coercion (SF, 269). And political authority is essential to provide a mechanism by which to change legal institutions without introducing confusion or anomie (SF, 271). According to Bay, all social systems require the existence of institutions, laws, and political authority in order to survive; and the existence of institutions presupposes the existence of sanctions which always involve potential punishment. Yet Bay insists that the need for sanctions does not imply a need for coercion.

> Institutions imply sanctions, but not necessarily coercive sanctions. Coercion, as I use the term, refers to (a) actual physical violence or (b) the application of sanctions strong enough to make the individual abandon his own strong and enduring wishes.
>
> It may be said categorically that actual physical violence is not a functional prerequisite of all social systems.(SF, 274)

The restraints upon individual behavior required for effective social organization need not include coercion; physical punishment is not a functional prerequisite of any social system (SF, 277-278). Bay suggests that the need for social restraints upon the individual can be fulfilled in two non-coercive ways:

> It seems that there are two apparent alternatives to coercion in the maintenance of social institutions and both alternatives can be approximated by political means. One approach is to try to adjust institutional patterns toward closer harmony with individual inclinations, if the latter are widely shared and widely compatible. The other is to try and manipulate individual inclinations toward closer harmony with institutional patterns. (SF, 274)

Whichever alternative is adopted, the result is a coercion-free society, a society which maximizes social freedom. Thus Bay notes that the

> total abolition of coercion is an ideal that can possibly never be fully vindicated in practice, but it can be approached in practice and is not unattainable in principle. It is not inconceivable that psychologically free individuals can be made to endure willingly all the restraints that an enlightened, self-restraining government and public opinion may impose. A society within which all children go to school motivated by a spontaneous quest for knowledge, in which there are no criminals to lock up and in which reasonable taxes are paid willingly-such a conception strains the imagination but does not surpass it. (SF, 94)

Bay acknowledges that the less society relies upon coercion to exact conformity, the more it will probably rely upon manipulation; therefore, gains in social freedom are accompanied by losses in potential freedom. Bay defines potential freedom as the "relative absence of unperceived external constraints on individual behavior" (SF, 95; SPE, II-27). To the extent that manipulation is effective in regulating behavior, the individual is unaware of the constraints operating upon him, thus the individual unknowingly suffers a loss in potential freedom.

> If it were possible to regulate all social behavior, including motivation, completely by institutional pressures, we would have the ideal type of society entirely without potential freedom, but paradoxically, with a maximal society freedom, since institutions are no longer external restraints if they once have become internalized so **that they govern motives** as well as **overt behavior.** (SF, **264)**

Bay suggests that the internalization of some norms and a susceptibility to some manipulation is essential not only for the existence of social organization but also for the development of individual identity.

> In our daily lives and even for sustaining our individual selves, we need a lot of "unperceived external restraints" on our activities, even on our thoughts. We all need our bearings, our cultural contexts; we need friends, and associates and communities to help us to direct and run our lives; we are all social beings and every healthy person needs to live in close and in' a broad sense restraining association with at least a few other persons. Individuals cannot make it on their own, divorced from all restraining norms and persons. (SPE, II-27)

Therefore, in his discussion of potential freedom, Bay draws a distinction between exploitive and non-exploitive manipulative restraints. Exploitive. manipulation is intended to further the interests of someone other than the exploited individual. And it is this form of manipulation which Bay desires to enable individuals to resist. "I wish to see maximized the ability and potential incentive of every man to resist manipulation, whether institutional or deliberate, in so far as the manipulation serves other interests at the expense of his own." (SF, 97). Bay refers to exploitive manipulation as "special interest manipulation" for it tends to promote or "preserve various kinds of prerogatives for privileged groups, classes or castes at the expense of the freedom and well-being of most others who are aware of no option but to obey and comply" (SPE, ii-27).

And he notes that government and organized religious and economic interests as well as private individuals may all engage in special interest manipulation.

Bay further suggests that to distinguish between manipulation which promotes special interests and that which promotes the public interest implies an "objective" concept of "interest."

> Interest is to be understood in an objective sense. It is assumed to be in a man's interest: (1) to achieve maximum health, physical and mental, and a maximum of psychological freedom; (2) to develop his talents and potentialities toward maturity and achievement; (3) to gain an adequate access to other values according to freely expressed preferences; (4) to have security that circumstances will continue to favor his freedom, growth and value position; and (5) to gain access to information bearing on alternatives of behavior including value choices, that are or can be open to him. Manipulation serving other interests at the expense of his own means manipulation that interferes with one or more of these five basic interests of man without demonstrably serving one or more of them. (SF, 97)

Having stipulated the "objective" nature of the individual's interest and having targeted the kind of manipulation he wishes to minimize in order to promote potential freedom, Bay again undertakes an investigation of the functional requirements of social organization in order to evaluate the level of special interest manipulation required for the persistence of social life. He concludes that:

> One can envisage organizations and whole societies enduring without exploitation by leadership...the general prerequisite of institutions and sanctions does not necessarily entail, so far as I know, the necessity also of some minimum of special interest manipulation. (SF, 336)

While every complex social system does require a certain mimimum of laws and obedience to laws, "there is no general requirement for special interest manipulation to be read into the prerequisite of legal institutions in enduring social systems" (SF, 337). Neither institutions nor laws themselves require special interest manipulation. Bay suggests, however, that it is inconceivable that governments would only manipulate attitudes in order to promote the general interest.

> A minimum of special interest manipulation is an unavoidable consequence of the political-authority requirement of complex social systems. Institutions and laws can theoretically operate entirely in the general interest. Political authority may approximate this ideal, but not reach it, even theoretically. The political authority requirement does not necessitate enduring conentrations of power in a

> few hands, but it does minimally designate certain people to make certain kinds of decisions at a given time. Even if these people are devoted to all their fellow men, it is inconceivable that they would not wish to promote a favorable appreciation of their own leadership, or at the very least, seek to protect themselves against unjustified recrimination. This is the theoretical minimum of special interest manipulation, it would seem, in the exercise of political authority. (SF, 337)

According to Bay, every government will engage in a minimal degree of special interest manipulation in order to engender loyalty, to capture the respect and devotion of the citizens. Yet to the extent that the government is ruling in the interests of the people, it would seem to "deserve" the loyalty of its citizens; hence the special interest manipulation associated with the inculcation of loyalty appears to be very minimal indeed.

After Bay has garnered so much "scientific" evidence to prove that a complex social system requires no coercion and only a minimal degree of special interest manipulation in order to perform adequately its functions, one question naturally arises. If coercion and special interest manipulation are not the functional requisites of social systems, it they are not "necessary" in any sense, why are they a staple of social existence? Bay's response returns to the problem of psychological freedom. Those individuals who lack psychological freedom are the principle culprits in the dissemination of coercion and special interest manipulation. Lacking a sense of self-esteem and a trust in their own capacity to secure desired ends, stripped of the guiding force of their naturally benign sentiments, psychologically unfree individuals may develop a power drive "to mask a grawing sense of powerlessness" (SF, 248). Behavior governed by a drive for power generally culminates in coercion and manipulation (SF, 251-253). Thus, "the power drive or the need to dominate is the kind of power that immediately raises the problem of social freedom" (SF, 298). For this reason, Bay suggests that the key to social freedom lies in psychological freedom: "The better the child has been enabled to preserve his psychological freedom, the less likely is the adult to develop a taste for exerting power over other people." (SF, 301).

Bay suggests that potential freedom is similarly dependent upon psychological freedom. The potentially free individual is autonomous, is capable of independent judgment and is prone to critical reflection. The behavior of the potentially free individual is governed by self-selected standards which promote his genuine in-

terests. Thus Bay notes that "potential freedom, to the extent that it is developed, provides the individual with the basic external requirements for making his judgments realistic or instrumental in promoting his values-namely an increased awareness of facts and ideas that are an objective part of the Ompirical and normative situation in which he acts." (SF, 122). Such an individual possesses "the ability and the incentive to question the usefulness and value of conformity to inherited institutions" (SF, 332). The psychologically unfree person, however, is unlikely to possess the capacity for a realistic appraisal of his situation. For the very perceptions and cognitions which guide the psychologically unfree person's behavior are likely to be serving vested ego-defense and social acceptance needs (SF; 9). And opinions and behavior serving such needs are "impregnable to rational argument or new evidence" (NWPL, 256). Bay claims that behavior dictated by neurotic needs cannot be autonomous; "an ego defensive, threat orientation makes genuine independence impossible" (SF, 359). Thus the very question of potential freedom becomes meaningful only for psychologically free individuals.

> To achieve a high degree of individual autonomy, it is first of all necessary to achieve a good integration between overt behavior or consciousness and the structure of basic individual needs. If a high level of psychological freedom once has been achieved, then the individual's potential freedom is realized to the extent that his needs and behavior are related realistically to the resources and opportunities open to him in the external world and to the extent that he can and will resist manipulative interference with his realistic vision. (SF, 366)

Lack of psychological freedom, then, locks the individual within the confines of ego defensiveness, precludes a realistic appraisal of the individual's situation, and focuses all the individual's attention upon the fulfillment of neurotic tendencies. The behavioral manifestations of these neuroses include coercion, special interest manipulation, and other "anti-humanist" drives. Pursuit of these neurotic endeavors creates the problem of social freedom and precludes the possibility of potential freedom. It traps the individual in a jungle of anti-humanist egoism, for the psychologically unfree individual lacks the capacity for caring for goals and issues beyond the requirements of ego-defense (SF, 100).

Therefore, Bay asserts that the psychological prerequisites for "optimal citizenship," that is, for the social and potential freedom essential to self-determination, include

> overcoming to the fullest extent possible ego defensiveness or being stuck with externalized political opinions. To promote gains in psychological security and in psychological freedom or at least in freedom to form political opinions independently of repressed anxieties about our worthiness as human beings, should be the first aim of human development promoting politics. (NWPL, 256)

According to Bay, the elimination of psychological unfreedom implies the liberation of benevolent and humanistic sentiments.° He tends to assume that all the destructiveness apparent in the world can be traced to neuroses. Hence, the elimination of neuroses constitutes the elimination of harmful, hurtful or "evil" behavior.

> I assume that every person's basic motives are humanistically inclined....I assume man is a social animal seeking community with other men. It is true that competition for scarce necessities of life or institutions stressing competitiveness can throw men into a state of mutual enmity. But loyalty to anti-humanist principles, in general, apart from a perceived necessity for protection against other men is invariably a symptom of deficiencies in somebody's psychological freedom. A high degree of psychological freedom insures the access to consciousness of man's basic sympathies with other men or more strictly speaking, it largely consists in this access to consciousness. (SF, 112)

To the extent that psychological freedom supplants neurotic ego-defensive behavior, it can be expected that autonomous individuals committed to humanistic ethics (SF, 110) and humane political programs (MB, 228) will emerge. Responsible, independent citizens will perceive their primary role to be

> the promotion of the public interest and the public Interest consists in maximizing the freedom for all by way of, first of all, reducing the amount of physical and mental damage done to any human being, deliberately or by circumstances. (V, 838)

Thus Bay suggests that a psychologically free citizenry is a moral citizenry dedicated to the use of politics to achieve ethical ends. He further suggests that the achievement of widespread psychological freedom is not a sociological impossibility.

> It is possible under conditions that are ideal in every respect to envisage a psychological freedom and self-esteem so highly and generally developed that humanitarian benevolence invariably prevails over envious aggression-and a

6. It should be noted that Bay goes so far as to define "humanistic" as "expressive of the basic motives in the individual." He seems to find it inconceivable that a natural human impulse could be harmful or destructive (SF, 340).

> system of social and political institutions so eminently reasonable and solidly rationalized from a humanitarian point of view that conformity is achieved without use of coercion over adult and mentally sane citizens.
>
> For a long time this goal is bound to remain at a distance. Realization of it will be approached, I believe, if it becomes widely accepted (1) that this goal is not a sociological impossibility and (2) that is is supremely worth striving for approximations of it. (SF, 278)

Once Bay has fully developed his three dimensional conception of freedom and demonstrated that the achievement of psychological, social, and potential freedom is not incompatible with the requirements of social organization, he proceeds to identify specific obstacles to individual freedom which ought to be eliminated through political action. Again claiming to operate at a purely empirical level, he suggests that there are three principle types of obstructions to the full development of human beings which correspond to the three dimensions of freedom. Neurotic defensiveness interferes with psychological freedom; violence and coercion negate social freedom; and special interest manipulation of "domination" constrains potential freedom.

As a result of his commitment to the establishment of a hierarchy of human rights corresponding to the hierarchy of human needs, Bay suggests that threats to social freedom from crippling violence and coercion must be a freedom theorist's first concern. "As a political goal, social freedom from coercion has a general higher priority than psychological or potential freedom." (SF, 103). Bay defines violence as "all kinds of existentially unnecessary harm to a person's health or freedom" (SPE, IV-17). And he notes that

> Any person's premature death or disease or humiliation or depression is by this definition caused by violence to the extent that the knowledge and resources with which to prevent that loss of freedom were available but not used. Violence is measured by the harm that is done to human beings. Death tolls and physical disabilities are easier to measure than mental disabilities and many other kinds of losses in levels of freedom; but none are immune to efforts at measurement. And the common sense of political action will not wait for all that research to be done. (V, 638)

Indeed, Bay suggests that common sense will dictate that "the right to life must be the ultimate individual human right to take precedence above all others." (SPE, IV-15). Political action must safeguard the security of each individual; it must protect each person from murder, as well as from grievous harm to physical and mental health. "From a political point of view, the most important

security objective must be the reduction of specific dangers threatening the destruction of human beings or the destruction of what is most dear to them, such as health, freedom and dignity." (SF, 102).

Bay suggests that threats to the individual's social freedom may stem from either deliberate acts of violence initiated by particular people or from structural violence which includes such things as poverty, unemployment and starvation (SPE, IV-17,18). Any threat to the individual's survival must be considered an impediment to social freedom and as such amenable to a political remedy.

Bay's prescriptions for the removal of obstacles to social freedom must be treated under two separate headings: obstructions created by structural violence and threats stemming from the acts of specific persons. To overcome starvation, poverty, and unemployment, the primary manifestations of structural violence, Bay suggests the substitution of a socialist economic system for the irrationality of capitalist production and distribution. He argues that the scarcity characteristic of the modern world is largely artificial and consequently, could be transcended by rational economic planning.

> There is no necessity today for scarcity anywhere in the world, least of all with respect to protein and other crucial nutritional requirements. It is all the more clear that other existing scarcities, especially in our own relatively affluent societies, are artificially produced, and often more perceived than real; they are not a matter of too many people and too limited a capacity to produce. Eventually, if a libertarian socialist society is ever achieved, I anticipate that community life and social relationships will be so enriched that most people's want of commodities to meet subjectivity needs will be radically reduced and result in an end not only to scarcity but to the illusion of scarcity. (SPE, IV-30,31)

Until such time that a libertarian socialist society is achieved, objective shortages created by the structure of the capitalist modes of production will persist; consequently, Bay acknowledges that short term strategies for distributive justice will be required. Therefore, he recommends that the survival needs of all persons in the world be met as a first priority; that each person be guaranteed an annual income; that all major discrepancies in levels of income and property accumulation be reduced by progressive taxation; that all promotional commodity advertising that fosters the illusion of scarcity in order to increase corporate profits be prohibited; and finally, that nationwide rationing schemes be initiated to insure that all shortages are shared on an equitable basis (SPE, IV-31).

Shifting to the problem of deliberate violence, Bay suggests that

constitutions and laws are the safest bulwark against coercion and hence, should be used to eliminate acts of deliberate violence initiated by specific individuals. "Constitutions and laws are the primary instruments of expanding freedom" (SF, 335); they can be used to insure the security and the guarantee the rights of each individual. Bay notes, however, that constitutional and legal guarantees will be effective only if the people in a particular social system have achieved a certain degree of psychological freedom.

> The corruption and brutality or coerciveness of a power holder depend more on his personality predispositions than on situational determinants....Consequently, the best hope for social freedom is the encouragement of psychological freedom by all possible means or the education of a population in which as few individuals as possible have defensive needs either to conform or rebel. (SF, 307)

The removal of external constraints upon individual behavior would then seem to require the creation of certain kinds of people. No one's security can be guaranteed unless all possess particular psychological characteristics which Bay depicts as psychological freedom. Bay admits that "it is still largely a measure of conjecture and sweeping interpretations just how different types of stable social institutions tend to affect the incidence and types of neuroses of individuals in each type of society" (SF, 232) . However, in general it is possible to establish both that anomic breakdowns constitute a real threat to the individual's psychological freedom and that frustration and stress are primary determinants of deficiencies in psychological freedom (SF, 232).' Thus Bay asserts that minimally every individual requires some institutional norms to regulate role expectations in such a way that the individual is not constantly frustrated by unpredictable behavior and precluded from achieving anticipated rewards.

Bay further suggests that since there is a "consensus among psychologists that the earliest social experiences of the child are among the most potent of all influences shaping the individuals's en-

7, One might object that "anomie breakdowns" constitute a threat to the individual's psychological freedom if and only if one accepts all the normative assumptions about human nature associated with a Durkheimian view of the world. And it is not clear that these Durkheimian assumption are compatible with certain Marxist assumptions' also incorporated in Bay's work. For an interesting analysis of the tensions between Durkheim and Marx, see Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie," in *Social Structure and Political Theory,* eds. William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Co., 1974).

during personality" (SF, 60), the problem of psychological freedom may best be dealt with in terms of child rearing practices and education policies. Adoption of child rearing practices which prevent the development of obstacles to psychological freedom would in all respects be superior to the resort to devices for the elimination of impediments after they have developed. For this reason, Bay asserts

> that an educational system propagating tolerant and humanitarian attitudes by no means is sufficient and possibly is not even among the most effective means toward developing tolerant and humanitarian individuals. It may turn out to be more effective in the long run to encourage child rearing attitudes that provide more individuals in the next generation with a maximum degree of security and protection of psychological freedom from as early in life as possible. (SF, 60)

Although Bay is not specific about the kinds of child rearing patterns which would enhance psychological freedom, the "unconditional love of significant others" appears to carry the burden for the prevention of ego defense needs (SF, 166). Without further specification, Bay asserts that

> if homes, nurseries and schools can furnish the soil for the growth of more basically secure individuals, their tolerance of ambiguities in the social world is likely to extend to the point where they are able to live constructive lives even in an ideologically complex and discordant democracy. (SF, 120)

According to Bay, all is not lost if child rearing practices fail to preclude psychological unfreedom. Although a more difficult endeavor, Bay suggests that there exists one potential mechanism for the removal of obstructions to the individual's psychological freedom:

> Perhaps the most fruitful avenue toward strengthening psychological freedom by social and political means leads through devising better techniques for enhancing the self-esteem of the average individual. The problem I am posing here is that of shaping institutions so that they tend to encourage expressions of mutual esteem between interacting individuals and to discourage attitudes and expressions of contempt toward individuals on account of stereotypes about roles of group attributes. (SF, 236)

Here, Bay advances the idea that equality of respect embedded in social practices and institutions may be sufficient to reinforce the individual's self-esteem and thereby break the hold of personal insecurities. He recommends the development of "horizontal

organizations whose members work together as political equals, as partners mutually committed to a continuing dialogue as the basis of majoritarian decisions about ends, priorities and strategies" (SPE, IV-34). Such organizations would intentionally strive to overcome structural hierarchy, to recognize ,the value of each person's contribution to cooperative endeavors and to transcend differences in status associated with the division of labor. Their goal would be to respect individuals as persons rather than as occupants of roles. Hopefully, this institutionalization of mutual respect would offset the obstacles to psychological freedom acquired during childhood. Thus Bay notes that "one of the most challenging research and policy problems of our time is how to institutionalize patterns of mutual respect that are conducive to the growth of self-esteem in all people" (SF, 237).

Bay identifies the third source of obstructions to individual development to be hindrances of potential freedom: manipulation and domination. He defines manipulation as a "process of regulating the supply of information in the interest of encouraging or discouraging certain types of behavior" (SF, 98). And he notes that domination constitutes a form of special interest manipulation which determines the beliefs, values and general worldview of individuals. "Ultimate value choices, moral categories and concepts and the very identity of most individuals are shaped in large measure by the political forces that dominate their lives for elite serving purposes." (SPE, I41). For this reason, Bay asserts that "domination refers to the mode of oppression that leaves the victims oblivious of their oppression. What is impaired is their cultural freedom, their freedom to outgrow culturally prescribed, conventional or ideological restraints." (SPE, II-25-26). Domination precludes autonomy, critical reflection and often, allegiance to humanistic ideals. The individual is so blinded by an internalized belief system, that it is impossible to distinguish

> between authentic liberties whose exercise reflect and facilitate autonomous self-expression, and ideologically manufactured feelings and perceptions of being free, which reflect and encourage programmed and predictable behavior patterns that serve social stability and elite interests. (SPE, I-11)

Thus Bay claims that ultimately

> domination amounts to ideological distortions of perceptions and cognitions, so that words are used and realities interpreted in ways that tend to assure the con-

> timing predominance of the powers that be; **indoctrination,** mystifications and actual fraud are common techniques in the **repertoire of domination. (SPE, III-38)**

From the numerous dimensions of domination characteristic of advanced capitalist democracies, Bay isolates two areas which particularly obstruct the individual's potential freedom, the "myth of democracy achieved" and "commodity fetishism." Bay suggests **that**

> in our parts of the modern world the fine arts of domination have become perfected to the point where the dominated tend to be taught and to believe that they are the masters and they their rulers are really their servants, this is what the **myth** of democracy-achieved is all about and the myth of socialism-achieved serves a corresponding function in state corporate societies today. (SPE, II-26)

According to Bay, the struggle to achieve any ideal necessarily tends to terminate when people believe that the goal has been realized. Therefore, the belief that contemporary democracies fulfill the democratic ideal undermines endeavors for improvement of the existing system.

> Acquiescence in the language of democracy-achieved, the language of democratic make-believe, amounts to support to and promotion of perhaps the single most potent ideological obstacle to political emancipation. A continuing use of the language of democracy-achieved helps to destroy our chances of ever achieving something like democratic self-government. (SPE, III-8)

Bay attributes people's unwillingness to be even mildly inconvenienced for the sake of fulfilling the most basic needs of others to their mistaken conviction that capitalist democracies constitute the highest form of justice achievable in social arrangements. Despite the "fact" that liberal capitalist social systems tend to

> allocate wealth so as to increase the fortunes and the power of a few, while continually increasing the dependency and relative or absolute deprivation of the many, (people continue to believe) that the system is truly competitive and truly fair, that wealth depends on effort and that the losers in the struggle consequently have only themselves to blame. (SPE, II-13)

Because they believe that the system rewards individuals on the basis of just desert, it is impossible for them to conceive that any social or economic inequalities are unjust. And without this fundamental perception of injustice, no action to alter the situation will be initiated.

The second fundamental obstacle to the individual's potential freedom, which Bay identifies, is commodity fetishism.

> Commodity fetishism keeps people subordinated. People increasingly have come to base not only their personal sense of security but their very sense of identity and worth as human beings on their relative "success" in aquiring access to commodities. (SPE, III-19)

People have shifted the focus of their concerns from relationships with other people to the acquisition of things. And this shift of focus gradually desensitizes people to the needs of others.

> People become too preoccupied with consumptive gadgetry and too enamored with their possessions to have much of an attention span left for ethical and political concerns, with the good of their communities and less still with the good of all less favored communities. (SPE, II-12)

Bay cites the most insidious consequence of commodity fetishism to be its capacity to lull people into complacency, to strip them of the ability to even imagine that things could be different.

> The most invidous part of it is that our commodity fetishism is gradually depriving us more and more of our capacity to choose how to order our own lives, individually and collectively...we become blind to alternate possibilities; blind above all to the possibility of trying to build a social order that does not exploit and victimize other peoples so that large corporations and the first world beneficiaries, the relatively affluerilt classes, may prosper. (SPE, III-34)

Bay contrasts the image of the dominated individual whose very wants and desires are manipulated to serve special interests with an ideal of the autonomous individual whose wants reflect genuine needs and who is committed to facilitate the fulfillment of all others' genuine needs through political action. Yet he recognizes that the distinction between "true" and "false" needs, between "genuine" and "manufactured" desires, is not any easy one to draw. In the *Structure of Freedom,* he articulates a faith that "increasingly sophisticated behavioral theory and research techniques will increase our ability to distinguish between genuine and manufactured human needs, wishes and desires" (SF, 327). Yet he acknowledges that this scientific knowledge alone would not be sufficient to transform people into autonomous agents. simply stipulating a hierarchy of basic human needs would not necessarily induce people to "feel" that these are their only needs and therefore, seek to fulfill only those scientifically validated needs. Successful manipulation is

not that easily reversible. Thus Bay notes:

> By definition, people cannot be induced to identify autonomously. All that can be done is to liberate individuals from pressures toward automatic loyalties and to give them information that makes informed individual choice possible. The choice itself, if it is to be autonomous, can only come from inside the individual. (SF, 341)

Consequently, he endorses a number of mechanisms by which to increase the information available to individuals as one possible way to counter manipulation. In addition to airing all sides of an issue, especially those sides representing minority interests, Bay recommends providing individuals with technical information about who would be likely to benefit both overtly and covertly from different policy proposals (SF, 321-323). Enabling people to see the "stakes" involved, Bay hypothesizes, would increase the rationality of their judgment. Bay also recommends that decentralization and the creation of competing power centers might mitigate the pressures toward unreflective conformity by creating cross-pressures. Finally, in the *Structure of Freedom,* Bay suggests that manipulation might have to be countered by manipulation as a last resort.

> Mass manipulation is not necessarily an evil...universal indoctrination in support of very general humanitarian goal values may be valued positively, provided that there is no coercion involved, of even one individual. (SF, 332)

Bay categorically rejects "forcing people to be free," but he sees validity in indoctrinating them to see the world in a particular way.

> In this sense, then, and in this sense only, do I consider "indoctrination to freedom" justified and valuable. It is useful in promoting both security and freedom, I believe, to encourage a consistent bias in favor of protection of basic rights including wide freedom of expression throughout the mass media of communication including the schools. It must be stressed however that this statement concerns a limited interference with potential freedom and not with social freedom. I favor encouragement of certain general attitudes favorable to freedom by persuasion but never by coercion. (SF, 125)

In later works, Bay appears to have rejected this indoctrination tactic as incompatible with his goal of promoting autonomy. In "The Liberal Make-Believe," he suggests that political theorists restrict their endeavors to "clarifying a viable alternative to the conventional pattern of loyalties and to showing up the more glaring fallacies of the conventional approach to citizenship" (MB, 215). If

the political theorist reveals the persistent injustice in the prevailing order and identifies an empirically feasible alternative, then the grounds for an autonomous choice will have been established. In *Strategies of Political Emancipation,* Bay reiterates that it is impossible to

> hold that politics should serve people's "true" needs while ignoring or suppressing their "false" needs. This course could indeed come to vindicate Plato's Republic of Stalin's Politboro. The resolution of this dilemma must be sought in dialectics as well as in positivist social research. We must begin with a healthy dose of respect for people's actual wants, whatever their origin or "genuineness"; in other words with a determination to champion negative liberty, freedom from coercion. To do people good against their will is to serve people badly. (SPE, IV-13)

In order to promote autonomy, Bay recommends radical political education, education designed to capture the terms of political discourse, to provide alternative meanings to value terms which raise questions about the validity of accepted definitions and to challenge conventional usage in such a way that certain "givens" now appear problematic.

> Political education is liberating education that focuses on political problems...education aiming at questioning the conventionally accepted limit situations by way of posing questions about justice and about the possibility of transcending traditionally accepted patterns of domination and deprivation. (SPE, III-37)

Bay now defines the task of politics, political theory and political education to be a coordinated effort to make "oppressive realities problematic" (SPE, Intro 4). For as long as people acquiesce in the dominant understanding of the world, they will have neither the insight nor the impetus to change existing arrangements. The goal then is to

> achieve mastery of key words and on one's own perception of one's political situation as it bears on issues of power and justice. Using the oppressor's words uncritically leads to passive thoughtless political behavior on the part of the oppressed. Learning to use words with a meaning that is valid for the oppressed, thereby challenging conventional usage can initate political consciousness and provide incentives to act in harmony with one's new understanding. (SPE, III-39-40)

Bay cites Freire's conception of the relationship between understanding and action with approval: "There is no true word that is

not at the same time a praxis. Thus to speak a true word is to transform the world." (SPE, III-40). He links autonomy to the correct understanding of reality and the correct understanding of reality to the creation of a just social order. In Bay's mind, autonomy is inseparably related to an egalitarian conception of social justice.

To enhance autonomy, Bay submits that one must eschew all paternalist measures as self-defeating.

> Unobtrusive paternalistic manipulation should be condemned. For it involves one person choosing priorities for another, attempting to program him or her without bringing all the available options out in the open and without attempting to assist the other person through frank dialogue in reaching his/her decisions. (SPE, II-28)

Instead, Bay endorses "fraternal influencing processes which seek to accomplish: an optimal articulation of issues followed by an optimal freedom of choice for each individual" (SPE, II-29). Bay now insists that the individual's ultimate right to reach one's own decisions must be respected. Hence he notes:

> the task is not to make decisions about what most people need, at variance with what they say they need, but to activate public discussion about what is needed; the task is to activate ourselves and one another in continuing discussions of our values and their policy implications...ideas develop in history as in the minds of individuals through rational confrontations, through challenges and counter-challenges. (SPE, IV-13, 14)

Bay is confident that once all the possible social alternatives are aired, once the full implications of policy proposals are grasped, all rational persons will cast their votes for just social policies. Since autonomous individuals are committed to egalitarian political values, one need never resort to paternalist manipulation, one need only provide a complete array of policy alternatives to enable individuals to identify the policy most in harmony with his or her "natural" sense of justice.

Nowhere are Bay's assumptions about human possibility more apparent than in his treatment of the obstacles to potential freedom. His stated goal is to "liberate the intellect to the point where the individual is prepared to question even the most basic assumptions about the meanings and purposes of life and of one's activity" (SPE, II-36). Yet his tacit assumption is that any individual who possesses the psychological freedom and the strength of mind necessary to question the fundamental purpose of his own life, as well as the meaning of society's endeavors, will come to the humanitarian conclusion that the end for both the self and society is the pursuit of

justice. Bay finds it inconceivable that any free individual who accurately perceives "reality" could knowingly coexist with injustice. Consequently, he attributes people's apparent willingness to do precisely this to ego defensiveness, neurotic social acceptance needs, or finally to special interest manipulation. In providing causal explanations for people's failure to pursue ardently his conception of justice, Bay denies the legitimacy of any alternative conceptions of justice. In effect, he claims that there are no rational grounds for abiding what he dubs "unjust": all rational beings must perceive reality as he preceives it; all must share the same commitment to the fulfillment of all people's basic human needs; and this intellectual commitment must impel all to act through politics to ameliorate the human condition.

Bay tacitly builds this substantive content into his conception of freedom. Every effort to eliminate an impediment to individual development is an effort to make the individual conform to Bay's standard of autonomy. For he simply cannot accept that a fully developed human being could act otherwise. Thus Bay experiences no contradiction when he holds a commitment to the "freeing of the intellect and conscience so that the individual can choose his own ideal and commitments freely" (MB, 234), and a belief that "to the extent that we set people fre to choose their own values and their own kind of society to work for...the value of life itself will come to be chosen, most often, as the basic normative point of departure" (MB, 235). For Bay, the values associated with the promotion of life and the fulfillment of needs are the only sane values; therefore, it follows that all sane individuals will choose to live according to them.

In linking psychological freedom and potential freedom to rationality, to the capacity for a "realistic" appraisal of the world and of one's place within it, Bay conflates rationality and truth. He fails to distinguish between standards for appraising the attitudes, dispositions, and procedures of those who hold a particular opinion or belief and the standards for assessing adequacy or correctness of that belief or opinion.[8] He simply assumes that the free individual is

8. Alastair MacIntyre suggests this distinction between truth and rationality: "true" and "false" are predicated of what is believed of statements; the truth or falsity of a statement is quite independent of whether the statement is believed by anyone at all. While rationality is predicated of the attitudes, dispositions, and procedures of those who believe; a person who uses the best canons of rationality available may be rational in believing something which is false. See "Rationality and the Explanation of Action," *Against the Self-Images of the Age* (New York, Schocken Books, Inc. 1971) 244-259; especially 247-249.

a rational being who necessarily holds certain "true" beliefs about questions of right and wrong, of justice and injustice. This assumption that the truth of certain value positions is self-evident to all rational beings negates the need for rational argument to sustain these value claims. One need only concentrate on making people "rational," this is, on eliminating obstacles to their psychological and potential freedom, for when that goal is achieved the truth will be manifest to all.

Bay's inability to accept that rational or psychologically free beings could honestly disagree about value questions seems to flow from his belief that the most fundamental values are inseparably related to human needs which are empirically observable. His failure to recognize the manifold normative components of higher order needs enables him to seek a scientific solution for problems which are essentially theoretical and hence, unalterably "contestable." He never questions the possibility that science can provide adequate evidence to validate the existence of higher order needs, to isolate the sources of need frustration or to identify acceptable means for the elimination of the causes of need frustration at tolerable costs to the individual and to society. Therefore, he has no qualms about vesting political authority in the social scientist. Nor does he envisage the possibility of any undesirable consequences arising from a conception of politics which establishes no checks on what can be identified as an obstacle to individual freedom. Convinced of the benevolence of psychologically free, rational beings, and confident of the vast problem solving capabilities of human knowledge, Bay does not anticipate any oppressive possibilities flowing from a rational humanist conception of politics devoted to the eradication of impediments to the individual's psychological, social, and potential freedom.

The Implications of **Bay's Conception** of **Politics**

Bay asserts that one fundamental value informs all of his theoretical work: "the one basic value adopted here is the commitment to the sanctity of every human life, physical and personal; not only to its sheer preservation but to its freedom, within empirically necessary and ascertainable limits, to grow and develop according to inner propensities and potentialities." (NWPL, 241). The commitment to the full self-development of each individual then, establishes the three essential characteristics of Bay's freedom theory:

> (1) the notion that all individuals should enjoy optimal security and freedom to live as they genuinely choose; (2) the idea that the state is at best a mere instrument to

> secure optimal freedom for all individuals; and (3) the idea that all individuals are equally entitled to optimal security and freedom, so that those tho are relatively less privileged always must have a prior claim on the state for redress; from which it follows that laws which perpetuate inequality in levels of freedom are illegitimate, with no moral claim to be obeyed. (MB, 226)

Bay's endeavor to enable individuals to live as they "genuinely choose," as well as his attempt to establish a priority rule for social policies linked to the priority of human needs culminates in the attribution of an unassailable authority to social scientists. Bay relies upon social scientists to establish a hierarchy of human needs and to determine the feasibility of universal need fulfillment. Consequently, their decisions dictate the content of political action and the substance of human rights. In his human rights approach to politics, Bay systematically substitutes scientific investigation for public debate in establishing the political agenda. To assess adequately the implications of such a conception of politics, it is important to consider three separate questions: (1) Can human needs serve the architectonic function for social policy which Bay assigns them? (2) Should social scientists be accorded such a significant role in determining (a) the political agenda, and (b) the contours of individual development? (3) Should the political sphere be expanded to include action directed at psychological development and at potential development?

The concept of human need constitutes the cornerstone of Bay's entire theoretical edifice. It underlies his conception of freedom, generates a moral imperative for political action, and provides the basis for a moral ontology capable of uniting empirical and normative inquiry. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to submit Bay's conception of human need to critical scrutiny.

Bay suggests that "basic human needs are characteristics of the human organism and they are presumably less subject to change than the social or even the physical conditions under which men live" (PP, 48) . Needs account for the basic biological and psychological unity of the human species and in that sense can be characterized as the human analogue of instincts (SPE, IV-14). A human need "refers to any or all the minimum requirements for every individual's health and well-being" (SPE, IV-12). While needs can therefore be loosely defined as any "urge or drive or behavior tendency whose gratification benefits the organism and the person" (NWPL, 242), Bay notes that this form of definition lacks operational rigor. It lacks rigor in that it would conflate a number of beneficial experiences for the organism, such as fulfillment of desires and wants, with needs. While desires and "wants are sometimes manifestations of

real needs," Bay suggests that "we cannot always infer the existence of needs from wants. Wants are often artificially induced by outside manipulation or they may be neurotically based desires whose satisfaction fails to satisfy needs, or both" (PP, 48). Consequently, he prefers the operational definition of need as "any behavior tendency whose continued denial or frustration leads to pathological responses" (NWPL, 242). One advantage of this definition is that pathological bahavior is amenable to empirical observation and is frequently the focus of scientific investigation. Furthermore, Bay assumes that the "most obviously and grossly pathological kinds of behavior indicate that relatively crucial needs have been denied or frustrated" (NWPL, 242). Thus the severity of pathological response can serve as an indicator of the urgency of the need. One drawback of this definition, however, is that it allows human needs to be studied only by indirection. While

> wants (desires) and demands can be observed and measured by way of asking people or observing their behavior. Needs, on the other hand, can only be inferred from their hypothetical consequences for behavior or more manifestly, from the actual consequences of their frustration. Whenever superficial wants are fulfilled, but underlying needs remain frustrated pathological behavior is likely to ensue. (PP, 48)

According to Bay, human needs are not immediately observable, they can only be inferred from certain pathological behavior patterns. This method for the verification of human needs is relatively unproblematic in the realm of biological necessity. When a person's health is impaired or when one dies from starvation or malnutrition, one can safely infer the existence of a bodily need for nutrition. Similarly when an individual suffers or dies from heat stroke or from hypothermia, it is permissible to infer a need for shelter from nature's extreme elements. Yet when one adopts this method to prove the existence of higher order needs, empirical observation is largely supplanted by intuition and hypothetical speculation. Bay acknowledges this complication: "With respect to needs, there is no easy way of empirical ranking, let alone measurement. Needs are hypothetical constructs. The concept is empirically based, but almost as elusive to the researcher as `human nature'." (SPE, IV-12). Yet he does not admit that the seriousness of this difficulty jeopardizes his human rights approach.

> My position is that all human beings have at least three broad classes of basic needs, only the first of which is shared by all animal species: basic physical needs, community needs and subjectivity needs. Moreover, I shall assume that there is a

> universal hierarchy among these need categories, in the sense that the basic physical needs precede the other two, followed by community or social belongingness needs. **(SPE, IV-15)**

He suggests that the evidence to sustain his position can be drawn from existing social science data. Consequently, Bay's writings are heavily laden with scrupulous references to a wide range of psychological, anthropological, and behavioral studies in an effort to demonstrate the existence of a scientific consensus concerning human pathology which can sustain an inference of the existence of a hierarchy of needs. Although Bay denies that a standard for human pathology is in any sense normative, he notes that due to the nascent state of the social sciences, "pathology can be no more clearly delimited at this juncture than health; nevertheless it would be consistent to characterize at least the following categories of behavior as clearly pathological: (1) suicide or serious attempts at suicide; (2) psychoses; (3) severe neuroses; (4) severe addiction to alcohol or drugs" (NWPL, 243).

While all might concur in the categorization of these phenomena as "pathological," it is not at all clear that this catalogue of pathologies evidences the frustration of specific higher order needs for social belongingness or for self-actualization. Before one can make a direct link between suicide, psychoses, neuroses or addictions and a need for a sense of membership in a community br a need for the full development of one's potential, one must make a host of assumptions about "normal" or "appropriate" human behavior which are normative rather than empirical. One can infer a need for social belongingness from pathological behavior only if one has already developed a speculative causal network which connects the frustration of a particular need with a particular pathological response. But then one is postulating the existence of a need and hypothesizing about the relationship between that need's frustration and a behavioral response. When one examines empirical data, one seeks evidence to sustain one's hypothesis. But any such "evidence" cannot provide independent documentation of the existence of the postulated need for the process is circular. For example, the depiction of the authoritarian syndromes"characterized by the inability of the individual to give expression to some of his own basic motives" (SF, 86) as a manifestation of psychological unfreedom is possible only after one has established an ideal of psychological freedom with all its attendent assumptions. One can recognize the pathology dubbed "authoritarianism" only when juxtaposed against a model of health. And this normative model of mental health logically cannot emerge simply as the additive inverse of the observation of pathology. It is a postulate or

an ideal which precedes and informs one's recognition of pathology. Consequently, this normative postulate cannot be independently verified by evidence drawn from in inferred from the existence of the pathology which it informs. Bay cannot infer the existence of psychological needs for self-esteem and an integrated personality from the existence of the authoritarian syndrome because his classification of that personality syndrome as pathological makes sense only after one presupposes both the existence of these needs and a particular mode of their frustration. In the absence of Bay's normative assumptions about the most fundamental psychological needs, the "authoritarian personality" could just as well be depicted as a manifestation of a healthy deference to the wisdom of one's elders and to the social wisdom embodied in cultural norms and traditions.

The problem with Bay's formulation is that every need he identifies beyond the functional requirements of the physical organism reflects normative assumptions about human possibility. He does not restrict himself to empirically verifiable needs, but engages in a form of specula ¯ tion which has all the characteristics of a philosophical anthropology which he admits himself to be beyond the realm of empirical proof. If he is to restrict his political prescriptions to the fulfillment of empirically certifiable needs, Bay cannot move beyond the physical needs of the human organism. And the satisfaction of the scientifically established basic human needs is not equivalent to the full self-development of each individual.° A political agenda established by these priorities must fall far short of establishing Bay's conception of the good life, the full liberation of human potential. Thus to the extent that Bay wishes to provide an empirical basis for political values and for human rights, the scope of that undertaking must be drastically curtailed.[10] If he prefers to keep

9. Marvin Zetterbaum has written two essays on the question of the relationship between human needs and political action; "Equality and Human Need," *American Political Science Review* 71: 983-998 (1977) and "Self and Political Order," *Interpreta ¯ tion 1(2):* 233-246 (1970). In both articles, he suggests that the conception of "human needs" cannot carry the burden which some theorists assign it. He questions the very existence of universal human needs, suggesting that needs themselves may be a function of social conditioning. Thus he notes: "If man is a social being, if what he is depends on social setting, then, it is difficult to speak of basic human needs as if these constituted a core external to and impervious to social penetration. Nor can the apparent ambiguity be resolved by defining basic human needs as formal requirements whose substantive content may be variously filled in different societies." ("Self and Political Order," p. 243)

10. For this reason, William Connolly has suggested that "Bay's theory of needs provides a very partial and precarious theoretical basis for the set of rights he seeks to vindicate...if we were to confine ourselves to arguments which tie human rights to needs, the set of rights sustained might be meagre indeed." "Comments on Bay," *Inquiry* 14: 237-243; p. 238-239.

his expansive list of needs and demands the protection of their corresponding rights; he must drop his claim to deal only with empirical questions. He must find an alternative justification for his human rights approach.

The authority which Bay accords social scientists is intimately connected with his attempt to resolve normative questions by empirical means. He suggests that they possess a certain expertise which qualifies them to play a key role in settling political questions. Since political questions focus upon the fulfillment of human needs, Bay suggests that the social scientists' capacity to certify the existence of universal human needs and to determine which of these needs can be universally fulfilled without depleting irreplaceable natural resources lends them a "natural" authority to set the priorities for the political agends. It is the empirical knowledge which social science can contribute to political decision making which justifies placing the social scientist in the role of decision maker.

Bay's proposal to assign social scientists this key political role hinges on the acceptance of his normative definition of politics and on his empirical conception of human needs. The distinction which Bay introduces between politics, the activity to improve or protect conditions for the satisfaction of human needs, and pseudo-politics, the activity to alleviate personal neuroses and to promote private interests at the expense of public interests, turns on his assumption that all psychologically free people are public spirited and concerned with justice. If one shares Bay's belief that it is inconceivable for a psychologically free person to tolerate human suffering, for a potentially free person to fail to act politically to eliminate any obstacles to others' freedom, or for a rational person to disagree with the values Bay believes to be self-evident; then one may agree that politics must be, moral action to expand each individual's full freedom. For this reason, one might find it reasonable to draw upon the expertise which social science can afford to isolate all sources of human suffering in order to provide political remedies. Yet if one questions any of Bay's normative assumptions about the nature of politics, of freedom, or or rationality; then the authoritative role of the social scientist will also appear problematic. For instance, it is quite conceivable that one could share Bay's basic moral premise that all human needs ought to be fulfilled while categorically rejecting politics as the appropriate means to this end. [11] It is equally con-

11. Hannah Arendt argues that fulfillment of basic needs is "prepolitical" in the sense that it refers to the realm of necessity which must be transcended before politics qua politics can emerge on the human scene. She claims that when economic questions such as these impose themselves on the political agenda, freedom is necessarily undermined. *The Human Condition* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958).

ceivable that one could accept Bay's conception of politics, yet reject his claim that higher order needs are empirically verifiable and consequently reject the role he assigns to social scientists. If one accepts that all higher order needs are informed by a normative ideal of human possibility, which is, in principle, unfalsifiable; then there is no reason to accord the social scientist a special political authority.

Indeed, if one takes seriously certain of Bay's claims about the importance of political participation for the development of the individual's full humanity, then one has yet another ground for the rejection of the social scientist's authority.[12] For to the extent that social scientists set the political agenda, they preempt the possibility for people to achieve the full development which political participation could afford. If scientific investigation establishes all political priorities, then mass participation could at best rubber stamp that decision. And such deference to scientific authority scarcely resembles the critical judgmental capabilities which Bay desires in his autonomous citizenry."

Perhaps Bay would retort that social scientists are needed to guide political action only through the transitional phase from pseudo-politics to politics. The political task of the social scientist is simply to create the preconditions for political existence, that is, to raise the political consciousness of the citizenry. Thus Bay notes that "optimal political development requires optimal human development

12. Bay is somewhat ambivalent about whether or not the "need" to participate in politics can accurately be called a "need;" hence, he notes toward rational political self-determination." ("NWPL", p. 257) Yet whether or not called a "need," participation in political action to eliminate injustice is essential to the full realization of one's humanity, according to Bay. "To become fully human, a constant tendency to be revolted by and to rebel against injustice is required." (Christian Bay, "Political and Apolitical Students: Facts in Search of a Theory," *Journal of Social* Issues social conscience can bring an individual to full life as a human being." (Bay, "Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass Society," in *Political Theory and Social Change* (ed.) David Spitz (New York, Atherton Press, 1967), p. 177.

13. In *Strategies of Political Emancipation,* Bay designates "science and the whole retinue of experts and professionals all of whom are thought of as qualified specialists in knowing what is best for the rest of us" as one of the two "heavy hands" which hold back cultural or potential freedom (SPE, III-21; the other is "tradition.") Yet in this same work, Bay reiterates the need for scientific determination of basic human needs to sustain a human rights approach to politics. Thus Bay seems to be trapped in a classic Catch-22 situation: To reject the social scientist outright would undermine this entire human rights approach to politics; to accord the social scientist the role of mediator between the "ought" and the "is" would undermine his goal of individual self-determination.

towards responsible citizenship" (NWPL, 257). The duty of the social scientist is to promote optimal human development which in Bay's scheme appears to entail the creation of a lasting predisposition to act justly in each citizen. The social scientist's goal would be to create a distinctly "political" way of being human for each individual which involves the development of both personal abhorrence of injustice and an unswerving readiness to act to eliminate all human suffering. Once such an autonomous citizenry had been created, the social scientists would happily retire, their work complete. This possibility raises the question of the desirability of according social scientists a role in determining the mode of individual development For if social scientists have the power to define obstacles to development and the means to eliminate these obstacles, then it is clear that they will largely be determining the kind of persons which individuals become. If Bay accords to social scientists the role of overseer of the transition, he will in effect strip "self-development" of all intelligible meaning. Bay arrives at this unfortunate juncture because he fails to distinguish between the possibility for empirically establishing the biological requirements for human existence and the impossibility of certifying "objective" higher order needs devoid of normative content. He unintentionally equates individual self-expression and self-determination with a substantive definition of autonomy. His willingness to designate all behavior which varies from his norm of public interested devotion to the elimination of injustice as "pathological" or "neurotic" strips the individual of possible rational justification for his behavior. Rather than recognizing that free individuals may choose to do evil as well as good, to develop into tyrants as well as saints; Bay creates a system in which those who choose values different from his own will be subjected to therapy rather than toleration or punishment. Thus, he denies those who choose to be different the status of rational agents by insisting that their psychological unfreedom precludes responsible choice. [14]

14. P.H. Nowell-Smith deals with the problem of the relationship between neuroses or subconscious drives which "determine" behavior and the possibility for free or responsible choice in "Psychoanalysis and Moral Language." He concludes that "psychological causes for my believing something are irrelevant to the question whether I have good reasons for believing it;" hence, the conception of "being responsible" need not be undermined by an understanding of psychology, Bay's hasty slide from psychological unfreedom to therapy stems from his inability to distinguish between two separate levels of analysis: between psychological causes and reasons for holding a belief. Nowell-Smith's essay appears in *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ed.)* May Brodbeck (New York, Macmillan, 1968), pp. 711-719.

Bay's conception of politics as activity which eliminates impediments to social, psychological, and potential freedom vastly expands the realm of legitimate political action overriding the distinction between public and private spheres. Whether the priorities of political life are set by ,knowledgeable social scientists or by autonomous citizens after debate and vote, virtually no area of individual life is immune from public policy. If the individual's belief system bears the mark of "psychological unfreedom" it can be eradicated by therapeutic measures upon public proclamation. If the individual's conception of full self-development is at odds with the public norm of autonomy, the individual can be subjected to "fraternal influencing" or "radical political education" in order to "free" his intellect.

In his zeal to advance a comprehensive definition of freedom, Bay too readily overlooks the possibility for oppression which flows from a conception which makes the individual's psyche and potential a matter of public policy. He seems to believe that a system designed to promote maximal freedom and individual autonomy will not be likely to betray its trust. But what he fails to realize is that his own tacit assumption that all free individuals will develop according to the same model, will cherish the same humanistic values and will adhere to the same political doctrines, itself threatens free self-determination. For one cannot simultaneously promote free self-expression and expect all to express the same beliefs; one cannot promote free self-determination and expect an identity of interests, indeed, a shared perfection to emerge in the populace. It is not Bay's commitment to freedom which threatens his ideal political system but his tacit equation of freedom with virtue.

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