Sexual Differences in Political Behavior*

This review discusses three major topics: Political Behavior; Feminist Critique; and Conventional Politics. First we examine the model of political sex roles, constructed by and for males, that constituted the paradigm of "political behaviorism" in political science during the 1950s and 1960s, and that continues to be accepted by, and the focus for, the professional research and teaching of a plurality of middle-aged (i.e. 45 years and older) male political scientists. This conventional model of political behavior is the one that continues to predominate in the thinking of most male politicians and political journalists and historians, and certainly of those who are age-mates of the political scientists specified above. This "Old-Boy" ideology of how politics is and ought to be practised has come under increasing criticism from feminists, however; and so our second major topic is the feminist critique of the conventional model of politics, in terms of both male and female predispositions and behaviors in its conventional practice (e.g., voting, campaigning, office holding). (In a companion article appearing elsewhere [Schubert, forthcoming a], I discuss half a dozen research questions that look to the future rather than the past, and are concerned with more unconventional aspects of sexual politics.)

The discussion here is based primarily upon the research and writing of female American political scientists, about recent and contemporary political behavior in the United States. Because of the overwhelming bias in favor of nurture-over-nature that has

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permeated the training and thinkng of political scientists during past generations and that still predominates (Davies, 1982; Caton, 1982; Schubert, 1975, 1976, and forthcoming a: section 1), the theory and data discussed below are based almost entirely upon recent human culture, as distinguished from our species biology, genome, and extraordinary potentiality for epigenetic change through development and learning (Waddington, 1975; Sagan, 1977; Shepard, 1978; Schubert 1985b, 1986). Only quite recently have some political scientists begun to pay serious attention to the biology of human sexuality as a crucial substrate of political behavior, so an integrated biocultural perspective on human sex differences in political behavior is largely a task for future scholarship to undertake (but see Watts, 1983b; and Schubert, forthcoming a) My deliberate overemphasis on human culture in the present review is balanced by my emphasis on biology earlier (Schubert, 1983c).

Political Behavior

Conventional Politics

The theory of politics that long was most widely accepted in political science focused upon the historical description of formal governmental institutions and their legal processes. Political philosophy was based upon the writings of (almost invariably) men, who had commented on the politics of their own times over the course of the two dozen centuries immediately preceding the twentieth, and raised questions about how government should be organized and run. These traditional concepts of American politics, rooted in the academic disciplines of the humanities, were the basis for the paradigm with which political science began in the United States a century ago; and it remained that until after the end of World War II (Schubert, 1966, 1967, 1983a).

The beginnings of political behaviorism can be traced to the first decade of this century and there was a substantial extension of interest in it following World War I; but not until about 1950 did behavioral science begin to exert a major impact upon the study of politics (see Graham and Carey, 1972). The behavioral approach signified the reorientation of political science toward the social sciences (especially sociology, cultural anthropology, and social psychology), together with a methodological shift toward quantification, statistics, and computer technology. Political behavior

thus became defined in terms of people outside of the traditional core of government plus the two major political parties; it focused on *individual* members of either political masses such as electorates, or of political elites such as legislators or the lobbyists who sought to influence their behavior. Nineteenth century theories of liberal democracy metamorphosed into mid-twentieth century theories of pluralism, with competition among interest groups the new deus ex machina. Behavioralism impelled its practitioners to examine, in terms of socioeconomic status, the roots of the choices of voters (especially in nationwide Presidential elections) and of elite political leaders. Students of political socialization undertook to understand the political attitudes and partisan preferences of adults by investigating how political cultures (through the public schools) condition the learning of eight year olds. Samples of political masses and elites alike were interviewed by survey researchers probing the respondents' explanations for their past participational decisions or their predispositions toward decisions to be made in the proximate future (see Schubert, forthcoming b).

In terms of the role theory developed by social psychologists, political scientists assumed that political actors played roles, thereby conforming (more or less) to the expectations of others. Such roles putatively were organized in systems; and acceptable theory had to be empirical and operationalized as well as systematic. Relationships between governmental actors and their informal clientele groups also were conceptualized in systemic terms; individual actors compared themselves (or were compared by political analysts) to appropriate reference groups. The voting of individual decision-makers became (or was) assimilated to that of others voting similarly as members of a common group or bloc. The rationality of such choices was appraised by models based on game theory, or other facets of econometric theory; and rationality was presumed to be defined by self-interest, as determined by the parameters of socioeconomic status (such as class). On the other hand it was recognized that such attributes as ethnicity, religion, and even political party identification, often are inconsistent with socioeconomic class interest, thereby creating cross-pressures for individual decision-makers (whether mass or elite) and complicating both the rationality of choice for them, and the prediction of their behavior. Political psychology, following the early lead of one of the most precocious and most important political scientist behavioralists (Lasswell, 1930), pursued a basically neo-Freudian line in its ex-

ploration of the personality of elites, and of the alienation and anomie that were presumed to explain such non-conformist voting behavior of the masses as nonparticipation. These were the major components of political behaviorism, as it came to preempt the attention, interest, and activities of the most active leaders of the profession of political science during the 1950s and 1960s (Eulau, 1966; Jaros and Grant, 1974; Gianos, 1982).

Little was said about the political behavior of women[1] because the model of politics explicit in political behaviorism remained faithful to the model of legal sex roles ordained by English common law. In terms of that model, according to Blackstone's authoritative commentary, husband and wife are in law one person: the husband (and see Sapiro, 1982b). In the conventional political model, so also is the political world a man's world; therefore, political behavioralism describes a man's game. A leading spokesperson for political feminism, Virginia Sapiro (1981b: 712), concedes that "the empirical truth at this moment is that politics is a male domain." The conventional political model clings tenaciously to the coattails-one can hardly say, in this situation, to the petticoats-of eighteenth century legalism, long after the law itself has significantly changed in the direction of liberating women from their previous statuses of both legal dependency and legal incompetence.

This raises the question how such a model can be useful in illuminating the relatively rapid changes taking place in regard to political sex roles in America during the twentieth century? Those changes were accelerating at the very time that political behaviorism was emerging as the dominant paradigm in political science during the 1950s and 1960s.

Unconventional Politics

The predominance of the political behavioral approach began to dissipate in the late 1960s, largely due to the impact of the *unconventional* (that is, contrary to the conventional model) political behavior of that era, involving marches and many other activities to

1. There were a few exceptions, of course, and the most important grew out of an interest and concern with the political education of children. In particular, there was the work on political socialization of Kent Jennings (e.g., Jennings and Thomas, 1968; Jennings and Langton, 1969; Jennings and Niemi, 1971, 1974, 1981; Beck and Jennnings, 1975; Jennings and Farah, 1981).

protest racial inequities (Blumberg, 1980), such as riots in the megalopolitan ghettos; and opposition to the Vietnam War and the political radicalization of a college generation of American students. These developments were reflected in the rise of dissident groupings within the political science profession: a black caucus, then a women's caucus, Marxist groups, anti-Vietnam activists, and others that joined to promote what became known as the Caucus for a New Political Science. There were even a few years, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the rudiments of a two-party system began to appear within the American Political Science Association. However, the fleeting promise of organizational democracy soon disappeared, leaving political scientists to be governed by the same system, of a self-perpetuating oligarchy of old boys with the right school ties, that otherwise had operated throughout this century. Needless to add, the first female President of the American Political Science Association, like the first female President of the United States of America, has yet to be elected.

During the past dozen years or so, there have been various dissenting critics of the conventional model, including anti-Vietnam radicals, pacifists, futurists, Marxists, blacks, women, and proponents of biopolitics (Bay, 1965; Easton, 1969; Wahlke, 1979). The discussion here, however, is confined almost exclusively to the feminist critique.

The Male Model

Latter-day studies in political behavioralism (i.e., those published during the 1970s and subsequently) often discuss sexual differences in political behavior, especially in regard to political socialization and political participation. Verba and Nie (1972), for example, report the analysis of 1967 survey data for a national sample, on the basis of which they generate a typology, including "passive citizens" who are relatively inactive politically. This class includes such "groups" as those with lower social status, i.e. blacks, the young, and to a lesser extent, women. Men, conversely, are said to tend to be "campaigners" to a greater extent than are women, who are also linked with lower education and income groups, older citizens, Catholics, and big-city dwellers. Men tend to *belong* to at least one organization, to a greater extent than do women although there is no difference between the proportions of men and of women who are *active* in at least one organization. Nevertheless, Verba and Nie

lump women-on the grounds of organizational affiliation-with blacks, and the young or old (as distinguished from middle-aged) Their regression analysis depicts women as low in every one of their five dimensions, including voting, campaigning, communal activity, particularized contacting, and overall participation. As a result, women are characterized, on the basis of the quantitative description in the Verba and Nie study, as conforming very well in their political behavior to the role in which they are cast by the conventional model.

The Use of Models

All models abstract from empirical phenomena in a highly selective manner, and they are useful precisely to the extent that they direct the attention of their users to certain facets of what might be observed, while specifying that other potential information-inchoate data (Coombs, 1964)-is to be ignored. Indeed, quantum theory (in modern physics), cognitive and social psychology, and psychobiology coalesce to instruct us that nothing is capable of being perceived by humans except in terms of the neural templates (schemata) of preconceptions that have become "hardwired" as the recallable reflections of reinforced past experience-the neurobiological equivalents of Proust's "Remembrances of Things Past" (Livingston, 1978; Peterson, 1982, 1983; Graber, 1982; Schubert, 1982, 1983a, 1983b). As Einstein once remarked to Werner Heisenberg, "it is the theory which decides what can be observed." Therefore, by failing to include sex as an important biosocial parameter in terms of which variations in political behavior could be expected to be observed, the conventional political model in effect put blinders on a generation of political scientists-my own generation-at the very time in human herstory when, for the first time, such observations would have been important to more accurate description and better understanding of political behavior.

Feminist Critique

Sex-Role Stereotyping

Lydia Drake was among the handful of young women at Oberlin College who were America's first coeds. About 1840 she composed a

draft speech containing the standard arguments employed then-and still invoked by some sexist stalwarts even today-to keep women out of politics. She listed forty propositions, of which only the first three (and then only in part) are reproduced here. The problem with the human female is that:

1. Her mind is inferior to that of man, and we know that it takes the strongest of minds to become a good politician ... .
2. It is beneath her dignity ... .
3. She has no right to vote .. .

For the rest of these and for the other propositions, see Lerner (1977: 339-41) .

Almost an hundred and thirty years later, Kate Millett (1969) published what already has become a classic critique of the politics of human sexual discrimination, primarily in the context of the degradation of women in the treatment of reproductive behavior in the literature of Western, industrialized societies since 1830. But the major topic of one of her chapters is an analysis of mid-twentieth century ideology, in which she discusses first the figuratively sexist stance, accompanying their notoriously literal preoccupation with sex, of the Freudians and post-Freudians (see Sulloway, 1979) . Then Millett turns (1969: 220-33) to what is known in social science as functionalist theory, which purported to provide the basis for objective, value free analysis of social structure.

In functionalism's measurement of differences between men and women, "every form of passivity and aggression in sex-linked behavior is tested continuously, yet little thought is given :. to [its] causality." Thus (Millett, 1969: 222) :

> Each of the social disciplines contributed to re-establishing and then maintaining a reactionary status quo in sexual politics, each through its own method of reasoning: anthropologists might study cross-cultural divisions of labor and ascribe them to a fundamental biological source, while sociologists, in announcing they merely recorded social phenomena, gradually came to ratify them by noting that nonconformist behavior is in fact deviant and produces "problems." The psychologist, in deploring individual maladjustment to social and sexual role, finally came to justify both as inherent psychological nature, fundamental to the species and biological in essence.

As an example, Millett (1969: 229-31) discusses an inventory of sex-linked psychological traits promoted by the leading sociologist Or-

vi1le G. Brim, Jr., who assigned to males instrumental roles, and to females expressive ones (but see section 4 of Schubert, forthcoming b). The male role is characterized as tenacious, aggressive, curious, ambitious, playful, responsible, original, competitive, and self-confident, but also as involving the incongruent traits of dawdling and procrastination, and of wavering in decision. The female role presumes the expression of affection, obedience, responsiveness to sympathy and approval ("from adults" [sic]), speedy recovery from emotional disturbance, cheerfulness and kindness, and friendliness to both adults and children; but it includes also anger, quarrelsomeness, revengefulness, teasing, extrapunitiveness, insistence on rights, exhibitionism, uncooperativeness with others in a group, jealousy, being upset by defeat, negativism, and tattling. Thus to the male is assigned "every virtue of human rationality," including most of the traits valued by the societies that males dominate; while to females are ascribed "every conceivable vice of character." The underclass status of females is cued by the attribution to them of the "more genial human traits," plus the nutritive ones that will help to assure proper caretaking of upperclass males. Millett points out that:

> To arrive at the political implictions . . . one has only to exchange [these sex-linked] catagories with other political classes. Were one to substitute black and white for male and female, one would have a perfect picture of both the expectation and the assumed conditions of a racist society. The obedience and good nature white expects from black would be accounted for, as well as white's dismay to find it accompanied with vengefulness, anger, and a refusal to co-operate. The same holds true of aristocrat and peasant; the former typically fancying himself an intellectual governor and seeing in the latter a warm and jovial servant, but one, alas, given to surliness, petty dodges, . . and frequent insubordination. The [dichotomy] just as adequately reflects the good and evil of capitalistic ethics; superiority and intellect on the side of the winning team and greedy spite on the other.

Millett concludes (1969: 232) that "sociology examines the status quo, calls it a phenomen[on], and pretends to take no stand on it, thereby avoiding the necessity to comment on the invidious character of the relationship between the sex groups it studies." But in this regard, political scientists generally, and political behavioralists in particular, have been no different than other social scientists. Shabad and Andersen (1979: 21), for example, point out that "political science as a discipline has demonstrated certain biases such that whatever attributes are found to characterize women's

political attitudes or behavior, those characteristics are then defined as `apolitical' or `unpolitical' or `naive.' "

Kay Boals (1975: 168) asserts "that there is a complex interrelationship between the knowledge generated by political science research and prospects for social change that vitiates behaviorist claims to strict political neutrality and scientific objectivity. In highlighting this interrelationship, feminist critique can make an important contribution to the study of male-female relations and to the discussion of more general methodological and epistemological issues within the discipline." Similarly, Judith Evans (1980a: 113) claims that the stereotyping of political sex roles was due to "the failure to question [that] springs from a positivist methodology inherent in which is an inability to query the status quo." Evans has also pointed out (1980b: 210) that in the judgment of their feminist critics, political scientists "have almost totally misrepresented the political character of women: they have written about differences that do not, in fact, exist; ignored the true implications of others; and avoided the possibility that some may be the product of discrimination and prejudice. For writers such as these, political science is a sexist discipline in a sexist society: the chorus sings not only in a strong upper class accent, but with a marked bass tone." According to Kelly and Boutilier (1978: 21), "the literature of the psychology of politics is not helpful because it has ignored women. Scholars following the Maslowian human development `self-actualization' school of thought, such as Jeanne Knutson, have devoted almost no attention to female political behavior" (but see Maslow, 1942). Another leading political-scientist Maslowian, Stanley Renshon (1974), undertook a survey in which he did collect information about his respondents' sex-but used it only to get at differences in their physical appearance (on an implicit scale of "hippyness").

Herbert McCloskey's article on "Political Participation," in the authoritative *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968:12: 252-65), consumes 11 1/2 double column pages with text in which there is absolutely no reference whatsoever to female participation and only one to the possibility of sex differences in participation. Indeed, he mentions the word "sex" only twice, and "women" only once, as follows: (1) "the American constitution, as originally framed, implicitly sanctioned prohibitions against voting or holding office for reasons of . . . sex" (253: 2); and (2) "The elements that compose the social environment include . . . sex . . . .

In general, participation tends to be higher among . . . men (as opposed to women) ..." (256: 1). The first of these quotations confirms Blackstone; and the second surely is *a de minimus* recognition of sexual differences in political behavior: it is hard to imagine how it would be possible to mention the subject at all, and say less. But in a subsequently published review essay on "Political Participation in America" in the leading national journal of political science, Jerrold Rusk (1976) does manage to say less: he goes on for some 81/2 pages of double column text without mentioning either "sex," "female," or "women" even once, saying nothing at all about women and politics.

A study of the effect of sex-role stereotyping upon the electability of candidates (Hedlund et al., 1979: 520) concludes that such stereotyping seems to affect most negatively the chances of female candidates, if they have young children and that becomes public knowledge during the campaign. A study by Lee (1976: 304), however, showed no significant statistical difference between women and *men,* in the correlation between electoral success and being a parent with children at home-but Lee did not examine the question whether there was public knowledge of such candidates' children.

Jane Jaquette notes Fred Greenstein's report of a "political socialization" study of schoolchildren's attitudes towards military combat, in which both sexes were equally ill-informed, "but when asked which of a series of pictures they preferred, nine of the boys and *none* of the girls were described . . . as `enthusiastic' or `excited' about the war. But "If excitement about war at the first grade level is what it will take to have women informed about the political system," Jaquette (1974: xxxii) observes, "then perhaps there is more wrong with the system (or with our current definition of it) than with women.

Bowman (1980) reported experimental survey research using a group of 125 of her undergraduate students as surrogates for the American electorate. The students were asked to appraise photographs of white adults (aged 30 to 50) in terms of their (1) physical attractiveness, and (2) attractiveness as candidates for public office. She found that the youthful surrogate voters (1) favored physically attractive male, but unattractive female, candidates; and (2) the female surrogate voters considered physical attractiveness to be more important than did the male surrogate voters, for *both* male candidates and female candidates. Conse-

quently, the female voters were most favorable to physically attractive male candidates, while the male voters were least favorable to physically attractive female candidates.

The leading work on political participation (Milbrath and Goel, 2nd ed. 1977) asserts that the finding that men are more likely than women to participate in politics is one of the most thoroughly substantiated in social science. A major reason for this is said to be because men move in environments having more stimuli about politics than do women. More generally, three principal explanations typically have been suggested as to why women are alleged to participate politically less than do men: (1) "political socialization," the "assumption that adult male and female participation differences have their origins in the female's childhood socialization, which leads her to have very passive expectations about her political role" as Susan Welch (1977) defines it, (2) "situational, the nurturant responsibilities that keep some women at home and out of the work force (and hence, as Milbrath and Goel put it, understimulated politically); and (3) what Milbrath and Goel refer to as "structural," the somewhat tautological (if sociological) argument that women are overrepresented in demographic groups that have low participation levels.

Carroll (1979: 306) has pointed out that "There is still a heavy focus on sex-role socialization, with its implicit tendency to `blame the victim' (or her mother) and to place on women the burden of changing the system which requires the existing sex-role patterns, rewards those who conform to it, and punishes those who defy it." Welch (1977: 721, 726) undertook to examine the validity of the political socialization hypothesis by using regression analysis to examine data from three national election studies spanning the two decades 1952-1972. She found that *after* controlling for both situational and structural variables, no systematic differences remained in the levels of male-female participation. Although she did not directly test the validity of political socialization, her results certainly lend no support to that hypothesis. More explicitly, she found that "the one activity where men participate significantly more than women is ... whether the individual has tried to influence another person's vote." But the presence of children in the home had even less effect on the mass participation of women than did marriage. Work outside the home produced a dramatic increase in female voting and other forms of political activity, and the positive effect increased over the two decades spanned by her study. Welch con-

eluded that "the stereotype of the politically passive woman simply is untrue."

Four Types of Political Male Chauvinism

My discussion here will focus on *behavioral* political science as a case study of political-scientist political-male chauvinism, but it should be understood that anti-feminist bias permeated all of the established fields of political science well into the 1970s. For similar critiques of anti-feminism in political philosophy, for example, see Okin (1979a: 393; and also 1979b): "Rousseau's writings about women . exemplify the general patriarchal bias of political theory"; and see also Elshtain (1981: Part I).

The extent to which political science presented itself so as to minimize the political contributions of women was documented in detail by Susan Bourque and Jean Grossholtz (1974). Their survey of the characteristic treatment of sex roles in classic works by the leading proponents of political behavioralism showed that in the choice of data to be analyzed as well as in interpretation of data, political behavioralists have insisted upon a narrow and exclusive definition of politics that limits its political activity to the stereotyped male role. Like blacks and the poor generally, women were blamed for their low participation by authors who defended an "open, democratic political system" of which excluded groups failed (for reasons inherent in their own personal inadequacies) to take advantage. Of ten such classics of political behavioralism, seven were published during the 1960s, and the other three earlier; many of these studies of political participation never mentioned women at all, in any context.

All of these studies displayed at least one-and some exhibited all-of four categories of distortion of the participation of women in politics: (1) "Fudging the Footnotes," defined as either making statements about female political characteristics, attitudes, or behavior not substantiated in the references cited as sources, or else misusing source data by ignoring qualifications and interpretations of the original sources; (2) "Assumption of Male Dominance," by not only asserting that but also by failing to question why and how it obtains; (3) "Masculinity as Ideal Political Behavior," the axiom that the stereotyped male political sex role is the norm for all political behavior, with the postulated correlate that behavior based on male values is rational while behavior based on female values is *irra-*

tional; and (4) "Commitment to the Eternal Feminine," which explains female political behavior as the necessary consequence of the social role of wife and mother, with the latter idealized and stereotyped as a sex role just as much as is the male political sex role.

Let us consider some examples. Robert Lane, in *Political Life* (1964 rev. ed.; originally published in 1959) fudges his footnotes by refusing to accept as valid any "uniquely feminine reasons" to explain in any important way why, as he put it, "At every social level women vote less than men." Meanwhile he relied exclusively upon a 1924 study of non-voting in Chicago-the very first systematic study of political non-participation ever published-and ignored all of the other evidence published during the next four decades. Similarly, on the question of male dominance, Lane argues that wives are persuaded to accept whatever may be the political position of their respective husbands. But the source that he cites finds the opposite: that disagreement between husband and wife leads to discussion and "mutual influence."

Male dominance is assumed by Angus Campbell and his coauthors in *The American Voter* (1960), in their argument that "The dependence of a wife's vote upon her husband's partisan predispositions appears to be one reason why the entrance of women into the electorate has tended to make little visible difference in the partisan distribution of the national vote." The same authors also argue that the lesser participation of women is probably a good thing, because the lower level of female conceptual sophistication about political matters doubtless leads to less stable support for the two major parties: and that is of course the "ideal male" (as well *as* a very conservative) line. Along that same line, Campbell finds that his data demonstrate that "Men are more likely than women to feel that they can cope with the complexities of politics and to believe that their participation carries some weight in the political process . . . what has been less adequately transmitted to the woman is a sense of some personal competence vis-a-vis the political world." Similarly, Lane appears to be saying that "the limited roles open to women lead directly to their greater intolerance, and ineffective tie to political matters, and an interest in the superficial, irrelevant aspects of politics. Women may appear to understand politics because of their manipulation of moral symbols, but they have actually missed the deeper currents, and more critical concerns" (Bourque and Grossholtz, 1974: 237).

Two of the early and leading students of political socialization,

Robert Hess and Judith Torney, in their *The Development of Political Attitudes of Children* (1967), assert that "The socialization of passive compliance in females may have an effect on political activity"; but nowhere in their study is there any evidence of "passive compliance"-indeed, what their data do demonstrate is remarkably little difference in the attitudes of boys and girls. Half a dozen years later Dean Jaros' leading text, *Socialization to Politics* (1973), after political feminism had become well established as a movement in both public and political-science-professional life (see Schubert, forthcoming b), and after the consciousness of both political scientist textbook authors and their publishers had begun to be raised. Consequently, this paperback does include a female figure on its cover; and no less than four pages of sex differences are cited in its index. Nevertheless, Jaros completely accepts the stereotypes for both male political roles and female social roles, attributing his finding that, unquestionably women "vote less, join fewer organizations, do less party work, read less and care less about politics," to the "set of norms women hold: that they should not be as participatory as men, that politics is a man's game." But he cites no evidence in support of his notions about women's attitudes; and he fails to mention the possible relevance of either situational or structural constraints upon female political participation.

"Commitment to the Eternal Feminine" is the social sex-role stereotype of the "situational" explanation. The former defines an extreme view that ignores both the ontogenetic, developmental changes that are typical of most women who *do* become housewives-and-mothers in traditional marriage arrangements (which included only about a fifth of all women by the 1980s), and also disregards the very different situation of the increasingly large proportion of American women who do not. It ignores also the range of individual differences in reactions to the traditional situation for those women who do experience it. The situational explanation itself asserts that many women, and especially those involved in traditional marital arrangements, are handicapped in their ability to participate politically as freely and as fully as men, because of the conjoint constraints of nurturant responsibilities and housewifely duties which limit their time and opportunities for civic life on the same terms open to men. Campbell concedes that "The presence of young children requiring constant attention serves as a barrier to the voting act"; but instead of viewing this as a problem potentially resolvable by a change in public policies and sex-role norms concerning child-

care responsibilities, he treats the question as one inherent in human nature. Therefore he foresees no alternative to "a permanent discrepancy in participation between the sexes."

In a now infamous statement frequently quoted in the literature of feminist politics, Robert Lane-whose wife, incidentally, is the author of a masterful insider analysis of the Old Boy Club that for decades monopolized the Yale University Department of Political Science, writing under the *nom de plume* Helen Hudson and under the title *Tell the Time to None* (1966)-warns of possibly dire consequences for a political society so corrupt as to *encourage* a larger role for women in politics. "Political affairs," he suggests, are considered by the culture to be somewhat peripheral to the female sphere of competence and proper concern"-but this characterization certainly does not apply to his own wife, whose understanding of academic politics evinces a degree of sophistication and subtlety about political as well as academic relationships that few male political scientists have exhibited in their writing. Lane continued:

> Would it be wise to reinforce the feminist movement, emphasizing politics on the women's page along with the garden club and bridge club news, and making ward politics something like volunteer work for the Red Cross or the hospital auxiliary? ... it is too seldom remembered in the American society that working girls and career women who insistently serve the community in volunteer capacities, and women with extracurricular interests of an absorbing kind, are often borrowing their time and attention and capacity for relaxed play and love from their children to whom it rightfully belongs. As Kardiner points out, the rise in juvenile delinquency (and he says, homosexuality) is partly to be attributed *to the feminist movement and what it did to the American mother* (emphasis added [1964: 355]).

Bourque and Grossholtz conclude (1974: 264) that "in political science, sexual stereotypes have relegated most women to the status of camp followers and the rest to the status of deviants, while at the same time convincing men that by virtue of their masculinity they have *real* participation" (emphasis added).

The Fable of the Male Bees[2]

Jaquette (1974: xxiv). points out that V.O. Key, like Campbell a most esteemed pioneer in the development of political

2. With apologies to both Mandeville (1729) and von Frisch (1971). "The queen honeybee lays the eggs that hatch into thousands of workers. Laying eggs is the queen's

behavioralism, likewise worried about the damage women could do to the political party system; but as Jaquette observes, Key did not ask what the party system had done for women. Women were long criticized by leading lights of the male "realist" school of politics (such as Key, Lane, Dahl, and Lipset-all past presidents of the American Political Science Association) for female idealism and naivete, and a consequent penchant for "do-goodism" (as it was stigmatized) said to interfere with and disrupt the normal processes of political brokerage. Such "realism" explicitly presumes a pluralist model of politics based on group conflict; but as Jaquette remarks, by the mid-sixties interest-group pluralism already was under heavy attack from non-feminist male political scientist critics (e.g., Lowi, 1969) on such grounds as its unrepresentative nature, its failure to deal with important issues, its encouragement of citizen apathy, and (she might have well added) its absolute amorality in regard to the content of public policy, as I have discussed at length elsewhere (Schubert, 1985a). With particular regard to interest-group politics and sexual egalitarianism, Irene Diamond and Nancy Hartsock (1981: 719) have commented (see also Schubert, forthcoming b) that

> the language of interests emerged along with the changes in the division of labor in production and reflected society's understanding of itself as dominated by rational economic men seeking to maximize their satisfactions. But human beings are moved by more than interests. The reduction of all human emotions to interests[,] and interests to the rational search for gain reduces the human community to an instrumental, arbitrary, and deeply unstable alliance, one which rests on the private desires of isolated individuals ... Close attention to women's activity rather than men's and the consequent thoroughgoing focus on whole human beings necessitates the development of *more* encompassing categories of analysis for political life.

Conventional Politics

We now turn to empirical data about sex differences in regard to the conventional political activities within the scope of the male

only job . . . . The workers do all the chores in a honeybee colony except lay eggs. All workers are females, like the queen, but they are smaller . . . . Drones, or male honeybees, are burly, clumsy creatures. They do no work, and have no sting." *The World Book Encyclopedia, 8:* 155 (Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Company, 1964 edition).

political sex-role model, which was described in the first part of this review and criticized in the second part. After reviewing evidence about present sex differences in political socialization, we shall consider various personality and other sociopsychological sex differences relating to the style of political performance; and then attitudinal differences between women and men, in relation to both the political process and public policy. The remainder and bulk of this part of this review will examine sex differences in political participation.

General Trends

There is abundant evidence that the general participation of women in politics increased steadily during the 1960s and 1970s, and that it is accelerating during the 1980s. Women now tend to hold political attitudes and engage in political behaviors which, according to Berenice Carroll (1979: 292), are "very similar to those of men, at all levels from school children to party activists and local officeholders . . . . This appears to be true both for masses and for `elites'-party leaders and activists. Only at the level of holding top party offices and high elective offices at state and national levels does a very significant sex difference appear." Carroll is a feminist critic of the male-stereotype political sex-role model. Her report that greater equality of socioeconomic and educational and situational opportunity already has resulted in virtual equality in political participational activities, except at the upper reaches of political party and governmental hierarchies, heralds the substantial fulfillment of one major aspect of the political goals of the feminist movement (Schubert, forthcoming b). But Carroll's euphoria goes well beyond the empirical data (see Corbett, 1982); and her suggestion that we now have "women holding political attitudes . . . very similar to those of men" is a half truth in substantial contradiction to both the empirical data and the goals of many other political feminists (Schubert, forthcoming b).

Political Socialization

Jennings and Niemi (1974: 105) found that when they investigated the effects of parental influence upon the political learning of children, mothers as well as fathers are important in shaping

party images and preferences. But such influences are sex-linked at the level of both generations: most girls identify with the same political party as their mothers do; while most boys prefer their father's party. Indeed, in those families where parents disagree in choice of political party but one parent is much more highly partisan than the other, daughters are 3 1/2 times as likely to agree with partisan mothers, than sons are in the other families with partisan fathers. When parents agree on the same party, however, daughters are twice as likely as sons to choose the same party as their parents. Jennings and Niemi (1974: 238) suggest that "Females seem to be more sensitive, in general, to the values of people immediately surrounding them." But another way of viewing such sex-related differences "is to say that at any given time a male adolescent is surrounded by more political dissimilarity than is the female." These authors speculate that the political rites of passage may be more difficult' for boys than for girls, due at least in the past to sexual differentiation in both social environmental empathy and the disparate political obligations of military service. However, Jennings and Niemi concluded that the situation was likely to become much more equalized, as between adolescent girls and boys, due to what they described as the "recent surge of the women's liberation movement."

They found also "quite visible vestiges of sex-typing and the definite imprint of sex-related roles," as exemplified by the importance of mothers in passing on the political cultures. Indeed, "If one could imagine a world inhabited only by grandmothers, mothers, daughters, and girl friends, the prospects for political continuity would be greater than they now are" (Jennings and Niemi, 1974: 326). Of course, there would be no males in such a world; and disregarding all questions about the preservation of the species (but see Frank, 1947), it staggers the imagination to ask it to presume that women would continue to behave as-however-they now do, *if* they no longer were in either genetic or social competition with each other (Symons, 1979) *vis-a-vis* fathers, male lovers, and sons.

A study by Sigel and Reynolds (1979-80) took a different approach to the question of whether mothers and daughters differ in their attitudes towards issues of political feminism. In order to control for most socioeconomic class variables (including "higher education"), they studied a group of Rutgers female undergraduates whose mothers were Rutgers alumnae. Comparing the responses of pairs of mothers and daughters, the daughters were more feminist than their mothers on all except two of fifteen questions. Alternatively, when

the replies of daughters as a cohort were compared with those of their mothers grouped, the daughters' cohort was more feminist than the mothers on all six issues for which the differences between the group means were statistically significant at the .05 level. At least a majority (and up to 90%) of the mother-daughter pairs were in agreement on eleven of the fifteen issues; and only one, of the total of 44, mother-daughter pairs were in complete disagreement on all fifteen issues:

In an earlier study (Sigel and Brookes, 1974: 122-23), girls were more numerous than boys in the overall sample, but boys nevertheless comprised a majority of those junior high school students who found themselves to be increasingly critical of "the government" (which the questions asked identified primarily with the President, and therfore with the *national* government) while the Vietnam war escalated during Lyndon Johnson's second term in the middle sixties. On the six questions of government responsiveness and performance, boys were almost twice as critical as girls (at average rates of 64.5% as compared to 35.5%). This led the authors to conclude that "Girls are far more inclined than boys to maintain positive orientations toward both government in general and policy in particular, in spite of the fact that both have gone through the same school experience within the same political climate." It was perhaps culturally too soon, the authors speculate, for political feminism to have had much effect on the thinking of these young adolescent females; but these girls also did not need to worry about being drafted.

In a subsequent study, Jennings and Niemi (1981) questioned what they described as the usual presumption, that sex and gender role differences are fixed and invariant over the life cycle. Their evidence came from longitudinal research, comparing the same panel of respondents after an eight-year interval. The members of this cohort were the mid-adolescent subjects of their earlier report (1974) who had progressed in age to their mid-twenties; such data might contradict the presumption of invariance, but it could hardly support generalizations about change in sex and gender role differences for more than a small-however formatively important-portion of the typical human political life-span. The authors do suggest that male-female contrasts in political involvement apparent in early adulthood are perhaps "suppressed" during adolescence. But the support for this suggestion is the observation that for five of six categories of "psychological involvement in

politics" (interest in public affairs, cosmopolitanism, reading newspapers, reading magazines, and listening to radio), females were relatively less involved than males, as they grew up. (Watching more TV was the exception.) Hence (Jennings and Niemi, 1981: 278), "women were acting in such a way as actually to increase the gap between the sexes." And although both males and females were more favorable in 1973 than they had been in 1965 to permitting elected Communists to hold public office-an entirely hypothetical question in the United States-the gap between the attitudes of males (the more favorable sex in both years) and females increased by 50 % . The most extreme difference was in 1973 between the male youths and the female parents of the cohort: over two-thirds of the young males were favorable, whereas two-thirds of the older females were opposed.

When the young female members of the cohort were divided into those who had, and those who had not, experienced motherhood by 1973, the biggest difference in overall political resemblance was between males and mothers, with nonmothers more similar to the males than to the mothers. However, nonmothers as a group were both better educated and more employed (outside of the home) than mothers; so a regression analysis was performed by Jennings and Niemi (1981: 298, 300), to control for the influence of education and employment status. The results showed that the differences between mothers and nonmothers remained important for seven out of ten measures, leading the authors to conclude that "motherhood itself has a great deal to do with the differences observed. Indeed, "Motherhood seems to be most crippling when children are in their preschool and early elementary school years. Nurturing and custodial demands are at their height [then]. As children age, the immediate constraints lessen and the political world becomes more salient."

Looking at the replies of high school seniors in 1973 compared to those of the ones surveyed in 1965, these authors reached the conclusion that there was overwhelming evidence indicating that traditional sex differences continued without important change. But from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies the direction of change in the national culture, including the political subculture, was clearly conservative. If a study had been made comparing high school seniors in the mid-fifties with those in the mid-sixties, a period of increasing radicalism in the national culture (Nieburg, 1973), then the evidence might well support an opposite conclusion: that traditional sex differences became significantly lessened.

Attitudes

It is, no doubt, a statistical truism that, as Baxter and Lansing (1980) point out, there is greater variation in behavior and attitudes within each sex than there is between their modal differences. Nevertheless, "At every age, women are substantially more likely than men to have liberal positions on women's issues. In fact younger men are less liberal on women's issues than women in each *older* age category" (Marilyn Johnson, 1980: 67, emphasis added; but cf. Sapiro, 1980). And across a wide range of issues of public policy, there has been a long-term tendency for women to be more pacifist than men and less supportive of violent solutions to social problems; for women to be more supportive of the rights of blacks, and of social welfare policies; and for women to be much more concerned than men about the safety of nuclear plants. The 1980 election poll (Poole and Zeigler, 1982) asked the policy question whether there should be more nuclear plants built, the status quo maintained, or existing plants shut down. On this issue a majority of men-and more than twice as many men as women-favored building more plants; conversely, only a sixth of the men (13%) favored shutting plants down, while almost twice as many women (25%) chose this alternative. Men also favored relaxing environmental regulations much more than women did, although housewives voted exactly the same as men, so that the difference here was with working women, whereas on nuclear plants it really was between men and all women.

At every age level, higher proportions of women than of men favor rehabilitation rather than more severe punishment for criminals, and believe that schoolchildren should be bussed as necessary in order to integrate better the schools racially (Johnson, 1980). Similarly, in the 1972 Louis Harris *Virginia Slims Opinion Poll,* men more than women were troubled by such conventional public policy issues as the state of the economy, unemployment, and foreign relations; while women more than men expressed concern about the Vietnam War and drug addiction. Men and women also differed in regard to appropriate solutions to all of these problems. Women more than men favored rehabilitation over punitive measures for addicts or criminals, and a strict system of gun control, while men favored capital punishment and shifting the federal budgetary allocation for defense at the expense of domestic welfare programs. Kay (1980) found that among law students, the women

supported social welfare policies more than the men did, and the women were more generally liberal politically than the men. She concluded from this that one effect of training and admitting more female lawyers may be to "increase the proportion of socially-oriented, activist attorneys." A study of several hundred female and a similar number of male senior executives of large corporations (U.P.I., 1982) reported that men were twice as conservative as women (42 % to 21 %) on social issues; and that three times as many women as men (22 % to 7 %) considered themselves to be liberal in their ideology.

Frankovic (1977) reports a factor analysis study of congresswomen in the 1975 session of the House of Representatives, based on their agreement and disagreement in voting behavior. The first (and by definition, most important) factor was one with which all, but only, liberal Democrats were correlated at more than + .50; it was best exemplified by Barbara Jordan, a black congresswoman from Texas, whose correlation (factor loading) was + .82 on this first factor, but less than ± .05 on either of the other two factors. The second factor included three of the five Republicans, with high correlations of + .82, + .81, and + .70. The third factor, which Frankovic indentified as geographical, manifests a more direct political interpretation as one identifying the political mavericks: it includes two such notoriously idiosyncratic politicians as Republican Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey, and Democrat Bella Abzug of Manhattan; and also two as independent as Republican Margaret Heckler of Massachusetts, and Democrat Elizabeth Holtzman of Brooklyn. One Democratic congresswoman, Marilyn Lloyd of Tennessee, was bipartisan in her voting behavior, with correlations of + .42 with each of the first two factors, and of substantially zero (- .06) with the third. Frankovic examined also the relationship, on the basis of their voting behavior, of a different group of congresswomen and a random sample of their male colleagues for the 1972 session. She found a statistically significant difference between the congresswomen and the congressmen on the first factor (liberal Democrats). She concluded that the women in Congress had become by the mid-seventies a cohesive group whose voting behavior differed importantly from that of their male colleagues.

On the basis of her sample of female state legislators, Lee (1976: 313-14) found that male and female respondents disagreed about the priority of different social problems. Men thought taxes were a major problem, while women expressed concern for ecology and for

health and welfare. Kirkpatrick's (1974) sample of female state legislators, who were upper-class married and relatively older, had little empathy for political feminism, which they are reported as having condemned on the grounds that "women's liberation": (1) has an inaccurate conception of women's situation and problems; (2) is hostile to marriage and the family; (3) is extremist in its criticisms and its proposals; (4) is partisan and sectarian; and (5) makes it harder for women to be elected to office. Her sample did not agree that *because of* their sex they should support child care, health, or welfare legislation; but all except three of the forty-six did support the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).

Kirkpatrick (1976) subsequently found in her survey of the attitudes of delegates to the 1974 national party conventions that there were substantial differences between the male and the female delegates concerning the political role of women. There was widespread agreement among the female delegates of both parties that role conflict had inhibited the political participation of women, and further that it did not need to do so. However, less than half as many men-and fewer than a fourth of them when McGovern supporters are excluded-agreed with a clear majority of the women on this point. Indeed, 46% of the McGovern male delegates, as well as three-fourths of McGovern's female delegates, strongly disagreed with the assertion that most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women. All of the delegates-both male and female-had much more liberal views than did the female rank-and-file party members on abortion, personnel policy, and the women's liberation movement. But as between men and women for both the Democratic and the Republican delegations, there was a clear ordinal scale with Democratic women most favorable to women's liberation, followed by Democratic men, and then by the Republican women, Republican men were least favorable.

Kirkpatrick constructed what she called a "Newwoman Index." This was a composite of scales, including the rejection of the following traditional beliefs: (1) that women are innately less able than men to exercise political power; (2) that nothing can be done to overcome situational (wife-mother role) constraints upon female political participation; (3) that women are not discriminated against by men in politics; and (4) that women covertly manipulate and control what men do overtly in politics anyhow. The negations of these beliefs are merged, and presumed to define the direction of feminist ideology. All of Kirkpatrick's measurements confirmed that

attitudes towards these scales are more strongly correlated with political ambition than with such conventional sociological attributes as age, education, and occupational experience. The correlation between political feminism and political ambition is positive, but important differences exist between women in the two major parties. Thus, all highly ambitious women perceived innate sex differences to be lower than did unambitious women, but at all levels of ambition, Democratic women perceived sexual differences to be smaller than did Republicans. Similarly, ambitious women were more sensitive to discrimination than unambitious ones, but Democrats were substantially more sensitive than Republicans. In regard to three characteristic feminist policy issues (favoring abortion rights, a national day-care program for young children, and equal employment opportunity), feminist women were three times as favorable to free choice on abortion as traditional women, over twice as favorable to the socialization of child care, and almost 50% more favorable to fair employment practices.

Boneparth (1982: 308) claims that while women at the grass roots typically are more pacifist than men in their attitudes, the women are also less interested in international politics. Verba and Nie (1972) found for their 1967 survey sample that men were almost twice as likely as women to be hawkish on the Vietnam War, and also twice as likely to be behaviorally active regarding the war, which resulted in a pronounced bias in favor of pro-war sentiment in the articulation and dissemination of political communications. A Gallup poll a couple of years later in 1969 confirmed that women were three times as likely to be doves as hawks, and also a third more likely to be doves than were males, who in turn were almost twice as likely to be hawks as women were. But Hershey (1977: 265) found that "it was not the dimension of masculinity but the dimension of traditionalism in sex roles that was related to the hawk position on Vietnam." More generally over the period of the past quarter of a century, according to Baxter and Lansing (1980: 59), "women have been more opposed to the use of force and to the support of warlike policies. When these measures are correlated with level of education and age, the younger, more highly educated women take the more 'dovish' position."

Holsti and Rosenau (1982), in a study of more than two hundred females classified as opinion leaders, and some two thousand males, found that on 80% of questions concerning "Cold War internationalist" matters, the difference between the group means was

negligible; and again, for a separate set of "Post-Cold-War *isolationist"* axioms, women were significantly more isolationist in their responses to eight of the items-and notwithstanding the fact that as a group, the females were younger, more Democratic, and more liberal generally than the males.

Frankovic (1982) reports differences in the attitudes of women and men in several national public opinion polls dealing with war and environmental issues. In April 1979, men were substantially more approving than women (by 56% to 36%) of the building of more nuclear power plants "to generate electricity." On election day in 1980, many more men than women (65% to 47 %) agreed that the United States should be "more forceful" in dealing with the Soviet Union, "even if it increases the risk of war." In May 1982, many more men than women (65% to 42%) thought it unlikely that there would be a nuclear war involving the United States within a decade or less. On the first and third of these issues, women responded predominantly liberally and men predominantly conservatively; but on the question of war with the Soviet Union, both women and men were predominantly conservative, although the men were more so.

In the 1980 election poll (Poole and Zeigler, 1982), on the question of issue saliency men and women both rated defense spending as the most pressing of the nine issues presented. The combined vote for men and women rated equal rights for women as the least salient issue; for men it ranked last, and for women next to last (which was government help to minorities) in importance. But abortion was the issue on which women differed most from men: women ranked it as second in saliency, while men ranked it eighth, just in front of equal rights for women.

Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that in the general population men were more responsive than women to specific policy issues concerning sex-role equality. It was not until the end of the 1970s that a majority of both men and women favored such women's issues as equal *pay* for equal work, pro-abortion legislation, child-care centers, and equality generally in sex roles (Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Corbett, 1982; and see Schubert, forthcoming b). Positive responses to a series of Gallup polls asking whether a female candidate at all levels of government would be supported "even if she *were* a woman" (emphasis added) and presuming that "she were qualified in all other [sic] regards" increased from only 31 % in 1937 to a bare majority in 1955, but exceeded 80% for male and female respondents alike by 1975, for all offices except the Presidency for

which it was 75% for men and 71 % for women.

In a national public opinion poll conducted in October 1980 on the question of voting intention in the impending Presidential election, respondents were identified by sex and also in terms of whether they lived in "two-adult" households or in other households. Frankovic (1982: 444) pointed out that the number of adults living outside the traditional nuclear family has increased during the past decade; and that the effect of a man and a woman living together as a mated pair tends to create a consensus that minimizes sex differences, "at least when a political *action is* concerned" (emphasis added). Similarly organized data that she reports show that in a May 1982 poll a majority of the men in two-adult households approved of Reagan, while a majority of the women in other households disapproved. Of particular interest, however, are the other half of the respondents, who preempt the middle ground between married (or at least, consorted) men, and single women: their opinion profiles are virtually identical, with proportions of consorted women and of non-consorted men, in equivalent approval (46% and 44%), disapproval (both 43%), and with no opinion (11% and 13%). This implies that the attitudes of many women on important political questions may be indistinguishable from the attitudes of many men (although not of their mates, to be sure). A possible inference is that sex-role differences in political attitudes are consistently and importantly influenced by differences in household social systems.

Hershey and Sullivan (1977) hypothesized that persons with flexible sex-role orientations would be more liberal in their political attitudes than persons with traditional sex role orientations. These authors distinguished between sex-role *attitudes (i.e.,* approval or disapproval of traditional sex-roles) and *identities (i.e.,* the concept of oneself in relation to the traditional roles, such as masculine or feminine), with the objective of relating both sex-role attitudes and sex-role identities to liberalism/conservatism in political attitudes. Their findings concerning sex-role identities are discussed in Schubert (forthcoming a, section 6); in regard to sex-role attitudes they found that women were much more liberal and nontraditional than men. But men were better informed politically than women, and considerably more tolerant politically but only slightly more so racially. Men took more interest in politics than did women; but women liked more than men did to talk about politics. The authors concluded that sex-role attitudes were part of a more general liberal-


conservative dimension, but they remained puzzled by the seeming incongruity of the lower female scores on political tolerance. The solution to their problem is found in transcending the unidimensional framework of their analysis, by looking at the structure of liberal and conservative ideology from a more complex, multidimensional perspective, as many European and other (but few American) political psychologists have undertaken to do (e.g., Eysenck, 1954; Wilson, 1973; Eysenck and Wilson, 1978; Lynn, 1981).

This approach is exemplified and discussed by Schubert (1977), as a two-dimensional field with the first reference dimension defined by substantive conservative/liberal political ideology, and the second reference dimension defined by psychological ideology. Building upon more than a quarter of a century of research by many contributors, I proposed a model incorporating several components of substantive conservatism/liberalism, including one of political/economic policy, and others of militarism/humanism, religiosity/sexual freedom, and ethnocentrism/sexual egalitarianism (see Figure 1). All of these components are highly correlated with the first dimension, of substantive conservatism/liberalism; all are distinguished from each other on the second or psychological dimension (Schubert, 1977: 25). Sexual freedom, for example, is psychologically in the positive direction on the first dimension ("tough-minded," in Eysenck's terminology) while sexual egalitarianism is psychologically negative ("tender-minded"). The data that Hershey are Sullivan present together with their discussion of it (1977: 44-46) suggest that if their data were re-examined through two-dimensional smallest-space analysis, women would be found to be more tough-minded than men in their political intolerance of unpopular political groups. But in the absence of the required data analysis this suggestion is an informed speculation, and should be construed to be an hypothesis, not an empirical finding.

Styles and Personality

Marilyn Johnson (1980: 66) has argued that "If women did not differ from men in their style of officeholding or political views, then overcoming the lack of women in office would be principally an issue of elite participation, with little consequence for public policy or the conduct of government." Women place more impor-

Figure 1
Dimensions and Components of Political Ideology
(from Schubert, 1977: 25)



tance than men do on their relations with constituents, for example; and Diamond and Hartsock (1981: 718) believe that women tend to define and experience themselves relationally, while men are more likely to form a sense of self as separate and disconnected from their social world. According to Werner and Bachtold (1974), women legislators (as compared to the general population of women among

their constituents) are distinguished as being more intelligent, more assertive, more venturesome, more imaginative and unconventional, and more liberal. They also exceeded elected male leaders particularly in regard to unconventionality, radicalism, dominance and self-sufficiency, sensitivity, and intelligence; but they tended to be more guilt-prone than the men, and notably less enthusiastic. Johnson cites another study that found significant differences favoring political women on personality dimensions of sociability, optimism, willingness to risk, liberalism, and a sense of political efficacy; and she noted that those are characteristics that resemble her own findings of greater assertiveness, adventuresomeness, imagination, and liberal attitudes among the women in her sample of state legislators.

Factor-analyzed data of a survey by Cook (1982a: 63) of personality traits of state trial court judges show that the female judges were considerably more social (attractive, cultured, and poised), and on the whole somewhat less instrumental (assertive, forceful, dominant, competitive, and aggressive) than the males. But the female distribution was bimodal (in terms of feminism) on instrumentalism: feminist women were even more, and non-feminist less instrumental than were males. This finding led Cook to suggest that "commitment to making a radical change in society tends to produce the kind of personality necessary for the effort."

Kirkpatrick (1974) claims that "political woman"-not merely the 46 females who composed her highly non-random sample-demonstrates that (see section 5 of Schubert, forthcoming a) a woman can be like a man, just like a man in fact: "Like most of the men who participate in democratic politics," Kirkpatrick's political women have strong egos; high self-seteem; a high sense of personal effectiveness and political efficacy; a well-integrated self-system with low guilt, anxiety, and aggression; broad identifications; habits of participation; a persistent need for achievement; realistic expectations; and pragmatic orientations;-just like Ambassador Kirkpatrick's own subsequent performance at the U.N.!

Certainly it is true that many quite conservative political leaders who are indistinguishable from males in their attitudes and official behavior come readily to mind; England's Margaret Thatcher and India's Indira Gandhi for example, and (to speak only of two of the more celebrated officials of the Environmental Protection Agency during Reagan's first term) Anne Gorsuch Burford and Rita Lavelle, in Washington (cf. Werner and Bachtold, 1974). It is easier to think

of counterpart conservative males, but only because there are more of them in public life. The relevant question is not whether conservative females with masculine attitudes and personality traits can and do reach positions of leadership in political systems constructed and still dominated by males (see Gilman, 1911); the questions are whether political systems resulting from larger female inputs and influence would be different, and if so how; and whether large (instead of minuscule) samples of females in positions of top political leadership would behave, in certain respects, differently from the males who presently predominate in such positions? It is obvious why a female conservative such as Sandra O'Connor became the first and only woman among more than an hundred Supreme Court Justices in the almost two centuries of relevant American history; Justice O'Connor, a protege of Barry Goldwater, *had* to, be as conservative as she is to be acceptable to the male President Ronald Reagan (and his male Supreme Court advisor, Jerry Falwell). The relevant question is what kind of policies would be sponsored by a Supreme Court with a majority of female justices, some conservative (like Sandra) and some liberal (like Rose Bird, the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, whom Reagan, although a fellow Californian, could never accept)? We are not likely to learn the answer during the present century; but learn it we may and during the lifetime of most readers of this prediction.

Gehlen (1969) states that none of the congresswomen whom she studied denied that their male colleagues met together informally and that the women were not invited and did not feel welcome to attend. Sapiro confirms (1981b: 711) that "men can effectively-even if unintentionally-freeze women out of conversations and debates, or simply render their communication ineffective." On the other hand, Gehlen adds that some of the congressmen admitted that certain congresswomen were sought out and included at times *because they were attractive females-an* example, perhaps, of pristine male sexism (as exemplified by Symons, 1979).

Shepfer and Tiger (1978), who studied female hierarchies in a kibbutz community in Israel (see also section 4 of Schubert, forthcoming a), found the most prominent trait of such female hierarchies to be high centralization, with a single highly dominant female leader concentrating all authority, in almost all of the groups. They noted also that such female leaders were all in fact or about to become postmenopausal so that they were in a position to exercise more stability at work than younger females of childbearing age.

These findings about the differences between male and female leadership hierarchies are not inconsistent with the studies of female structure in non-human primate groups (Blaffer Herdy, 1981; and see Schubert, forthcoming a); and Sapiro (1981b: 711) notes that social psychological research on humans "suggests that women's leadership in primarily male domains such as politics may be curbed by the difficulties which all people, but especially men, have in being supervised or led by a woman."

Political Parties

Baxter and Lansing (1980) observed that although women have differed conspicuously from men in their perceptions and responses to various Presidential candidates (such as Eisenhower, Nixon, Wallace, and McGovern), there nevertheless was a remarkable similarity between women and men in their declared identifications with political parties. However, that situation was changed, if not by, then at least in response to, the Reagan Presidency. The percentages of party identification for men and for women, as among Republicans and Independents and Democrats, are virtually identical (i.e., differences of 1% or none at all) with a single exception, as between 1980 and 1982: 6% of the men who were Democrats in 1980 declared themselves to be Independent in 1982. This meant that equal proportions of men and women (22% and 23%) were Republican; but more men than women were now Independent (45 % to 36 %); while fewer men than women now were Democrats (33% to 41%). In other words, more women were Democrats than Independent or Republican in 1982, and also 55% of all Democrats were women. The 1982 *New York Times/CBS* Election Day exit poll showed that almost two-thirds (64%) of unmarried women claimed to have voted Democratic in congressional elections, while 58% of the unmarried men did likewise; married persons also favored the Democrats but only slightly and with no statistically significant difference between men and women. The consequence was an increasing discussion of a "gender gap" in differential support for the Reagan Administration, as between women and men. But that had been foreshadowed even before Ronald Reagan assumed office: in the election of November 1980, the turnout rate for the election was just as high for women as for men for the first time since such data were collected; and all major voter polls reported that men favored Reagan over Carter by a 60 to 40% margin, while the division

among women was 50-50 (Frankovic, 1982: 440). Consequently, it was the men and not the women of America who elected Reagan.

Kirkpatrick (1976) presents a detailed analysis of the delegates to both major-party Presidential nominating conventions in 1972. Women constituted then, as they do now, a majority of the rank-and-file identifiers, with the Republican Party as well as with the Democratic; but women comprised just 40% of the Democratic delegates, and only 30 % of the Republican. These female delegates tended either to be professional persons themselves, or else to be married to professionals. According to Kirkpatrick, there were no significant differences in the recruitment of male and female delegates-although her data do not enable her to explain why, overall, there were about two male delegates for every female delegate participating in the 1972 conventions.

Fowlkes et al. (1979: 775-76) report a discriminant analysis of the relationship between sex and party roles for some two-hundred-and-fifty activists, divided about equally between the two major political parties in the Atlanta (Georgia) metropolitan area. Democrats were distinguished from Republicans on a dimension of incentives and roles, with Democratic *women* most unlike Republican ***men. A*** second dimension, of ambitions and activities, distinguished the sexes, although here it was *Republican* women who were most unlike *Democratic* men. Males tended to be characterized by their aspirations for office, attendance at party meetings, telephoning activity, desire to make business contacts, and canvassing activity; whereas females were more concerned with organizational roles and party loyalty (accord: Jennings and Farah, 1981). As Clarke and Kornberg (1979: 459, 462, 468) put the matter, "it is women officials rather than men who work hardest and longest for their parties during elections and in the interims between them"; and they find that in all parties "women officials disproportionately are Stalwarts." Moreover, it is among the top party leaders that women do relatively the most work as compared to men-three times as much in the United States and *five* times as much in Canada. McGlen and O'Connor (1983) agree that women put more time in on party jobs than men do; women are better than men at the "human relations" aspects of the job; and women give more emphasis than men do to the problems of constituents.

Campaigns and Voting

Men engage only slightly more than women in campaign activities, such as trying to influence the votes of others, attending

political meetings and rallies, and working for or giving money to a party or candidate. But when women run for office, they consistently have more difficulty in raising campaign funds than do men.

Getting individuals to run as candidates is a different matter. Diamond (1977: 52-53) states that the crucial factor for women-although not for men-is recruitment rather than motivation. Lee's study (1976) of candidates who had run for local office in a predominantly upper-class suburban community-a setting in which we should expect the recruitment of females to be high-indicated an important relationship between age and candidacy: women and men were age-mates in similar proportions *only* among fifty-year-olds. Differences in interest and attention are greatest among young parents as compared to other adults, and McGlen and O'Connor (1983) attribute this to differential pressures for the time to cope with social demands, which delays young mothers in getting involved in partisan politics; and that in turn affects their subsequent ability to compete equally with men in other aspects of electoral politics (see Lee, 1976: 306). There were more than three times as many younger men as there were younger women, but only about twice as many older men than older women. Most women past 52 years of age are post-menopausal (Goodman, 1980: 746) and no longer have young children at home.

Welch (1978) undertook to examine the recruitment of women by testing the "structural" hypothesis: that females are excluded from public office-holding by being severely underrepresented in the "eligible pool" of candidates, determined primarily on the basis of educational and occupational criteria. Women have had particular difficulty, for example, in getting admitted to law schools so that they could obtain law degrees. This resulted in highly disproportionately fewer female attorneys, although the practice of law is the career that a large proportion of male politicians have used as a springboard to public office (McGlen and O'Connor, 1983). Welch's study was based on a sample of legislators for a dozen states in the central region of the United States, plus a 1972 national election survey sample of the electorate of those same states. Measuring and comparing both sets in terms of standard sociological attribute criteria, particularly socioeconomic status, she concluded that there should have been from three to four times as many female legislators as she found in fact, assuming that the structural characteristics should predict for females the same as for males. Instead of finding that only eight percent of the legislators were female, she ought to

have found about 25% -which would still be far less than the 53% that women comprise of the total population. Welch interpreted this finding to signify support for the structural hypothesis: that women in the age cohorts of her study were indeed held back from participating more fully in the state legislative office, because of their restriction from enjoying equal opportunity with men to become educated suitably for entry into the professions. But there were clearly other and even more important constraints to keep female legislative representation down to only a third of the level it should have been on the basis of even the structural inequality that obtained; and a level less than a sixth of what true demographic parity with men would have required.

Stoper (1977) reported that the domestic labor of the husbands of political women did not significantly increase to compensate for the wives' outside commitments of time and energy; but political involvement by men did increase the domestic labor of their wives. This and other aspects of situational factors give men a preferential advantage over women, in political participation: not only is it expected that men more than women will do it but also the side costs to men for political participation are much lower than they are for women. It is, therefore, the more incongruous, in response to the question, "To what extent do you feel your political activities conflict with your family life?" that half again as many *men* as women (62% to 41 %) professed to experience a high degree of conflict (Sapiro, 1982a). Other situational factors were investigated by Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz (1977), who found that for a local sample of respondents in Houston, Texas, working-class men and women were more alike in both political attitudes and behavior than upper-middle class persons among whom there were larger differences between the sexes. However, working-class women who took an active role in community politics in Chicago had much higher levels of political information and awareness as a result of their political activities (McCourt, 1977); whereas the Houston women with young children were less likely to vote irrespective of social class, education, and age (Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz, 1977).

McDonagh (1982) found, contrary to the conventional wisdom that increased employment of women (achieved status) is the best explanation for increased political participation, that *derived* status was just as important. Derived status refers to the occupational and social class status of one's spouse, which indicates that housewives share in the socioeconomic status of their husbands and hence have

an equivalent situational basis for political participation. However, a study of the 1980 presidential election, by Poole and Ziegler (1982), reported that the proportion of female voters classified as housewives dropped from 49% in 1968, to only 27% in 1980. Examination of the data they report shows that this 22 % drop in women who identified themselves as housewives was divided, between an increase of 9 % in working women, and a larger increase of 13 % in women who were temporarily laid off, unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, or students. It is therefore not surprising that in 1980, as in the three previous presidential elections, women did not vote cohesively as a group. In the 1972 election, men voted in diametric opposition to working women: the percentages of support for McGovern and Nixon were 33 % and 56 % for men, but 58 % and 35 % for working women; while housewives voted 18% and 64%-even more conservatively than men generally. Virtually identical differences occurred again, in the 1976 election between Carter and Ford; but a big change came in 1980, with the support for Carter and Reagan divided 26% to 40% for men, and a much smaller difference of 30% to 36% for working women and of 27% to 34% for housewives.

Voting remains the most common, and usually the only, form of conventional political participation that Americans take part in, but voting is not a valid indicator of political mobilization because of the weak relationship between voting and other types of participation. Of those persons included in the 1967 national electoral sample studied by Verba and Nie (1972), about one in ten was relatively active on all of the dimensions of participation that they studied: community cooperation with others, contacting others, and campaigning, as well as voting. On the other hand, almost one person in four was found to be completely inactive on all dimensions and took no interest at all in politics.

The sociological profile that describes females most likely to vote includes having at least some college education; upper middle class or higher family income; being a professional person; living elsewhere in the country than in one of the southern or border states (although by 1976 this residential subcultural effect was only a third as large as it had been a quarter of a century earlier); and being between 30 and 60 years of age. These same criteria also predict male voting; and Lansing (1974: 11) presents data showing that in presidential elections, women under age 65 vote in almost the same proportions as men, although over 65 fewer women vote. But voting

by women continues to increase as more women become employed other than as homemakers exclusively. By 1976 black women voted in slightly higher proportions than did black men, and in all of the regions of the country including the South.

Elite Participation: General

Although women comprised a clear majority of 53% of the total voting population of the United States in 1979, they filled only about 4 % of all elective political positions (Hedlund et al., 1979: 513) . But there are considerable differences in the proportions of women participating in different institutional arenas; for example, women are relatively well represented among White House staffers, but least in the office of the Presidency itself; and (subject to considerable local and regional variation) on average are best represented in local government councils, next best in state legislatures, and least well in Congress. Schramm (1981) reports summary data from which it is possible to generalize about changes during the half century 1931-1981. The proportion of female members of the U.S. House of Representatives, for example, did not exceed 4 % during the period 1964-1980 (and was less than that during the intervening elections); and although that level was double what it had been during the Hoover Administration, that nevertheless constituted an increase of only 2%. In state legislatures, however, there was a gradual but steady increase from the same 2% level in 1931, to the 4-5% level from 1953-1973, after which there was a rapid increase to over 10 % by 1981. The proportion of female delegates to Democratic national conventions remained relatively stable at 20 ± 5% from 1924-1972; but that level doubled in 1976, and was 50% in 1980. Change for the Republican female delegates was similar although at a slightly lower level: from 15 ± 5 % from 1924-1972, doubling in 1976 to about a third.

Female White House staffers fluctuated within the range of 10 ± 5% from 1940-1975, and then tripled to about 30 % under the Carter Administration in 1976. The first female Cabinet officer was Frances Perkins in 1933; by half a century later and including Elizabeth Dole, there was a total of seven. Women had constituted a relatively substantial proportion of 6 to 7% of other federal executives during the New Deal and World War II periods; this dropped to 3 ± 1 % from 1945-1972; and then climbed back (under the Ford and Carter Administrations) to 8% and rising by 1977.

Marilyn Johnson (1980: 63-64) reports that by 1978, 14% of the Presidential appointments in the Carter Administration were women; while the 18 women who served in the House during the 95th Congress constituted 3'/2 % of its membership.

There were two female governors and three lieutenant governors by 1978, and about an hundred women in state cabinet-level executive positions (Stewart, 1980: 4). By Johnson's calculation slightly over 9% of state legislators in 1978 were women, 101 of the 1,975 senators and 601 of 5,583 state representatives. Data for 1975 indicated that women then constituted almost 15 % of state administrative boards and commissions-although a majority of the agencies surveyed had no female members whatsoever. At the county level of government women included about 3% of all officeholders; whereas in municipal governments, some 10,000 women constituted 8% of the mayors plus council members; and in local school boards, women were about 25 % of the members in 1978 (see Jennings, 1979, on "school politics").

Congress

Since the beginnings of the 1970s, congresswomen increasingly have come to resemble congressmen demographically; congresswomen always had resembled congressmen in terms of socioeconomic status. Prior to then, for example, half of the female U.S. Senators (like Muriel Humphrey) and two-fifths of the representatives were appointed or elected to vacancies created by the deaths of their husbands; and the average congresswoman was significantly older (about 6 years: 58 as compared to 52) than the average congressman. There was also a pronounced regional bias in sexual representation prior to 1972: only 17 congresswomen had come from southern states, and of these only two had been elected at regular elections. Werner (1968: 45, and 1966) states that

> Biographical information of the seventy women who served in Congress from 1921 to 1964 indicated that they were an "elite" group. The majority had college degrees and considerable professional training and experience, predominantly in the areas of teaching, law, communications, and the applied sciences. Most had been married and shared a successful political partnership with their husbands. Effective springboards for entry into Congress had been service in the state legislatures and their party organizations on the local, state, and national level, after their childbearing years were over.

Gehlen (1977: 15-17) has discussed the party regularity and effectiveness of the congresswomen serving in the 91st Congress (1969-1970), whom she compared with a random sample of that session's congressmen. There were only ten women (6 Democrats and 4 Republicans) and the 7 % sample of the men included 30 (of the total of 425) males, 17 Democrats and 13 Republicans. Even with these very small samples, her analysis showed a statistically significant difference in favor of women, in effectiveness in getting introduced bills enacted into legislation: 3% for the women and only 2% for the men. For successful bills that women had supported as sponsors, over 40 % listed a female either exclusively or as first among a group of co-sponsors; for enacted bills supported by men, less than 25% showed a congressman as the only or leading sponsor. This finding contradicts the stereotype that women are by nature and/or training incapable of being as effective legislators as men. In terms of their voting these congresswomen supported President Nixon, their own respective parties, and indeed the House of Representatives as a whole at slightly higher levels than did the men. Nevertheless, the odds were extremely high that none of these women could ever expect to be elected to the party floor leadership (to say nothing of becoming the first female Speaker); according to McGlen and O'Connor (1983) only seven women have chaired congressional committees.

State Legislators

Werner (1968: 43-50) remarked the underrepresentation in state legislatures of women in what were in 1963-64 the five most populous, highly urbanized, and industrialized states (California, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio); instead, women were relatively more numerous in the legislatures of smaller, New England or Western states. Of course, a contemporary list would certainly substitute Texas for Ohio (and possibly Florida and Arizona for Pennsylvania and Illinois, depending upon how the criteria of population, urbanization, and industrialization were to be weighted); but in any case the relationship denoted by Werner would certainly be weakened both because of change in the classification of states, and because of change during the past two decades in the representation of women in state legislatures generally. Twenty years ago, however, most female state legislators were or had been married; had reared children; and had had some post-

secondary education, although a majority had not completed college. Their most common political background experience was in party organization (either state or local), or in city or town government; some had had experience as lobbyists. Most had been in their late forties when initially elected as a state legislator; and most had accumulated relatively short tenure compared to the average for the men with whom they served. Most of these women were affiliated with whichever was the *minority* party in their respective states; and few of them had attained positions of leadership as chairs of major committees; and of course none as majority or minority party floor leader or as house speaker.

Diamond (1977: 38-45) presents more recent data for the 1971 state legislative sessions. She found

> very few young women; only 7 percent of the women are under forty as compared to 21` percent of the men. Young children generally preclude only mothers, not fathers, from active political and occupational involvement. Twenty-eight percent of the men had a child below the age of ten, while this was true of only 13 percent of the women. The female legislators have not foregone childbearing for their political careers (twenty-eight had families with four or more children), for each of the sexes had an average of 2.6 children. Perhaps most striking is the fact that a large proportion of the legislators are elderly: 40 percent of the men and 31 percent of the women are sixty-five years old or more. Not suprisingly, this age pattern results in distinct differences with respect to marital status. Among men 89 percent are married and 4 percent are widowed, while among women 59 percent are married and 24 percent widowed. Widowhood may provide women with an opportunity for a new career.

Women were much better represented in the lower than in the upper chambers, and not least because of the much larger size of the lower houses; almost half (23) of the senates contained no women, while for the remaining 26, the range was from one to four women. (The legislature of Nebraska is unicameral.) There was not much difference in the educational background of male as compared to female legislators, by 1971; about ten percent more men had completed a postgraduate degree, while an equivalently larger proportion of women than of men had college degrees but no postgraduate work. There were striking differences in individual income, since most of the women but few of the men were married to spouses who supported them. There were distinct differences in political party office-holding experience: a fourth of the women legislators who

had had party experience, but virtually none of the men, had worked in a position classified as that of a "secretary"; 30% of the men but only 12% of the women had held the office of party "chairman," although an additional 14% of the women had served as party "vice-chairman" (back in those days of sexist language: see, for example, Martyna, 1980; Adams and Ware, 1979). Almost half (45%) of the men, but only 18% of the women, aspired to other political or governmental positions.

The qualitative differences that Diamond found were equally important. The ambitious men were interested in state-wide elective office, not excluding the governorship (or even, possibly, the Presidency); while except for a handful of women who were thinking in terms of state-wide office, most had not set their sights above the level of chairing a house committee, or election to the state senate. There was, however, nothing unrealistic about the modal ambitions of either sex, given the structure of political opportunity open to them at the time of Diamond's survey a dozen years ago.

Another study of the same era was done by Jeane Kirkpatrick (1974), who as a conservative Democrat until 1985 served as Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations during Reagan's first term. Her book *Political Woman is* based on in-depth interviews with 46 of the 50 elite female state legislators who attended a special invitational conference that was convened in 1972 at the Rutgers University Center for the American Woman and Politics. Kirkpatrick's report is a portrayal of the highly selective group, whom she studied and compared with a sample of male state legislators, as women who indeed conform to a political sex role that is entirely compatible with the overtones as well as the undertones of the conventional model: these are respectable women who know and keep their place in a man's world. There is far more than the innuendo of the title of her book, however, for she implies that they are not just a small group of upper-class swells, but rather that somehow they typify Everywoman.

Instead, it appears that they resemble Everyman: "the most far-out political liberals among them were social conservatives: no weird lifestyles, no granny glasses, no bra burners, no noisy profanity. *In appearance and style these women are as conservative as a group of male politicians."* (Emphasis in the original.) "The respects [she continues, comparing her sample with a comparable group of men'] in which these male and female legislators differ are those directly relevant to traditional sex roles. The men have more educa-

tion; 70 % have professional degrees. Most are lawyers. All have been continuously employed. The male legislators had more children and entered politics earlier; 60 % had more than two children and almost 90 % first ran for the legislature when they were under forty." And "All these sex specific characteristics," Kirkpatrick is careful to point out, "derive from traditional role definitions which cast women as nurturers." She considers it "no accident that most of the women in this study (like most of the women who have served in Congress) have Protestant backgrounds; *that* religion traditionally defines hard work and perserverance as human rather than male virtues" (emphasis added). Her political women "accept as reasonable the prevailing relations between the sexes and, therefore, feel few resentments against the status quo." Indeed, "many of these women expect little, ask little, and get little help from their spouses. They neither expect nor get the kind of service many male legislators' wives provide." The latter remark is contrary to most other findings on the subject; and in any event, it certainly does not apply to Kirkpatrick herself, who at the time her book was published (as now) was married to the then long-time Executive Director of the American Political Science Association (who had formerly been a State Department official), a man who then as now provided the most expert and intense support for the professional career of his wife.

Quite rightly, Kirkpatrick concludes that the political women of her sample "conform in all crucial respects to the male model." But in Kirkpatrick's view it was inconceivable that any political woman could become the speaker or the majority leader of any American state legislative chamber.

Local Government

Merritt (1977) surveyed 118 suburban villages and cities ringing Chicago in Cook County (Illinois), with the objective of ascertaining possible differences in the characteristics of male and female candidates, and of winning and losing candidates. Her sample included all 145 female candidates, and a slightly smaller random sample of males. As we found to be true also of state legislators, the female candidates tended to be less well educated and consequently fewer of them than of men had professional occupations. However, Merritt argues that civic volunteerism provided the female candidates with alternative experiences for obtaining relevant skills. The

average age was the same for both sexes; but as we found to be true for legislators, there were fewer women than men either under 30 or over 60 years of age. So far her findings seem consistent with those, reviewed above, concerning state legislators. For both the male and the female candidates, those over forty years of age tended to be winners; while younger candidates of both sexes tended to be losers-and all under 30 lost. Non-professional persons tended to be winners while professionals tended to be losers, however, even though candidates with relatively higher incomes were more numerous and more successful than poorer ones. Most surprisingly, and again for both sexes, those with only secondary or technical education were much more successful than all of the candidates with higher education. Females with civic involvement tended to be winners, but every one of the males with heavy civic involvement lost his election. Male candidates who derived from political participation "impersonal" satisfactions (defined as representing constituents, public service, and solving problems) tended to be winners; but females with the same orientation tended to be losers. Merritt concluded that for men, success was related to social contacts with local politicians, while for women it was related to non-elective political involvement.

Welch and Karnig (1979) looked at the characteristics of council members and mayors in the 264 American cities with at least 10% blacks and populations of 25,000 or more. Based on Diamond's study of state legislators, the authors here hypothesized that (1) the less desirable and important the office, the higher the proportion of females elected to it; and conversely (2) the more prestigious or financially rewarding the position, the higher the proportion of males. They considered the hypothesis that women would do better in at-large than in single-member district elections; but the published evidence bearing on this question was in conflict. They hypothesized also that white females in competition with minority candidates (e.g., black males) would be less successful than female candidates in competition with male candidates of the same race as themselves; they did not consider the alternative hypothesis, that white females would do less well than black females with whom they are in direct electoral competition. Welch and Karnig's 1978 study found women in 13% of the positions surveyed, an increase of 30% over the 9.7% of females in comparable positions observed by one of the co-authors in a study done only two years earlier. Nevertheless, only 6% of the cities in their sample had female mayors;

40% had no female council members; and in only 2.3% of the councils surveyed did women occupy half or more of the positions. Moreover, the attained proportion of 13% was only one-fourth of the 52% of the seats that would correspond to their proportion of the population of the sampled cities. The competition hypothesis was not supported by their data, however,-white females won just as frequently over black as over white males, relatively speaking. The hypothesis about desirability and importance of positions was supported. The authors concluded that the main hurdle is to get women nominated and officially certified as candidates: once they *are* candidates, women can win about as often as men. This finding agrees with what Diamond found for state legislators: that it is more difficult to recruit female candidates than it is to motivate them to campaign successfully.

Mezey (1978a, 1978b) undertook a study of the women serving in elective office at all levels (federal, state, and local) in the State of Hawaii during 1974-75, plus a few who had run successfully in the 1974 election. Mezey noted that 1974 appears to have been a turning point in the representation of women in Hawaiian politics. Less than 20 women served in the state legislature throughout the preceding half century, whereas ten were elected in 1974. Nine women were elected to municipal councils in that year and Patsy Mink was congresswoman from Hawaii then. Mezey selected a matching sample of male politicians, ending up with 42 respondent officials: 27 Democrats and 15 Republicans. She asked them about their perceptions of the assets and liabilities of female officeholders and found sharp differences in the outlook of male and female respondents on most of the issues that she asked about.

Mezey found that women, to a much greater degree than men, deemed important as assets such personal attributes of women as honesty, sincerity, charm, and sensitivity. Women believed also that female candidates are handicapped by mass chauvinism-that they are not taken seriously by voters, are not considered smart enough, and are believed to be too emotional. However, Mezey's respondents thought that it is an asset for women that they feel and show greater concern for people and people's issues-women are easier for people to talk to, less concerned with power, and more humane; but women are specifically handicapped by elite male chauvinism because their male colleagues do not accept or respect female officials as equals. On the other hand, Mezey's male respondents, to a much greater degree than the females, believed that: women have a

campaign advantage in that public attitudes require males to treat female opponents with kid gloves, in public debate and discussion (the handicap under which George Bush avowedly labored in his "vice-presidential" debate with Geraldine Ferraro); women really are inferior to males-females talk too much, are too concerned with comfort and their appearance, and lack the staying power (stamina) of males. Once in office, the men felt, women betray other of their inherent weaknesses and liabilities-females are too emotional, demand special privileges that males do not expect, are too concerned with trivia, and tend to nit-pick. Twice as many women as men were also of the opinion that, once in office, women have to work harder than men do to prove themselves, and that women maintain regular informal social interactions with colleagues outside the official political sessions. Five times as many women as men believed that women are frozen out of informal gatherings of their male colleagues, while men, directly to the contrary, said that they believed that women are fully included in the informal gatherings of political colleagues.

Mezey found that her female respondents had more positive attitudes than did the men towards women participating in the political arena, and that they were more inclined to view marriage and a political career as compatible. The women also had more favorable attitudes than men towards an increased role for women in politics, but there was no important difference between women and men in regard to "women's issues" of policy (such as strict enforcement of equal pay for equal work, reform of rape laws, and the provision of adequate childcare and preschool facilities for the benefit of working parents).

Mezey reports that the public image of her female respondents was that of just being one of the boys, "not stressing any differences between themselves and their male opponents on the basis of sex-especially on women's issues." But that is not the way in which the female candidate for the governorship came across in Hawaii's statewide primary election of September 1982. The incumbent male, who easily won and considerably outspent his principal opponent (the female) in the Democratic Party primary, stood pat on his old-boy image as a stalwart product of and the principal heir to the Jack Burns machine which had run the state for a full political generation. George Ariyoshi ran, as he put it, "on his record," discussed no issues, and debated no opponents. Jean King, who had been his Lieutenant Governor for the preceding four years, pro-

bably expected to lose and therefore was able to give considerable time and thought to her concession speech, in which she presented herself as a deeply concerned, highly issue-oriented, and conspicuously female human. She ran as herself, with little reference to or use of her family; while the governor was tireless in rounding up virtually his entire extended family, conspicuously covering three generations, as the reference group presented with him for public approbation. It was impossible for even a moderately dispassionate viewer of the telecast of Mrs. King's final campaign speech to find any objective basis for looking upon her as "one of the boys"-which the Governor so patently is. Very much to the contrary, she came through as an example of what some feminist writers have begun to call the New Political Woman.

Judges

By 1977, the number of female federal judges was only 7 (out of a total of more than 500), or about 1.4% . Five of them were United States district court judges; one was an appeals court judge; and one a judge of the Tax Court. There were no women on the territorial courts or the other federal administrative courts; and no woman had ever been a member of the United States Supreme Court. Cook (1980: 42, 54, 132-33) indicates that in 1977 there were 28 (out of a total of 813) female judges of state appellate courts (3.4%); 134 (out of 5,146) in the state courts of general jurisdiction (2.6 %); and 213 (out of 3,950) in the minor state courts (5.4%). Two-fifths of the female judges of the state courts of general jurisdiction were no more than fifty years old; ten (about 8%) were black; almost three-fourths were Democrats and slightly more than a fifth were Republicans, while eight others did not identify themselves with either major party. There were no female judges of the general jurisdiction courts of twenty states; only one such female judge in each of ten states; two.to five each in fourteen states; and more than five each in the remaining six states. In the trial benches of the 58 major metropolitan areas at that time, there were no female judges in 26 cities; one each in 13 cities; from two to five each in another 13 cities; six each in Miami and in the District of Columbia; seven each in Chicago and Philadelphia; ten in New York City; and fourteen in Los Angeles.

Five years later, there were substantial changes ire the participation of women as judges at all levels of government, On September

25, 1981, Sandra O'Connor joined the United States Supreme Court (see Cook, 1982b; and cf. Cook, 1979); and there were a dozen federal appeals judges (out of an increased total of 144), and all of them were due to President Jimmy Carter's strong follow-through on his campaign commitment to increase the representation of qualified women in the federal government (see Martin, 1982). Shirley Hufstedler, the only female federal appeals judge in 1977, had resigned in 1979 to accept a position in the Carter cabinet. Instead of five there were thirty-six female federal district judges (of whom three-fourths were appointed by Carter), out of an increased total of 514; so the percentage of women judges in the regular federal lower courts had increased to between 7 and 8 % (data compiled, and kindly made available to this author, by Professor Beverly Cook, as are likewise all data relied upon in the remainder of this paragraph). The number of women judges in state appellate courts had doubled to 55 (out of a new total of 982), and in the local courts of general trial jurisdiction to 225 (out of 6,000), so that the percentages of female judicial representation were 6% for appellate and 4% for trial state courts (and see Carbon, Houlden, and Berkson, 1982). There were still two states (Nevada and South Carolina) in which no woman had ever served on a state court of appellate, general trial, or even major limited trial jurisdiction; and of course a much larger number of states-20 (40%)-in which no woman had ever served on an appellate court. Minnesota became the first state in 1982, together with the District of Columbia, to have two women serving together on the jurisdiction's supreme court. The first and organizational meeting of the National Association of Women Judges convened in Los Angeles in October 1979, with approximately 100 female federal judges in attendence. The group continued to meet annually, and its membership had grown to over three hundred judges of regular federal and state courts, plus almost half as many administrative judges, by three years later. Political scientist Professor Beverly Cook was the keynote speaker who delivered the opening address at both the first and fourth annual meetings.

Cook (1981) has undertaken to investigate the extent to which the increase in women judges will make a difference in advancing the cause of political feminism. Her study is based on both empirically observed judicial attitudes and a computer simulation of judicial decision making. She examines attitudinal differences between male and female judges in regard to public policy issues affecting most directly the interests of women. Her sample included 170 state trial

judges who responded to questionnaires mailed in 1978. Of these, the 85 women constitute two-thirds of all of the female state trial judges in courts of general jurisdiction at that time. Very much to the contrary the 85 males, although selected to match the female judges in court location, included only 1½ % of the total of 5,655 male judges of the same courts. One focus of the research was upon role conflict as this related explicitly to the cross-pressures of an outside job versus home employment of adult females. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with eight statements that had been selected to be provocative in regard to various aspects of the question. The female judges were more supportive of the feminist position in all eight instances than were the male judges: the average was 85% for female judges and 64% for males. According to Cook (1981: 231), "The simple correlation between sex of the judge and the job/home role conflict was .434"; this indicates that sex is moderately related to feminist attitude. She then took the five statements on which there was the most disagreement between the female and the male judges. She dropped from the sample of respondents the 18 males and the one female who, on the basis of a criterion derived from factor analysis, were least supportive in their attitudes toward public roles for women. The remaining state judges with high factor scores on the work/home role conflict index were then examined in terms of their percentages of support for feminism. The resulting data (Cook, 1981: 231) show that among Democrats and Republicans alike, the female judges were *twice* as supportive as the males (64% to 32%).

The simulation part of Cook's study was based on a path analysis with two independent variables, SEX and PARTY; two intervening variables, ATTITUDE and FEMINISM; and one dependent variable, DECISION. Of these, SEX was male or female; PARTY was political party self-identification; ATTITUDE was as measured on the five sex-role statements; FEMINISM was by self-identification; and DECISION was based on the judicial respondents' choices in an hypothetical case involving a married woman with children who petitioned the court for permission to resume her maiden surname. Cook was quite forthright (1981a: 233) in presuming a biobehavioral paradigm: "Biological sex is a part of the individual's identity from birth and so can be treated as the first variable in the [causal] series. Sex identity in society colors daily life and almost every experience which contributes to the development of personality."

She presumed that SEX and PARTY are statistically independent, for purposes of her analysis, on the ground that "There is no relationship expected between sex and party, since children of both sexes usually join the family party and neither party has given adult feminists an incentive for allegiance." This may have been true for her sample in this particular research, who returned their questionnaires in 1978. But it is not a statement that one would wish to make prospectively, in the light of the relatively massive changes in female representation in the federal judiciary made by Carter in 1979, and which Cook herself has analyzed and reported better than anyone else. Carter's actions certainly became quickly and well known to state trial court judges of either sex, and the impact upon pro-feminists was surely not limited to *federal* judges. Cook's data (1981a: 227) show that her sample included 55 Democratic and 15 Republican female judges, and 47 Democratic and 35 Republican males. They constituted the sample with which the path analysis was done; and for those data the phi correlation between being a female judge and Democrat is + .23. That is surely a modest correlation; but it is also somewhat large to be assumed away as an approximation of zero, The fact that there was this modest correlation between SEX and PARTY would only have the effect of making SEX seem somewhat more important, and especially in relation to PARTY, as a predictor of judicial decision-making behavior. But no doubt it implies also that the Democratic party was more supportive than the Republican party to the candidacies of female lawyers to state judicial office, whether appointive or elective.

None of the simple correlations between the variables in the causal diagram is as high as ± .40 (which would betoken at best a moderate level of relationship); and the weakest association is, counterintuitively, that between SEX and FEMINISM at only + .182, which Cook describes as "the least strong but most significant." No doubt we should understand "least strong" as referring to the correlation statistic; and "most significant" to the intuitive expectation that the statistic contradicts. It seems clear from the analysis that biological sex, attitudes toward sex role in relation to home/work, and self-identification, have together only a modest influence upon these judges' decisions in the hypothetical case of the requested pro-feminist name change.

In her conclusion, Cook (1981a: 237) remarks that "women's organizations can continue to encourage and support women with feminist attitudes and records, with a high probability of getting

egalitarian public decisions for women from the bench." This may be true; but a conclusion better supported by her path analysis would speak of a *low* probability-or at best a modest one.

Comparative

On the last Sunday in April of 1982, the all-male electorate of Switzerland's least populous canton voted by a decisive 4-1 majority to continue denying to women the right to vote in Appenzell Inner Rhoden town and cantonal elections. Only those of the 5,000 resident adult males who are armed with either a sword or a bayonet are permitted to join in the Landsgemeinde, the annual outdoor assembly that decides by popular vote the important issues confronting the community. There was a brief debate before the vote was taken on the question of women's suffrage; and a young male member of the assembly declared that Appenzell women did not need the right to vote because they fully trusted men to take care of their interests. Hundreds of foreign tourists and local women who were spectators of the colorful meeting in the town square reacted with boos and laughter to the show of hands favoring continuation of the male monopoly of local politics. Switzerland, although widely (if somewhat romantically: Herold, 1948; Wolf, 1969) esteemed in popular opinion as a veritable cradle of political democracy (Thurer, 1971; Barber, 1974), was the last country in Europe to permit -.omen to vote in national elections and to hold political office in the national government, beginning only in 1971.

Werner (1966) noted the seeming incongruity that the United States, which she characterized as one of the oldest Western democracies, nevertheless had the smallest percentage of women in its national legislature as compared to either western European or eastern Asian countries. At that time the United States had 2%, as compared to Great Britain (3%), France and Norway (4% each), the Netherlands (6%), Denmark (11%), and Taiwan (15%). But only in Japan (50%) were women equally represented at that time.

A survey of the national legislatures of six countries (Kohn, 1980; and for a global summary of 35 countries, see Boulding, 1976: 792-94) shows during the three decades 1949-79 an average of about 30 women (6% of the total membership) continuously in the West German Bundestag. This was more than in any of the other countries sampled (Austria, Switzerland, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States) although less than the proportion of female represen-

tation in the Communist East German Volkskammer, for which the data cited (Kohn, 1980: 173) indicate an average of 110 women deputies (an average of 26% of the total membership) for the two decades 1950-71. The comparable data for Austria (1949-79) indicate an average of 11 female deputies (6%) of the Nationalrat. The Swiss data cover, of course, only the single decade 1971-79 during which an average of 16 women (8%) served in the Nationalrat. The corresponding figures for the British House of Commons and the Canadian House of Commons are 25 and 6 (4 % and 1 %, respectively) for the three decades 1949-79.

The equivalent data for the United States for the same three decades are an average of 14 congresswomen and 1 (less than 1 ½ %) female Senator, for averages of 3% and 1% of the total memberships of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Evidently women have been better represented, in terms of absolute members, in both the West German Bundesrat and the British House of Commons (and even in the Swiss Nationalrat!) than in the American House of Representatives; and in terms of relative representation, the percentages show that women did about twice as well in all three of the continental legislatures as they did in the Anglo-American ones. Of the six countries sampled, only in Canada were women more poorly represented in the national legislature than they were in the United States. However, O'Connor and McGlen (1978: 600) have pointed out that, contrary to the situation in either Great Britain or Canada, in the United States the federal courts have undertaken a much more activist role in defining both constitutional and statutory guarantees so as to extend the legal rights of women (see O'Connor, 1980) . In the opinion of these authors, "the situation of women in the U.S. *at present* seems to be *relatively* [their italics] the best," at least as compared to Britain and Canada.

Five of the same six countries included in Kohn's analysis of legislatures, but with Finland and Italy and the Netherlands substituted for Canada, were included in an eight-country study by Jennings (1982), of sex differences in political participation. The behaviors studied included: discussing politics with others, contacting public officials or politicians, attending political meetings, working for a political party or candidate, trying to influence others in their voting, and voting in the most recent national election. Jennings' data indicated that men's participation significantly exceeded that of women in all eight countries, although it was least so in Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and Finland; but it was

twice as large for Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany.

Concerning family socialization, Jennings was interested in investigating it as a causal factor in sex differences in political behavior. He examined the relative extent to which children talked with their fathers (as compared to their mothers) in regard to politics, study or work, religion, and sex. He found that in the United States, mothers were the preferred talking partners of children for all subjects, whereas in all of the other countries fathers were preferred for politics, and mothers for the remaining three subjects. In all countries there was a consistent scale in the ordering of the subjects that children preferred to discuss with their mothers, with sex in the highest priority, next religion, then study or work, and of course politics came last. Jennings concluded from these and other data (1982: 23) that "there must be something rather special about politics; it is somehow more appropriate for males than for females [and] the extent to which politics departs from other arenas of life in terms of parental behavior testifies to the singular staying power of the image of politics as a male enterprise."

O'Neill (1978) notes that in most countries there has been little correlation between the strength of feminism and women's suffrage. He points out that when German women were granted the right to vote by the Weimar Republic (as one plank in a broad platform of liberal reforms), the newly enfranchised female electorate rejected the social Democrats in favor of the conservative, religious parties that had been most adamantly opposed to women's suffrage. This helped pave the way for the Nazis, who of course were fanatical in their suppression of women and sex egalitarianism (Rupp, 1980; Millett, 1970: 157-68). Indeed, "Women suffrage almost everywhere was advocated and fought for by left wing and liberal people[;] and women, once enfranchised, almost everywhere voted for conservative parties" (O'Neill, 1978: 211; see also Schubert, forthcoming b).

The specific causes for the rejection of what was a promising beginning for political feminism during the post-World War I period were different in the Soviet Union. Lapidus (1974: 253; and cf. Millett, 1970: 168-76; and Farnsworth, 1980) reports that:

> Particularly in the late 1920s and early 1930s the proportion of women voting in elections and participation in the work of soviets and governmental executive committees at all levels increased rapidly. This pattern is less true at higher levels of leadership, where the small number

> of women in high executive positions within the governmental apparatus contrasts strikingly with their active role in local civic affairs . . . As a result of intensive recruitment efforts the proportion of women in the [Communist Party itself] rose from 8 % in 1922 to 16.5 % in 1934, and from 17% in 1945 to 20.7% in 1950. It has remained stable at this level for over two decades, with the current proportion at 22.6%. Moreover, women are largely absent from the leadership of the party. Only one woman has ever been a member of the powerful Politburo, and the proportion of women in the party leadership was greater in the prerevolutionary period than it has been at any time since then.

More generally, Kirkpatrick (1976: 468) observed that "Women are as rare in the leadership circles of Communist parties as they are in the top levels of most conservative parties. The Maoist, Soviet, and Castro governments share with Vorster's South Africa, Amin's Uganda, and Anglo-Saxon and European democracies the condition of male dominance."[3]

A mid-seventies public opinion survey indicated that the Danes and British were most sympathetic at least to the idea of having women participate actively in the *discussion* of politics, followed by the French, and then the Germans. In terms of the direction of their views, women were found to be more conservative than men but particularly so in such predominantly Roman Catholic countries as Italy, France, and Belgium. Sapiro (1981a) analyzed cross-cultural survey data concerning the attitudes of political party members, classified by sex. In the United Kingdom as well as in France and Italy, men were more pessimistic than women about equal socioeconomic opportunity for women, and only in Germany were women less optimistic than men. On the other hand, only in France was there isomorphism between general political ideology, and feminist ideology (that is, for both males and females, respondents affiliated with the political left perceived the most inequality of opportunity for females; while those on the political right perceived the least inequality as between men and women in their employment opportunities.)[4]

3. For discussions of the political behavior of women in some other countries, see: Algeria (Boals, 1974); Black Africa (van Allen, 1974); Chile (Chaney, 1974); China (Maloney, 1980); Columbia (Harkess, 1980); Costa Rica (Aviel, 1974); Cuba (Casal, 1980); and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Jancar, 1974).

4. Political feminism in several countries of western Europe is discussed for: East Germany (Einhorn, 1981); Finland (Juusola-Halonen, 1981); France (Sauter-Bailliet,

The most general hypothesis given widespread credence by the relevant research literature in comparative politics is that there is a correlation between sexual political equality and modernization (i.e., industrialization, urbanization, and what a generation ago was called "political development" in "Third World countries"). This view sees the most traditional societies as the ones that are most vigorously male-dominated; and that contrariwise, the ones that have gone furthest in integrating technology with welfare socialization are the polities most open to sexual egalitarianism in politics, as perhaps best exemplified by Japan and Scandinavia-and perhaps most quintessentially by Petra Kelly, the former leader of the Green party in West Germany whose own political socialization was in part American during the 1960s with Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy; but see section 3 of Schubert (forthcoming a); and see Papadakis (1984), Capra and Spretnak (1984), and Kelly (1984).

Baxter and Lansing (1980: 143, 167, 174) claim that, going beyond the formal semblances of sexual political equality, nowhere in the world is there equality between men and women in terms of the actual political power they wield.

Summary

This review has examined first the models of political behavior that political scientists have employed to understand how and why government is organized and operates, and public policy gets made. That analysis underscores the extent to which politics was conceptualized and perceived to be man's game until only about two decades ago. Next we observed the feminist critique of the "For Men Only" polity, including evidence indicating that the political scientist image of political sexual egalitarianism lags far behind the changes that have taken place in actual political behaviors-which we examined in detail in the third major part of the review. That analysis demonstrates that there have been important and pervasive changes in the extent of female political participation and activism; but those changes have been largest in elections and least in political elite office holding, and they have been larger in the governance of local communities; less at the level of state governance; and least in

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1981); Italy (Columbo, 1981); the Netherlands (de Vries, 1981); Portugal (Barbosa, 1981); Spain (Raque-Arias, 1981); and West Germany (Kawan and Weber, 1981).

the elective and highest appointive offices of the federal government.

Similar changes have been taking place in other countries throughout the world, but much more so in industrialized "first world" countries than in much more recently politically independent-it would hardly be accurate to characterize most of them as politically *liberated-countries* of the "third world."

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