Kissinger's World Restored *and Statesmanship in Search of World* **Order**

Philosophical thinking about statesmanship is indispensable for establishing the basis of legitimacy and order in world politics. Legal or moral choices in a state's external relations achieve meaning only within a normative framework where the claims of power and ethics are harmonized in national self-expression. This paper examines the philosophy of statesmanship inherent *in* Henry Kissinger's account of how Metternich and Castlereagh brought order to Europe after the Napoleonic Wars at the Congress of Vienna. Kissinger's analysis, in A *World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822,* focuses on the possibilities of statesmanship and the philosophical blend of prophesy, daring, and self-control that characterized classical diplomacy at its height. What makes Kissinger's book a lasting contribution-in diplomatic history and political thought-is his profile of the statesman as both a willful creature and tragic prisoner of history, situated at an uneasy juncture where the logic of political necessity flows from a deeper understanding of the relation between authority and freedom in the lives of men and nations. Kissinger did not approach these leaders as a nineteenth century schoolboy would have pondered Plutarch's *Lives,* imagining that he would find models worthy of emulation; he studied them because they gave him a perspective from which he could more effectively examine the problems of his own time.'

Part of this philosophical perspective can be found in Kissinger's appraisal of Metternich's approach to political problems as an example of the rationalist model of the philosopher-statesman.

> Statesmanship was the science of the interests of states, and subject to laws entirely analogous to the laws of the physical world. The statesman was a philosopher who understood these maxims, who performed his tasks but reluctantly, for they deflected him from the source of the only real enjoyment, the contemplation of truth; he was responsible only to his conscience and to history-to the former because it contained his vision of truth, to the latter because it provided the only test of its validity.'

Austria's foreign minister regarded his political maxims as universal and eternal principles expressive of an underlying metaphysical order. Philosophy, in a time of permanent revolution, was the only means of rescuing universality from contingent claims. Metternich's great successes "had been achieved by a remarkable diplomatic skill which had enabled him to control events by defining their moral framework." Diplomacy, however, "is not a substitute for conception; its achievements . . . will depend upon its objectives, which are defined outside the sphere of diplomacy and which diplomacy must treat as given." This was for Kissinger a reminder that creativity in statecraft is not exhausted in the necessary tension between organization and inspiration. Noting that the multi-lingual Habsburg Empire presented virtually insurmountable problems, Kissinger remarked:

> Any real criticism of Metternich must . . attack not his ultimate failure, but his reaction to it. It is Metternich's smug satisfaction with an essentially technical virtuosity which prevented him from achieving the tragic stature he might have, given the process in which he was involved. Lacking in Metternich is the attribute which has enabled the spirit to transcend an impasse at so many crises in history: the ability to contemplate an abyss, not with the detachment of a scientist, but as a challenge to overcome-or perish in the process.'

The task of the statesman, therefore, is not only to maintain the perfection of order, "but to have the strength to contemplate chaos,

there to find material for fresh creation."

The first part of this essay assesses Kissinger's distinction between the "insular" and "continental" statesman, with an emphasis on relating system-wide equilibrium to domestic structure. A second line of analysis illustrates that Kissinger's comparison of legitimate and revolutionary international orders drew upon competing philosophical orientations on the interplay of authority and freedom in man's political existence. Final remarks address the requirements of rational statesmanship and the common fate of mankind.

Legitimacy, Revolution, and Principles of World Order

It is significant that Kissinger begins a work of diplomatic history with an ethical reminder of the imperfect relation between intentions and consequences in foreign policy behavior, Those ages, he suggested, which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search ofpeace. "Whenever peace-conceived as the avoidance of war-has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community." The most generous ideals combine with a maximum incentive to mollify the most aggressive state and to accept its demands, even when they are unreasonable. Such situations could only produce massive instability and insecurity. By contrast, the goal of stability based on an equilibrium of forces is realizable only when "the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace." Stability, according to Kissinger, has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy.

Kissinger examines two ways of constructing an international order: by will or by consensus, that is, by conquest or by legitimacy. For twenty-five years prior to the Congress of Vienna, Napoleonic Europe was convulsed by an effort to achieve order through power, and to contemporaries the lesson was not its failure but its near success. Legitimacy, as used here, should not be confused with justice; "it means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims

and methods of foreign policy."[5] Kissinger acknowledged that war might occur in a legitimate order; he insisted, however, that such a war would be limited, and that diplomacy would be an option. In other words, wars would be fought *in the name* of the existing structure and the resulting peace would be justified as a better expression of the "legitimate," general consensus.

Few periods illustrate so clearly the dilemma posed by the appearance of a revolutionary power than the aftermath of the wars of the French Revolution. The basic property of a revolutionary power "is not that it feels threatened-such feeling is inherent in the nature of international relations based on sovereign states-but *that nothing can reassure it."* Diplomacy, the art of restraining the exercise of power, cannot function in such an environment.

> But it is the essence of a revolutionary power that it possesses the courage of its convictions, that it is willing ... to push its principles to their ultimate conclusions . . . . The character - istic of a stable international order is its spontaneity; the essence of a revolutionary situation is self-consciousness. Principles of obligation in a period of legitimacy are taken so much for granted that they are never talked about, and . . . therefore appear to posterity as shallow and self-righteous. Principles in a revolutionary situation are so central that they are constantly talked about . . . and it is not unusual to find both sides invoking their version of the "true" nature of legitimacy in identical terms.[6]

A new philosophy asserted that it would recast the existing structure of obligations, and Revolutionary France set out to champion the claim. "What can make authority legitimate?" had been defined as the key question of politics. Disputes among the great powers no longer concerned the negotiation of differences within an accepted framework, but the validity of the framework itself; the political contest had become doctrinal. The balance of power which had operated so intricately throughout the eighteenth century suddenly lost its flexibility, and the European equilibrium was endangered by the revolutionary ardor of a conqueror who proclaimed the incom-

patibility of his political maxims with those of other states. Although Napoleon succeeded in overthrowing the existing concept of legitimacy, he could not replace it with an alternative. Napoleon imposed upon Europe a kind of negative unity, where force had replaced obligation, where opposition to a foreign occupier culminated "in a consciousness of otherness which was soon endowed with moral claims and became the basis of nationalism."' When Napoleon was defeated in Russia, the problem of constructing a legitimate order confronted Europe in its most concrete form.

The issue facing the statesmen at Vienna was not reform against reaction-"this is the interpretation of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." Instead, as Kissinger argues, the problem was to create an order out of which change could be brought about through a sense of obligation rather than through an assertion of power. Regardless of what one thinks about the moral content of their solution, it excluded no major power from the European concert and testified to the absence of unbridgeable schisms. Moreover, the settlement did not rest on mere good faith-which would have put too great a strain on self-limitation-or on a pure evaluation of power, which (owing to the difficulties of measurement) would have made the calculation too uncertain. Rather, there was created a structure in which forces were sufficiently balanced, so that self-restraint could appear as something more than self-abnegation, but which took account of the historical claims of its components so that it could find acceptance. There existed within the new international order no power so dissatisfied that it did not prefer to seek its remedy by working within the framework of the settlement rather than by overturning it.

Europe's ability to salvage stability from seeming chaos was largely the work of two great men: of Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, who negotiated the international settlement, and of Austria's minister Metternich, who legitimized it. When the fate of empires is at stake, the convictions of their statesmen are the medium for survival. Success in foreign policy depends on the correspondence of these convictions with the special requirements of the state. The very success of Metternich, as Kissinger explains,

made inevitable the collapse of the state he had fought so long to preserve. Metternich was a product of an age in the process of being transcended; he was born in the eighteenth century "of which Talleyrand was to say that nobody who lived after the French Revolution would ever know how sweet and gentle life could be." Like the century that formed him, "his style was better suited to the manipulation of factors treated as given than to a contest of will, better to the achievement through proportion than through scale." [8]

Metternich refused to come to terms with the new age "not because he failed to understand its seriousness but because he disdained it." Kissinger comments:

> He might achieve victory but not comprehension and for this reason he came to use the proudest claim of the Enlightenment, the belief in the universality of the maxims of reason, with increasing self-consciousness as a weapon in the revolutionary struggle. Had Metternich been born fifty years earlier, he would still have been a conservative, but there would have been no need to write pedantic disquisitions about the nature of conservatism . . . . But in a century of permanent revolution, philosophy was the only means of rescuing universality from contingent claims. It was for this reason that Metternich fought so insistently against the identification of his name with the period, an attitude seemingly so inconsistent with his vanity. [9]

"To individualize an idea," Metternich insisted, "leads to dangerous conclusions, as if an individual could be a cause; a wrong conception for when it does apply it indicates that a cause does not exist but is dissimulated." The dilemma of Metternich's conservatism, as Kissinger realizes, is "that it must fight revolution anonymously, by what it is, not by what it says.'

Metternich found a fitness in the universe which corresponded to man's highest aspirations, a well-ordered mechanism the understanding of which insured success and whose laws could not be violated with impunity: "States, just as human beings, often transgress laws, the only difference is the severity of the penalty." The Austrian statesman described his philosophy of human nature and

society as part of a universe governed by eternal laws. "Society has its laws just as nature and man. It is with old institutions as with old men, they can never be young again . . . This is the way of the social order and it cannot be different because it is the law of nature .. . the moral world has its storms just like the material one." Metternich resorted to these truisms of eighteenth century philosophy to oppose revolution and liberalism, not because they were wicked, but because they were unnatural. The essence of existence was proportion, its expression was law, and its mechanism an equilibrium. Metternich's own reflections may be cited to indicate why the conservative statesman was the supreme realist and his opponents the visionaries:

> My point of departure is the quiet contemplation of the affairs of this world, not those of the other which I know nothing and which are the object of faith . . . . In the social world .. . one must act cold-bloodedly based on observation and without hatred or prejudice . . . . I was born to make history not to write novels and if I *guess* correctly, this is because I *know.* Invention is the enemy of history which knows only discoveries, and only that which exists can be discovered."

Statesmanship, as understood by Metternich, involved understanding the "science of the interests of states." The Napoleonic Wars did not seem to him like the wars of earlier centuries-set battles with finite objectives which left the basic structure of national obligations intact. He knew it to be impossible to satisfy the Corsican *parvenu* by compromise or to moderate him by concessions. "All nations made the mistake," he wrote in 1807, "to attach to a treaty with France the value of a peace, without immediately preparing for war." Peace was illusory for a revolutionary system, "whether with a Robespierre who declares war on chateaux or a Napoleon who declares war on Powers." This belief was reinforced by Metternich's conviction that the principle of solidarity of states superseded that of revolution. Isolated states are "the abstractions of the so-called philosophers." He claimed that the "great axioms of political science" follow

> from the recognition of true interests of *all* states; it is in the general interests that the guarantee of existence is to be found, while particular interests-the cultivation of which is considered political wisdom by restless and short-sighted men-have only a secondary importance . . . . Modern history demonstrates the application of the principle of solidarity and equilibrium . . . and of the united efforts of states against the supremacy of one power in order to force a return to the common law....[12]

Similarly, Castlereagh's icy pragmatism epitomized the Britain of his time. No man more different from his great protagonist, Metternich, could be imagined. Metternich was elegant, facile, rationalist; Castlereagh solid, ponderous, and methodical; the former was witty and eloquent, if somewhat pedantic; the latter cumbersome in expression, although effective in debate. Yet, partly by design and partly through shyness, Castlereagh concealed his inner self, bearing his own burdens and thinking his own thoughts. Neither official nor private papers gave him away, and his speeches tended to be opaque rather than clear or philosophical. Yet it was this man, more than any other, who forged again a European connection for Britain, who maintained the coalition, and negotiated the settlement which in its main outlines was to last for over fifty years. The Concert of Europe grew out of the necessities of the greatest war in which Britain had ever engaged and was meant to protect her from her ancient adversary across the Channel.

As Kissinger notes, however, the war had not been fought by Britain against revolutionary doctrine, but against a universal claim; not for freedom, or the validation of a state's own historical experience, but for independence. It was this aspect alone that enabled Castlereagh to obtain for it the consent of his countrymen. Unlike the Continental powers, at war for the defense of a social order, Great Britain took up arms for the creation of "great masses" necessary to contain France: "The power," Castlereagh wrote in 1813, "of Great Britain to do good depends not merely on her resources but upon a sense of impartiality and the reconciling character of her influ-

ence . . To be authoritative she must be impartial: to be impartial she must not be in exclusive relations with any particular Court." [13] Eight years later, when Metternich was crafting a doctrine of universal interference to combat world revolution, Castlereagh reminded him that the Napoleonic Wars were joined by Britain on the basis of material considerations separate from vague enunciations of principle. [14] Since the equilibrium was viewed by Britain in political rather than social terms, its operation depended on a balance among states of roughly equal power, not on a principle of legitimacy. The British nightmare was a continental peace which excluded Britain.

The Liverpool Cabinet was a more uncompromising opponent of Napoleon's continued rule than even the Austrian government. This opposition, however, had nothing to do with the legitimacy of the Bourbons; it stemmed from the belief that no peace with Napoleon could be permanent. Napoleon's escape from Elba, Castlereagh figured, was secondary "to the more vital question whether Europe can return to that moral system by which . . the interests of mankind are to be upheld or whether we shall remain . . . under the necessity of a system of military policy; whether Europe shall in the future present the spectacle of an assemblage of free and armed nations." [15] While Metternich considered revolution "unnatural," Castlereagh looked upon the outward projection of the French Revolution as unsettling. Doctrines of government had to be subordinated to international equilibrium. Great Britain, the island power, was absolutely secure in its constitution; ideological currents across the Channel, however potent, could not seriously threaten that constitution. The doctrine of non-intervention was simply the reverse side of the belief in the uniqueness of British institutions. Castlereagh embodied these insular convictions in replying to a proposal by the Tsar for European intervention against the revolution in Spain in 1820:

> When the territorial balance of Europe is disturbed, [Britain] can interfere with effect, but she is the last Government in Europe which can be expected . . . to commit herself on any

> question of an abstract character . . . . We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution. The Alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its original formulation. It was never so explained to Parliament; if it had, most assuredly the sanction of Parliament would never have been given to it.[16]

The essential_ fallacy of Castlereagh's political philosophy, according to Harold Nicolson, was that by exaggerating the general need for "repose" he sought to enforce static principles upon a dynamic world." Obsessed by the long periods of struggle against French militarism, he identified liberal thought with revolution and revolution with war. He failed to realize that an alliance based upon the maintenance of the existing order could not preserve its unity in a Europe where interests and ambitions were in a constant state of flux. When Castlereagh began to transform the coalition against Napoleon into an international organization to preserve the peace, he ended up separating himself from the Parliament and people of Britain. The conception that stability might reside in commitment and not in a mechanical balance, in precaution and not in defense, was so far beyond the imagination of the British Cabinet that no one protested against Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance. Drafted by Castlereagh, the treaty provided for periodic conferences "by the High Contracting Parties ... for the consideration of the measures which shall be the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations ...."[18] George Canning argued that this "new and very questionable" method of diplomacy would "necessarily involve us . deeply in all the politics of the continent, where as our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies and then with commanding force."[19] Castlereagh, as Nicolson explains, refused to face the fact that both Metternich and Alexander, Czar of Russia, were fundamentally averse to democratic or constitutional thought; whereas he desired to use the Grand Alliance to protect the small nations, they desired to exploit it for purposes of repression. Above all, Castlereagh underestimated the mood of

isolationism in British public opinion which induced men of all parties to regard as "foreign" and "un-English" a policy of continental commitments and negotiation. "He failed," wrote Sir Charles Webster, "to associate his ideas with the deepest emotions of his age."[20]

The Normative Foundation of International Obligations in a Revolutionary Age

The statesmen at Vienna sought to replace the Napoleonic reliance on force with a set of international arrangements that depended on a "sense of obligation." There had to be a "consensus on the nature of a just arrangement"; otherwise, there would be no possibility of a stable international order, which alone guaranteed peace. A revolutionary period in politics or world affairs is a symptom of the fact that the self-evidence of the goals of the social effort has disintegrated, that a significant segment of society holds values which either cannot or will not be assimilated. It is not the adjustment of differences *within* a political system which is now of issue, but the political system itself. As a result, stability and reform, liberty and authority, come to appear as antithetical, and political contests turn philosophical and ethical instead of empirical.' The challenge of stipulating the normative foundations to world order-the requirements of legitimacy *and* justice among conflicting states-rests ultimately with visions of permanence and change in human nature and history. Kissinger writes: "The statesman lives in time; his test is the permanence of structure under stress. The prophet lives in eternity which, by definition, has no temporal dimension; his test is inherent in his vision." The confrontation between the two is tragic, "because the statesman must strive to reduce the prophet's vision to precise measures, while the prophet will judge the temporal structure by transcendental standards."[22]

In an important chapter analyzing the political thought of Metternich, Kissinger compares the ethical underpinnings of conservative and revolutionary concepts of political legitimacy. Both perspectives may be viewed as answers for two complementary questions: What is the meaning of authority? What is the nature of freedom? Political obligation in a stable social order is associated

with the concept of *duty-the* assertion of the self-evidence of social maxims in a world where an alternative to the status-quo is virtually inconceivable. Political obligation in a revolutionary period is associated with a concept of *loyalty,* whereby submitting the individual to the general will of society takes on a symbolic and even ritualistic significance because, as Kissinger notices, alternatives seem everpresent.[23] "An ethic of duty involves a notion of *responsibility,"* whereby actions are judged according to the orientation of the will. This may also be considered "an ethic of motivation," involving political actions of the individual in conformity with a standard of morality which-no matter how rigid-must become individually accepted in order to be meaningful. "An ethic of loyalty involves a notion of *orthodoxy,"* in the sense of providing a basis for group identity. Kissinger describes this also as an "ethic of relation to group standards which may be validated in any number of ways: by rationality, tradition, charisma, etc." It does not exclude the individual from the social code, but it does not require it. The language and universality of duty is epitomized by Kant's categorical imperative, "Act so that the maxim of your act might be made a universal principle." This command speaks to an obligation which is objectively necessary without any regard to personal advantage, desire, or a more ultimate goal. The language of loyalty and contingency is evident in the maxim "My country right or wrong."[24]

"The world is subject to two influences," Metternich wrote, "the social and the political . . . . The political element can be manipulated; not so the social element whose foundations must never be surrendered."[25] How, then, could a conservative rescue his positions from the contingency of conflicting claims? Kissinger analyzes different dimensions of the conservative remedy by comparing Metternich's political thought with that of Edmund Burke. On the one hand, Burke's conservatism rejected revolutionary change in the name of historical forces, inasmuch as change undermines the temporal aspect of society as well as the social contract. It was "wise Prejudice," Burke avowed, "to venerate and demonstrate loyalty to the nation; one should approach to the faults of the state as the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solicitude."

> Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure-but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement . . . . It is to be looked on with reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of a particular state is but a clause in a great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher nature . . . according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.[26]

Burke's inclination toward conservatism led him to give long-established political institutions the benefit of the doubt and to regard the task of reason-properly conceived-to be the elucidation of the implications of a tradition for a particular concrete situation. As he expressed it, "When ancient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment, we have no compass to govern us ...."[27]

On the other hand, Metternich's conservatism led him to fight revolution in the name of reason, to deny the validity of questions about the nature of authority on epistemological grounds. To Burke, history was the expression of the ethos of a people; to Metternich, it was a "force" to be dealt with, more important than most social forces, but of no greater moral validity. The disorders brought on by revolution were symptoms of a trans-national period and their violence a reflection of the ignorance of their advocates: "Revolutions are temporary disturbances in the life of states . . . . Order always ends up by reclaiming its own: states do not die like individuals, they transform themselves." The statesman's role was to guide this transformation and to supervise its direction. The difference,

then, between a conservative and a revolutionary order was not the fact of change but its mode:

> A consideration the liberal spirit usually ignores ... , is the difference in the life of states, as of individuals, between progress by measured steps or by leaps. In the first case, conditions develop with the consequence of natural law; while the latter disrupts this connection . . . . Nature is development, the ordered succession of appearances; only such a course can eliminate the evil and foster the good. But leaping transitions wind up by requiring entirely new creations-and it is not given to man to create out of nothingness. [28]

At this juncture, it is well to recall that the vital core of Metternich's policy was the idea of the balance of power. The idea of stability, a balance between extremes, was applied to man as much as to the forces of nature, and was a scientific statement of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. The ineluctable laws of the universe compelled men and things to seek repose as the only possible escape from dissolution. A disturbance of the balance would mean civil war within a state and external war between states, just as it would mean calamities in the physical world or moral anarchy in the nature of man. Metternich, while arranging in 1820 the series of congresses designed to defeat revolutions in Germany and Italy, authored a "profession of faith" which coupled an analysis of the nature of revolution with a philosophy of history. His censure of the revolutionary era profiles the presumptuous man, the natural product of a too-rapid march of the human spirit towards seeming perfection:

> Religion, morality, legislation, economics, politics, administration, all seem to have become a common good and accessible to everyone. Science appears intuitive, experience has no value for the presumptuous; faith means nothing to him and he substitutes for it the pretense of a personal conviction, to arrive at which, however, he dispenses with analysis or study, for these seem too subordinate activities to a mind which believes itself capable of embracing at one blow the whole ensemble of issues.

> Laws have no values for him because he did not contribute to their preparation and it is below the dignity of a man of his quality to recognize limits traced by ignorant and brute generations. Power resides in himself; why submit to what can have use only to men deprived of . . . insight? That which was appropriate for an age of weakness is no longer adequate for that of reason . . . . [All this] tends to an order of things which individualizes all the elements which compose society ... [29]

It was the task of statesmanship to distinguish the form and substance of this contest and to create the moral foundation of an order on which only time could confer spontaneity. Civilization was the degree to which change could come about "naturally," to which the tension between the forces of destruction and conservation was submerged in a spontaneous pattern of obligation.

Epistemological nuances did not prevent Metternich from repeating Burke's remark that a man has an interest in putting out the flames when his neighbor's house is on fire. Revolution was a kind of disease, and measures of public health ought to be international in scope. A Neapolitan or a Spanish Bourbon, a Dom Miguel in Portugal, was to be supported not because of his political virtue, nor because of the divine right of kings, but because the right of hereditary succession was a guarantee of other rights that underlie the whole social order. Metternich never thought that the principle of legitimacy belonged of itself to the moral order. Kingship was not the only form of government; hereditary monarchy was not the only form of kingship. The monarchical principle was to be defended because in Europe of the nineteenth century it happened to be the constituted source of authority-the visible symbol of the rule of law. To Burke, a revolution was an offense against social morality, the violation of the sacred contract of a nation's historical contribution. To Metternich, however, it was a violation of the universal law governing the life of societies, something to be combatted not because it was immoral, but because it was disastrous.[30]

Metternich's conception of freedom and authority is examined by Kissinger in the context of two philosophical orientations typical

of the Western political heritage. Individual liberty can be understood either as the absence of restraint or as the voluntary acceptance of authority. The former position sees freedom residing outside the sphere of political authority; the latter treats freedom as a quality of authority. The negative version of freedom is the expression of a society transcending its political structure, a society-as in Locke-that exists prior to the state and whose political organization resembles a company of limited liability organized for the pursuit of discriminate goals. Men, Locke wrote in the *Second Treatise,* agree

> to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it . . . . When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politick, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.[31]

Only consent can morally oblige a man to join his own force to the common executive power of society to assist it in defending the body politic from external threats.[32] Insofar as man's liberty is an activity that occurs outside the governmental sphere, "politics has a utilitarian, but not an ethical function; it is useful, not moral." The Lockean concept of freedom presupposes a society with a conservative character, whatever form its political landscape may take. Were this not the case, says Kissinger, no society could operate a system whose strength resides in its social cohesiveness, in the things "which are taken for granted." Burke's conservatism, for the same reason, had little or no applicability to the British domestic scene, but was directed against its misapprehension by foreigners.[33]

The Anglo-Saxon version of freedom was without a natural home on the Continent. Lockean philosophy, prior to 1789, was the testimony to an *accomplished* revolution; his optimistic conclusions about a rights-oriented society constituted a doctrine of reconciliation which lacked the elan of a call to action. Leo Strauss and others have pointed to the close connection between the admonition (from the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding)* to rest content within

the modest limits of our knowledge, to let probability "govern all our commitments," to eschew universal knowledge and improve life within the frame of observation and experience, and the common-sense, utilitarian conclusions to be drawn from the *Second Treatise.*[34] Britain was the example of a cohesive society that could regulate itself through custom and thereby reveal disputes to be peripheral. The social upheaval ushered in by the French Revolution prompted Continental powers to embrace a different ethical justification for freedom. European societies containing fundamental schisms relied upon law, the definition of a *compulsory* relationship.[35] Thus Kant and Rousseau, not Locke, were the representatives of the Continental version of liberty which sought freedom in the identification of the will with the general interest and considered government freest-not when it governed least-but when it governed justly. In Kant's terms, "Every action is *right* which in itself . . . is such that it can co-exist along with the Freedom of Will of each and all in action, according to a universal Law."[36] An action is wrong if it hinders the exercise of freedom of will according to universal law and any compulsion or restraint which is necessary to remove this hindrance is right.

Kissinger demonstrates that Metternich's differences with his liberal antagonists revolved around the concept of freedom in an "ethical state." To Metternich, a constitution was much more than a written document, as marriage was much more than a marriage contract. "Rights," according to the Austrian statesman, could not be created, they existed. Metternich seized upon a fundamental contradiction-or at least, a paradox-of democratic theory, by suggesting that ideal constitutions simply endow with arbitrary existence that which has eternal validity. To make a constitution was to give legislative shape to revolution. In Metternich's unhappy judgment:

> Things which ought to be taken for granted lose their force when they emerge in the form of arbitrary pronouncements . . . . The mania of law-malting is a symptom of disease which has ravaged the world for 62 years . . . . Natural, moral or mate - rial forces are not fit subjects for *human* legislation. What

> would one say of a Charte which side by side with the Rights of Man exhibited the laws of gravitation? . . Objects mistakenly made subject to legislation result only in the limitation, if not complete annulment, of that which is attempted to be safeguarded.[37]

The view of human nature insisting on man's potential for self-government was then attenuated-within the same body of democratic theory-by an understanding of human nature limiting the scope of this government. This leads of necessity to the point in justifying universal rights. Anglo-Saxon countries were able to surmount this dilemma, Kissinger says, in that the relation between state and society had a utilitarian and juridic, not an ethical, foundation. In an ethical state, however, constitutional checks and balances (i.e., explicit limitations on government) become insignificant. What counted for Metternich's statism was an ethical sanction to political rule, one in which self-restraint, not constitutional dicta, preserves the balance between order and freedom. Metternich's intellectual failure, Kissinger concludes, was in fighting liberalism in the name of the very universality it claimed for itself. It is almost impossible for a rationalistic philosophy to survive the demonstration that the same premise can lead to two diametrically opposed conclusions.[38]

In comparing Metternich and Castlereagh, Kissinger recognized their differences, but maintained that each was committed to upholding the European equilibrium. That had never been the intention of either Napoleon or Czar Alexander, whom Kissinger considered revolutionaries. They believed Europe could be united by an act of will; Napoleon, the conqueror, aimed at universal dominion; Alexander, the prophet, hoped for a reconciled humanity. But the perfection of power and its ideals implied uniformity; Kissinger wrote, "Utopias are not achieved by a process of levelling and dislocation that erodes all patterns of obligations."[39] The statesman remained suspicious of all such designs, knowing that the survival of the state depended on its being prepared at all times for the worst contingency. The statesman knew that he could not escape time, that his duty was to reflect always on accident and contingency.

Metternich's application of universal principles of statecraft "was in reality the *tour de force* of a solitary figure." The eighteenth century had been persuaded that knowledge was power; events in the nineteenth century proved the inadequacy of that maxim.

> The statesman must . . . be an educator; he must bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and its future. In this task his possibilities are limited. A statesman who too far outruns the experience of his people will fail in achieving a domestic consensus, however wise his policies; witness Castlereagh. A statesman who limits his policy to the experience of his people will doom himself to sterility; witness Metternich. [40]

The Austrian statesman was determined that a French Revolution and a Napoleon would never plague Europe again. The former was "the volcano which must be extinguished, the gangrene which must be burnt out, the hydra with jaws open to swallow the social order." He had seen it engender hysterical expectations drowned in blood, and the ensuing champion turn into a tyrant whose ambition and zeal spelled the death of millions. Hans von Srbik provided a concise definition of Metternich's political creed: ". . . A world doctrine which saw the new century and its forces as hostile, a doctrine heir to the international attitude of pre-Revolutionary days; which was at the same time a classic expression of the ultra-conservative thought of the Restoration era."" Kissinger qualifies this verdict by emphasizing that Metternich was a conservative, not a reactionary.

Desmond Seward, in a new biography of Metternich, contends that Kissinger "goes too far in portraying Metternich as a survivor of the Enlightenment waging a lonely battle in an uncomprehending century, as a contemporary of Kant and Voltaire." For example, Kissinger glosses over the mental climate of the Restoration, dismissing Metternich's religious attachments. "Metternich was not irreligious," Kissinger wrote, "but he admired the Church more for its utility and its civilizing influence than for its truth."[42] An excessive emphasis on Metternich's rationalism, Seward claims, obscures a

natural philosophical kinship with Edmund Burke. The Irishman could find no better advocate for such maxims as "People will not look forward to posterity who have no time for their ancestors" and "You can never shape the future by the present." Metternich adopted many of Burke's ideas reformed; "where Burke had seen revolution as violating Britain's historical constitution, the Austrian saw it as destroying the traditional structure of Christian Europe."[43]

Statesmanship And The Necessity of Choice

Few reviews of Kissinger's work as a diplomatic historian have examined the vital connection between A *World Restored* and the philosophy of history and human destiny shaping his realist worldview.[44] As a graduate student at Harvard University, he was captivated by Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West.* The deep strain of pessimism and fatedness that permeates each page of Spengler's classic struck a responsive chord in the young doctoral student. In a concluding passage of his undergraduate honors thesis, Kissinger wrote that "life involves suffering and transitoriness," and that "the generation of Buchenwald and Siberian labor camps [could] not talk with the same optimism as its fathers." Spengler, as John Stoessinger points out, provided no conclusive answers for Kissinger. What troubled him about *The Decline of the West* was its utter acceptance of the inevitability of historical events- in short, the author's total submission to historical determinism.[45] Spengler's experience of history revealed the growth and decline of organic cultures, "the endless unfolding of a cosmic beat that expresses itself in . . . a vast succession of catastrophic upheavals of which power is not only the manifestation but the exclusive aim."[46]

Any philosophy of history, Kissinger asserted, leads straight to metaphysics, and involves an awareness of the mysteries and possibilities not only of nature but of human nature. Levels of meaning within history can be understood by the "reaction of various thinkers to the problems of human necessity and human freedom, in their capacity to experience depths unaccessible to human reason alone." Spengler exempted progress as a category of meaning for history. For example, the life of nations poses the problem of motion, "which

results from the irrevocability of our actions and prevents us in the eternal flux of things to . . . observe that which is in the act of observing itself, to ever causally determine the inner-connectedness of events."[47] Life is hereby animated by an inner destiny that can never be fully defined; history reveals a majestic unfolding that may be intuitively perceived but never causally classified. Spengler's intuitive vision arises from man's consciousness of his mortality as well as his loneliness in a world where he can never grasp the total meaning of others. What history demonstrates phenomenally is found in Spengler's vision of the world-as-experience: "A boundless mass of human Beings, flowing in a stream without banks; up-stream a dark past wherein our time-sense loses all powers of definition and restless or uneasy fancy conjures up geological periods to hide away an unavoidable riddle, down-stream a future even so dark and timeless. "[48] Yet Kissinger insisted on the power of the individual to affect his destiny. Spengler, he maintained, failed to grasp that inevitability is a poor guide and no inspiration. Man lives with purposes and through his hopes glimpses a reality beyond mere phenomena. The moral dimension of human nature, Kissinger explained, derives from

> an inward necessity, from the personal in the conception of the environment, from the unique in the apprehension of phenomena. Consequently; objective necessity can never guide conduct, and any activity reveals a personality. Reason can help us understand the world in which we live. Rational analysis can assist us in developing institutions which make an inward experience possible. But nothing can relieve man from his ultimate responsibility, from giving his own meaning to live, from elevating himself above necessity by the [moral] sanction he ascribes to the organic immanence of existence. [49]

Kissinger's search for meaning in history evokes a dual feeling of inevitability coupled with an inward doubt. On the one hand, the inevitability follows from the unfolding of a chain of events which the mind arranges into a causal sequence. The individual can never really be certain that another development was possible, that an inexorabil-

ity did not shape all endeavors. On the other hand, skepticism is "a token of rebellion against this view, an assertion of the specificity of the individual, a demand by the soul for freedom." However one may think about the necessity of events, "at the moment of their performance their inevitability could offer no guide to action." Spengler's analysis was deficient and could provide no postulate of action because necessity constitutes an attribute of external reality. The experience of freedom enables man to rise beyond the suffering of the past and the frustrations of history. According to Kissinger, this capacity for self-transcendence, or spirituality, represents "the unique which each man imparts to the necessity of his life."[50] The dialectical interplay between fate and freedom was affirmed by Alfred North Whitehead in the following terms:

> As soon as high consciousness is reached, the enjoyment of existence is entwined with pain, frustration, loss, tragedy. Amid the passing of so much beauty, so much heroism, so much daring, Peace is then the intuition of permanence. It keeps vivid the sensitiveness to the tragedy; and it sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal:-What might have been and what was not; What can be. The tragedy was not in vain. This survival power in motive force marks the difference between the tragic evil and the gross evil. The inner feeling belonging to this grasp of service of tragedy is Peace-the purification of emotions.[51]

Foreign policy is a form of art and not a precise science, something that many professors have great difficulty grasping. Hans J. Morgenthau, to whom Kissinger and other realist thinkers owed a considerable intellectual debt, contrasted the rationality of the engineer with the wisdom and moral strength of the statesman. To be truly successful and truly "rational" in political action, knowledge of a different order is needed. This is not the knowledge of single tangible facts but of eternal laws by which man moves in the social world. The key to human nature is not in the facts from whose uniformity the sciences derive their laws. "It is in the insight and the

wisdom," Morgenthau wrote, "by which more-than-scientific man elevates his experiences into the universal laws of human nature." [52] The Aristotelian truth that man is a political animal is true forever; the truths of the natural sciences are true only until other truths have supplanted them. The statesman recognizes in the contingencies of the social world the concretizations of eternal laws. Edmund Burke, in his "Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians," pointed to the unsolvable contrast between what the statesman needs and wants and what he is able to obtain.

> A statesman differs from a professor in a university; the latter has only the general view of society; the former, the statesman, has a number of circumstances to combine with those general ideas, and to take into his consideration. Circumstances are infinite, are infinitely combined; are variable and transient; he who does not take them into consideration is not erroneous, but stark mad, *dat operam ut cum ratione insaniat,* he is metaphysically mad. A statesman, never losing sight of his principles, is to be guided by circumstances; and, judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment, he may ruin his country forever. [53]

The achievement of the wisdom by which insecurity is understood and sometimes mastered is the fulfillment of human possibilities. Where the insecurity of human existence challenges the wisdom of man, there is the meeting-point of fate and freedom, of necessity and chance. Without assurance of victory and with the odds against him, man persists in the struggle, a hero rather than a searcher for scientific truth. [54]

Kissinger's choice of a topic for his doctoral dissertation was influenced by Morgenthau's intellectual perspective in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics.* A connection is evident from the reasons stated by Kissinger in the Preface:

> The success of physical science depends on the selection of one crucial experiment; that of political science in the field of international affairs, on the selection of the crucial period. I have chosen for my topic the period between 1812 and 1822,

> partly, I am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to those of our own day.[55]

The distinction between "legitimate" and "revolutionary" international orders underscores the elements of continuity and change for either a bipolar or a multipolar arena within which radical ideologies compete for the allegiance of mankind. It must be emphasized, however, that Kissinger never limited his analysis to what international theorists designate as *structural realism-i.e.,* treating international structure and the balance of power as the primary variables for explaining foreign policy conduct. Distinguishing between organization and inspiration in statecraft, between the requirements of bureaucracy and statesmanship, is also a task for ethics and philosophy. For the international thinker, "the structural problem of foreign policy is . . . to try to guarantee the relative security and . . . also the relative insecurity of all the parties."[56] At the same time, "some common sense of values must be found so that the participants will not constantly attempt to overthrow the international order." Kissinger also identified a normative component in theorizing about international relations: "The application of these principles depends on the conception of a sovereign unit, on what the sovereign units are capable of doing to each other, and on what these units want to do to each other." If there is a change in the "idea of the legitimate unit," then events will lead to a transformation of the international system and a period of upheaval; this is one of the problems of the contemporary period.[57]

Like Hegel, Kissinger believed that certain statesmen, by virtue of their inspiration, stood at history's fateful junctions and, through an act of vision and courage, earned the right to immortality: "Men become myths, not by what they know, or even by what they achieve, but by the tasks they set for themselves." Moreover, the inspiration of the statesman is always tested by the restraints imposed upon him by organization- the need for winning domestic support for his policies. "It is the inextricable element of history, this conflict between inspiration and organization . . . . Inspiration is a call for greatness; organization a recognition that mediocrity is the usual

pattern of leadership."[58] Kissinger likened the statesman to one of the heroes in classical drama who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellow man and cannot validate its "truth." Nations learn only from experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act. By contrast, statesmen "must act *as if* their intuition [were] already experience, as if their aspiration were truth." The moral predicament of the statesman arises from the effort to escape time and the need to survive in it.

> It is for this reason that statesmen Often share the fate of prophets, that they are without honor in their own country, that they always have a difficult task in legitimizing their programs domestically, and their greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience. The statesman must therefore be an educator; he must bridge the gap between a people's experience and his wisdom, between a nation's tradition and its future.

Can a statesman meet both the challenges of inspiration and organization?

Kissinger's tragic perspective on politics left little room for optimism. His assessment of America's national purpose in the world, particularly the self-righteous accent of American exceptionalism, was never far from the melancholy conclusion of his undergraduate thesis: "No civilization has yet been permanent, no longing completely fulfilled."[59] Americans, Kissinger wrote in *The Troubled Partnership,* "live in an environment uniquely suited to a technological approach to policy-making." American history brings the confident conviction that "any problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise." Europeans, by contrast, "live on a continent covered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human foresight."[60] An end to the Cold War brings the recognition that, for the first time in American history, "we can neither dominate the world nor escape from it." Geography no longer assures security, and "our prosperity is to some extent hostage to the decisions on raw materials, prices, and investment in . . . countries whose purposes are not necessarily compatible with ours." The most fundamental

challenge to American foreign policy in a new age, however, "is not to our physical resources but to our constancy of purpose and our philosophical perception." America can "no longer wait for dangers to become overwhelming" insofar as "they will appear ambiguous when they are still manageable." Creative thinking about foreign policy means coming to grips with an almost overwhelming paradox of the contemporary world:

> At the moment when we still have great scope for creativity the facts are likely to be unclear . . . . When we know all the facts, it is often too late to act. This is the dilemma of statesmanship of a country that is irrevocably engaged in world affairs-and particularly one that seeks to lead."[1]

The relationship between philosophy and statecraft in any one period raises obvious questions about the validity of historical analogies. As humans we are prone to reason by analogy, and indeed, historic reasoning cannot help arguing by analogy. On the one hand, a historic event is a unique occurrence which never happened that way before and will never happen in this way again. On the other hand, it is typical insofar as it shows certain similarities to other occurrences, and when we ask ourselves the meaning of a contemporary occurrence, we can only understand that event and judge it by resorting to the accumulated treasure of historic knowledge. Since the problem of reasoning by analogy is inherent in human thought, it is only natural that historians can be led astray by preferences concerning the importance of similarities and dissimilarities. For example, some who defended American intervention in Vietnam reasoned by analogy with Munich and Hitler; others, opposed to this course of action, invoked analogies with the Sicilian expedition of Athens or events leading to the fall of the Roman Empire. Montaigne clearly pointed to the existential difficulty of reasoning by analogy.

> As no event and no shape is entirely like another, so also is there none entirely different from another, an ingenious mixture on the part of nature. If there were no similarity in our faces we could not distinguish one man from beast; if there were no

> dissimilarity we could not distinguish one man from another. All things hold together by some similarity; every example is halting, and the comparison that is derived from experience is always defective and imperfect. And yet one links up the comparisons at some corner. And so do laws become serviceable and adopt themselves to every one of our affairs by some wrested, forced, and biased interpretation.[62]

Yet the conduct of foreign policy requires in each instance a comparable situation. Kissinger suggested that one could talk endlessly about the "balance of power" or "legitimacy" or the "impact of personalities"; however, as new cases arise, that knowledge will be empty if one does not understand what the elements of power are, how legitimacy is conceived, and what the impact of structure on events can be.[63] This requires an intuitive feeling, which can be partly taught from history but which is partly philosophical inspiration. Metternich's period, often by the most cunning *raison d'ētat,* built upon the common adherence to legitimate principles as the basis for imposing restraints upon the political will of national actors. Part of those restraints that institutionalize an equilibrium derive from philosophical judgments about the nature and destiny of man, in addition to the responsibility that freedom brings in moments of change or revolution in world history. Bismarck's diplomatic legacy, after all, illustrates that an international system where the balance of power becomes an end in itself is poised for self-destruction.

The lessons Kissinger discovered in the diplomacy of Metternich and Castlereagh were never far-removed from his own intellectual self-assessment. "I think of myself," the Secretary of State said in 1974, "as a historian more than as a statesman." As a historian, Kissinger was conscious of the fact that every civilization that has ever existed has ultimately collapsed. History is a record of efforts that failed, of aspirations that were never realized, of wishes that were fulfilled and then turned out to be different from what was expected. We always tend to think of historical tragedy, Kissinger explained, as failing to get what we want, "but if we study history we find that the worst tragedies have occurred when people got what they wanted . .

and it turned out to be the wrong objective." The historian lives with a sense of the inevitability of tragedy; the statesman, however, has to act on the assumption that problems must be solved. And Kissinger may have been more philosopher, than either historian or statesman, in speaking to the predicament of men and nations: "Each generation lives in time, and even though . . . societies have all suffered a decline, that is of no help to any one generation, and the decline is usually traceable to a loss of creativity and inspiration and therefore avoidable."[64]

Profound thought and concrete action ought to coincide in one and the same individual: the statesman. The philosopher is responsible for the truth of his thought, whose effects are incalculable, but he is not tied to the situation of the day. The statesman is responsible for the effect of his actions and bound by the effect of his words in a particular situation. Both have their weaknesses: the philosopher does not act, and the statesman limits his thinking to close quarters. But philosophy and politics, as Karl Jaspers suggested, "should get together." In particular, Jaspers' analysis of the rational requirements of statesmanship points to the confluence of power and ideals, moral choice and political necessities in defending national and international interests.

> Of all encompassing importance is the distinction between two ways of thinking. *Intellectual thought is* the inventor and maker. Its precepts can be carried out and can multiply the making by infinite repetition . . . . *Rational thought* . . . does not provide for the carrying out of mass directives but requires each individual to do his thinking, original thinking. Here, truth is not found by a machine reproducing at will, but by decision, resolve, and action whose self-willed performance, by each on his own, is what creates a common spirit.[65]

The rational attitude views the statesman with the concern of sensing our common fate in him. The statesman must always be sensitive to the facts in keeping all means of power and force in mind and at hand; if he does not know where he stands, he may end up in the absurd position of a leader being removed by a handful of men, saving his life

but dooming his country with the words, "I yield to force." By the same token, the statesman stands at the frontier of humanity, at the place where someone must stand so that all may live. These few men, neither isolated nor deified, "but rooted in the real will of those who recognize themselves in them, might come to power because they dominate men by their character from within, not by force from without."[66]

Jaspers' defense of the rational statesman brings the spectator to the intersection of philosophy and statesmanship. The statesman is guided by moral-political ideas in the framework of a historic situation. He must work within the continuity of history-"the seeming grandeur of noisily manifested temporary power"-to found things that will endure. No such vision of the statesman, whom Jaspers contrasts with politicians of elan vital, is conceivable without some concern for how the life of reason relates to the structures and processes of government and society. This brings one back to the question of where rational analysis begins. We find in our immediate circle both the opinions and the terminology expressing ideas of right and wrong; the political thinker's duty is to find the path leading from this vocabulary and these customs toward the objective element. This inquiry is guided by the postulate that there is such a thing as human nature, and that its rational articulation constitutes advice for the organization and self-interpretation of society. Eric Voegelin was right in arguing that there is no sense talking about good and bad institutions, or making concrete suggestions about this or that social problem unless we first know what purpose or end these institutions are supposed to serve.[67] The link between rationality and politics can be summarized as follows: For there to be any rational discussion of politics, there first has to be agreement on the common good. There can be no agreement on the supreme good, however, if one does not have a conception of human nature. This conception implies the immutability of human nature, and this is linked to a certain conception of man's participation in a transcendent reality, a transcendent *Nous*.

Discussing the reciprocal relationship between freedom and responsibility for those statesmen who "venture into the public

realm," Hannah Arendt alluded to the moral sphere of political action.

> Caught up in our modern prejudices, we think that only the "objective work," separate from the person, belongs to the public; that the person behind it and his life are private matters . . . . [However] we must change our views and forsake our habit of equating personal with subjective, objective with factual or impersonal. Those equations come from scientific disciplines, where they are meaningful. They are obviously meaningless in politics, in which realm people on the whole appear as acting and speaking persons and where .. . personality is anything but a private affair. [68]

What Arendt describes as the subjective element of personality-the creative process by which an individual subject offers some objective work to the public-closely resembles the Greek *daimon,* the guardian spirit that accompanies every man throughout his life. This *daimon,* this personal element in man, can only appear where a public space exists; that is the deeper significance of the public realm, which extends far beyond what is ordinarily depicted as political life. To the extent that this public space is also a spiritual realm, there is manifest in it what the Romans called *humanitas.* This designation signified the very height of humanness because it was valid and true without being a datum of verifiable science.[69]

The statesman's ethos is part of the ethos that bears a people and the individuals in it. We evade the issue by separating politics and ethics and shift the making of great decisions away from the common ethos into "just politics," for which others are held responsible-that is, if we despise these others because "politics is crooked." It is an undesirable and cowardly fate for man to live outside of, and without responsibility for, the politics by which he lives in fact! The imagined sanctity of a free private existence and of a world of the spirit distinct from politics seems possible under certain relatively stable political

conditions-but *it* only *seems* so. For precisely because *of its* untruthful concern *with* politics, irresponsibility will see *the* despised politics *shatter,* destroy, and unmask *its* existence.

Greg Russell
University *of* Oklahoma

NOTES

1. Stephen R. Graubard, *Kissinger: Portrait Of A Mind* (New *York: W.W.* Norton, 1974), *xv.*

2. Henry *A.* Kissinger, "The *Conservative* Dilemma: Reflections On The Political Thought *Of* Metternich," *American Political Science Review 48 (1954),* 1021-22.

3. Henry *A. Kissinger,AWorldRestored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), *323.*

4. Ibid., 1-2.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 3.

7. Ibid., 4.

8. Ibid., 8.

9. Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemma," 1020.

10. Kissinger, *A World Restored, 9.*

11. Ibid., 10.

12. Ibid., 13.

13. Quoted in Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna* (New *York:* Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1946), *58.*

14. See Sir Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh* (London, 1925 *and* 1931), II, *554.*

15. Kissinger, *A World Restored, 32.*

16. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,* II, *240.*

17. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna, 258.*

18. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, 5th* ed. (New York: Alfred *A.* Knopf, 1973), *435* n.l.

19. Quoted in Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna, 262.*

20. Ibid., 259.

21. Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemma," 1017.

22. Graubard, *Kissinger: Portrait Of A Mind,* 38.

23. Kissinger, *A World Restored,* 192.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 191.

26. Edmund Burke, *Selected Writings and Speeches,* ed. Peter J. Stanlis (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963), 470-71.

27. Ibid.

28. Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemma," 1024.

29. Ibid., 1025-26.

30. Kissinger, *A World Restored,* 194.

31. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), 254-55.

32. See the analysis of Dante Germino, *Machiavelli to Marx: Modern Western Political Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 135-47.

33. Kissinger, *A World Restored,* 194.

34. See Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 220 ff., and Lee Cameron McDonald, *Western Political Theory,* Vol. II: *From Machiavelli to Burke* (New York: Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich, 1962), 337-38.

35. Kissinger, *A World Restored, 194-95.*

36. Immanuel Kant, *Philosophy of Law,* trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1887).

37. Kissinger, *A World Restored,* 198.

38. Ibid., 200.

39. Ibid., 316.

40. Ibid., 322, 329.

41. Quoted in Desmond Seward, *Metternich: The First European* (New York: Viking, 1991), 85.

42. Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemma," 1022 n.13.

43. Seward, *Metternich: The First European,* 86.

44. For a notable exception, see Peter Dickson, *Kissinger and the Meaning of History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

45. John Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 7-8.

46. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee, and Kant," (B. A. Honors Thesis, Harvard University, 1951), 18, 348.

47. Ibid., 14-15.

48. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West,* trans. C. F. Atkinson, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926-28), I, 105.

49. Kissinger, "The Meaning of History," 341-42.

50. Ibid., 348.

51. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventure of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 369.

52. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 219-220.

53. Burke, *Selected Writings and Speeches,* 313.

54. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man, 223.*

55. Quoted in Stoessinger, *The Anguish of Power, 9.*

56. In a conversation with Walter Laqueur, Kissinger remarked:

> A statesman must strike a balance between capability and intention. He cannot rely on the goodwill of another sovereign state, because that would be an abdication of foreign policy. He cannot base his policies on physical preeminence alone, because unless he is willing to establish a world empire, this will only tend to unite his enemies and force him to attempt a cynical and dangerous policy of divide and rule ... .

See Henry Kissinger, *For The Record* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981), 116-17.

57. Ibid.

58. Kissinger, *A World Restored,* 317, 322.

59. Kissinger, "The Meaning Of History," 326.

60. Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: Anchor, 1966), 23.

61. Kissinger, *For The Record,* 74-75.

62. The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, ed. Jacob Zeitlin (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936), III, 270.

63. Kissinger, *For The Record,* 114-15.

64. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for *New York Times, The*

Department of State Bulletin 71 (11 November 1974), 629.

65. Karl Jaspers, *The Future Of Mankind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), ix, 7.

66. Ibid., 237.

67. See the comments of Eric Voegelin *in World Technology and Human Destiny,* ed. Raymond Aron (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 223-24.

68. Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 72.

69. Ibid., 73.