The Political Science Reviewer • Volume 45, Number 1 • 2021
© 2021 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System

"Two Going Together": The Alliance of Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle's *Ethics*

John Boersma
University of Wisconsin–Madison[*]

All good students of Aristotle recognize that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the life of philosophy is prioritized over that of politics. However, the exact relationship between these two types of life has been the subject of considerable debate. While some scholars argue that Aristotle offers an "inclusive" account of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) that requires a combination of the intellectual excellence of the contemplative life and the moral excellence characterized by political life,[1] others have suggested that Aristotle's teaching on happiness is "exclusivist," in that he treats the life of contemplation as superior to and incompatible with a political life devoted to moral excellence.[2]

More recently, scholars have turned to the rhetorical quality of the *Ethics* to shed light on this dispute.[3] Recognizing Aristotle's embrace of the art of rhetoric as a means of persuasion that takes into account the character of the audience being addressed,[4] these scholars maintain that the *Ethics* contains a "rhetorical strategy,"[5] which is designed to present philosophy as an enterprise worthy of respect to noble, well-bred gentlemen who are politically involved but are not philosophically inclined.[6] It is maintained that in this way Aristotle alleviates, without entirely denying it, the tension between the life of philosophy and the life of politics.

[*]I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of *The Political Science Reviewer* for their many helpful suggestions for revision and improvement.

Specifically, these scholars posit that Aristotle presents the political life in a manner that subtly exposes its limitations.[7] They conclude that the rhetorical quality of the *Ethics* provides further evidence of the "exclusivist" reading of the *Ethics*, according to which the life of the intellect is superior to and ultimately incompatible with the political life of moral excellence.

A focus on the rhetorical quality of the *Ethics* provides much purchase because it accounts for what appear to be a striking number of inconsistencies in Aristotle's work.[8] However, the rhetorical quality of the work does not provide conclusive evidence supporting the "exclusivist" reading of the *Ethics*, and there are, in fact, several difficulties with such a reading. First, in describing his intention at the outset of the treatise, Aristotle argues that the good of a nation or city is "nobler and more divine" than the good of any single individual.[9] How can the good of the city be "nobler and more divine" than the good of a single individual if the *Ethics* ends with the conclusion that the human good consists in contemplation alone?[10] Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the "exclusivist" approach is that it struggles to incorporate much of Books VIII and IX, both of which deal with friendship, into the overall inquiry of the *Ethics*. Those who focus on the rhetorical quality of Aristotle's *Ethics* treat these books largely as an exhortation meant to prepare the reader for Aristotle's somewhat startling claim that the philosophic life is the happiest life.[11]

I suggest that Aristotle's rhetorical strategy does not simply weigh in favor of an "exclusivist" reading of the *Ethics* but instead supports an interpretation that views philosophy and politics to be complementary. While it is certainly true that Aristotle prioritizes the life of contemplation, paying attention to Aristotle's use of rhetoric in the first portion of Book IX of the *Ethics* problematizes an "exclusivist" reading that holds the life of contemplation to be incompatible with the life of politics. Instead, "Aristotle's use of rhetoric"? provides support for an "inclusivist" reading of the *Ethics*, which posits that happiness (or human flourishing) requires *both* intellectual and moral excellence.[12] I argue that Aristotle's primary audience in Book IX of the *Ethics* are those who

are philosophically inclined and have an instinctive disdain for established political authorities,[13] as well as that Aristotle seeks to convince these readers to take the claims of politics seriously.

In what follows, I show first that in the beginning of his treatise on friendship in Book VIII of the *Ethics*, Aristotle intimates the great benefits that can be had if those who are philosophically inclined were to befriend those in power by alluding to the *doloneia*, an episode in the *Iliad* that shows the great personal and political advantages of a friendship between those who are wise and those who hold power. However, I also explain that while Aristotle believes the advantages of such a friendship to be great, he casts doubt on the feasibility of such an alliance by pointing out that these two types of individuals—the philosophically inclined and the politically powerful—are not disposed to befriend each other. I then turn to Book IX, in which Aristotle introduces the difficulty of fostering a friendship between the philosophically inclined and the politically powerful by way of a discussion of the giving and receiving of benefits. Despite these difficulties, I make the case that in the first six chapters of Book IX, Aristotle undertakes a rhetorical address to convince his philosophically inclined readers that those with political authority are deserving of respect.[14] His ultimate aim, I argue, is to cultivate friendship between those who are philosophically inclined and those in power in order to ensure that his philosophically inclined readers might influence those in power and order the realm of politics toward the common good. Last, I conclude with an adumbration of the manner in which this friendship can both cultivate a sense of fellow-feeling (ὁμόνοια) in the political community more generally and bring about the conditions for the community to engage in leisure. I suggest that an analysis of Aristotle's educational system discussed in Books VII and VIII of the *Politics* would go some way to providing such an account. The upshot of my analysis is that it provides further support for the "inclusivist" reading of the *Ethics*, counters recent charges that Aristotle views the philosophic life to be purely egoistic and incompatible with the political life of moral excellence, and provides guidance for how this ethical treatise ought to be studied.

Power and Wisdom

Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship in Book VIII of the *Ethics* with a sort of panegyric to the advantages and uses of friendship. He tells us that friendship is "most necessary with a view to life" and that "without friends, no one would choose to live" (*NE* 1155a5–6). Friends provide beneficiaries for whom one can perform good deeds, and they can help guard the prosperity of the wealthy or act as a source of solace for poor (*NE* 1155a7–12). Friends can save the young from error and can provide care for the old (*NE* 1155a12–14). Moreover, near the end of this introduction, Aristotle states that friendship is also useful for people in their prime who wish to perform noble actions; in support of this contention, he cites the *Iliad*: "For 'two going together' are better able both to perceive and to act" (*NE* 1155a15–16).

Why does Aristotle provide a citation of the *Iliad* in his opening statement on friendship? While much scholarship glosses over this citation as simply forming part of Aristotle's opening encomium to friendship that will later be qualified or developed,[15] some scholars have argued that this passage is intended to bring out the competitive or rivalrous aspect of friendship. For example, Anne Marie Dziob argues that Aristotle's purpose is to point out that what inspires one to perform noble actions is the spirited, competitive rivalry that can exist among friends.[16] Patrick Cain and Mary Nichols go even farther in emphasizing the rivalrous nature of friendship, arguing that Aristotle means to convey that "noble friends do not readily 'go together' in support of each other's noble deeds" because their "very competition with each other for nobility means that their nobility competes with their friendship."[17]

The difficulty with these interpretations that highlight the rivalrous aspect of friendship is that the very citation "two going together" (σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω) implies that the friends work together in a spirit of aid or cooperation, rather than a spirit of competition.[18] I propose that the context in the *Iliad* from which the citation—σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω—is drawn reveals that Aristotle intends to highlight the importance and benefit of complementarity in friendship. The citation is taken from the *doloneia*, the

episode in the *Iliad* in which Diomedes and Odysseus conduct a reconnaissance mission at night to seek information concerning the movement of the Trojan troops.[19] The *doloneia* is a telling example of two individuals whose complementary strengths work together in harmony, rather than of a competitive rivalry in which they seek to outdo each other.

The citation of σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω is spoken by the courageous and powerful Diomedes as he is selecting a partner to accompany him on the expedition. Diomedes selects Odysseus, describing him as "wise above all . . . in understanding."[20] In large part because of their complementarity, their excursion is wildly successful. They not only learn of the Trojan troop movements but also are able to sneak into the Trojan camp and abscond with some fine horses.[21] Odysseus's wile proves indispensable in extorting information from Dolon, the hapless Trojan soldier whom the two warriors encounter on their expedition, while Diomedes' ruthless courage ensures that Dolon does not reveal their presence to the Trojan captains. Together, the wily Odysseus and the courageous Diomedes are able to provide great benefits for the city, which redound to their own honor.[22] By alluding to this vignette, Aristotle intimates the great political benefits that can be attained if power and wisdom are able to work together effectively.

However, if Aristotle begins Book VIII by insinuating that great political benefits can be had by allying wisdom with power, by the middle of Book VIII he begins to cast doubt on the feasibility of such an alliance. The difficulty of forming this alliance is, in no small measure, the fundamental problem of politics: How does one ensure that power and authority are oriented toward the good and exercised in accordance with wisdom? In general, power tends to be in the hands of gentlemen who are not philosophers, leading to the result that power is often exercised in a capricious manner that has dubious results for the regime.[23] While a spate of good fortune may in rare circumstances produce a wise ruler or a philosopher-king, such an occurrence will be far from the norm. Right near the center of Book VIII, Aristotle obliquely indicates that this problem is not easily solved by friendship or by simply surrounding those

who hold power with wise counselors, as those with power rarely surround themselves with those are wise:

> It has been said that the serious person is at once pleasant and useful; yet such a person does not become a friend to someone who exceeds him [in power], unless [the person in power] is also exceeded [by the serious person] in virtue. . . . Yet [those in positions of authority] are not much accustomed to becoming these sorts [of friends to the virtuous]. (*NE* 1158a32–39)

Aristotle suggests that those in positions of power are unlikely to become friends with the serious man (σπουδαῖος) because a certain inequality, something in their respective characters, prevents the easy alliance of power and wisdom.[24] The remainder of Book VIII further details the difficulties involved in cultivating and maintaining such a high-powered political friendship.[25] Aristotle does not provide a solution to these problems until Book IX. Thus, Book VIII opens with an impression of the great benefits that might be had if a friendship between those in power and those with wisdom were to develop, but Aristotle leaves us questioning whether the actualization of such a friendship is possible.

Friendship and Inequality

In the first half of Book IX, while ostensibly dealing with the giving and receiving of benefits, Aristotle discusses in an esoteric manner how friendship between the wise and the politically powerful may be developed. Aristotle's intention in taking up this theme is indicated in the first sentence of Book IX, which states that its subject matter is heterogeneous friendships, in which the goal of each party is different. He begins by providing the example of a political or market friendship between different craftsmen, which is easily equalized through the medium of commerce, as each party exchanges his wares according to their value—a type of friendship Aristotle has already discussed at length in Book V in connection with justice (*NE* 1133a7–32).[26] In contrast, the following example

that he provides seems to be in some ways a nonpolitical friendship, which is more difficult to equalize and, as a result, is susceptible to dissolution: the erotic friendship between a lover and a beloved who enter into the relationship for different purposes. Aristotle notes that such relationships will dissolve "when the lover loves the beloved for the pleasure involved, [while] the beloved his lover for his usefulness to him, and when both parties do not have what each wants" (*NE* 1164a6–10). Because neither party to the relationship receives what it desires, the relationship ends.

By providing the example of a political, market-based friendship that is easily equalized alongside a seemingly nonpolitical relationship that is difficult to equalize, Aristotle subtly raises the question of whether relationships may exist that are both political *and* difficult to equalize. Are some political relationships beyond the realm of proportional justice? The answer, it turns out, is yes. The relationship between those with political authority or ambition and those who are philosophically inclined is one that is political in nature and beyond proportional justice.

That Aristotle has this particular relationship in mind is borne out by his subsequent discussion concerning the giving and receiving of benefits. He uses an erotic relationship, in which neither party receives what it wishes, as a springboard to launch into the question of who is to decide the worth of what is given in a friendship. Ought the person who "takes the initiative in giving" assess the gift's worth, or should it be "the one who is first in receiving" the gift? (*NE* 1164a23–24). Aristotle answers that "he who takes the initiative in giving appears to entrust this assessment to the receiver, which is in fact what they assert Protagoras used to do" (*NE* 1164a24–25). Aristotle's example of Protagoras is revealing and introduces the subject matter that will silently come to dominate the rest of Book IX.[27] Protagoras, of course, was the philosopher who claimed to have the unique ability to teach men "the political art" and how to "make men good citizens."[28] By using Protagoras as an example, Aristotle draws attention to the classic theme of the relationship between politics and philosophy, a relationship that is both political and difficult to equalize.

Protagoras, asserts Aristotle, would "bid the learner to estimate how much he held [his teachings] to be worth knowing, and that is the amount he used to take" (*NE* 1164a25–27). In describing Protagoras's conduct, Aristotle distinguishes him from other sophists, "who take money in advance and then do nothing of what they claimed, because their promises were excessive" (*NE* 1164a27–31). While the sophists are rightly accused by those with whom they contract for failing to deliver what they promised, those who take the initiative in giving advice for the benefit of their partner "do not give cause for accusation" and may instead be practicing the highest type of friendship (*NE* 1164b34–35). Thus, Aristotle implies that those philosophers who advise with the intention of benefiting the one who receives the advice—perhaps by teaching him "the political art" or by making him a "good citizen"—may, in fact, be practicing the highest form of friendship (*NE* 1164a35–36).[29]

While the introduction to Book IX strongly suggests that Aristotle intends to discuss the friendship between philosophers and those who hold power, several obstacles prevent the easy attainment of this type of friendship. First, as noted, Aristotle indicates that those in power and those who philosophize are not likely to befriend one another (cf. *NE* 1158a32–39). Those who are in power may have had to engage in decidedly nefarious tactics to attain their position and, as a result, cannot be described as virtuous or good. Thus, it can fairly be asked: What would dispose the philosopher to dispense advice to such a person? As will be made clear, Aristotle appeals to his philosophically inclined audience by way of a protreptic address that encompasses a series of rhetorical devices meant to prepare his reader for the potentially difficult character of those who are politically powerful. Next, after having inculcated a solicitous disposition in his reader, Aristotle explains precisely *why* his audience is in need of a friend before turning to a description of *whom* he should seek out as a friend. As I hope to make clear, Aristotle addresses each of these issues in turn, explaining how and why the friendship between those who are philosophically inclined and those who hold power can be attained, thereby securing the coincidence of wisdom and power necessary for political flourishing.

Taming the Philosopher

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle presents the following advice regarding political oratory: "Those present [at the address] may be inclined to treat the matter either more or less seriously than you wish them to. You may accordingly have to excite or dispel some prejudice" (*Rhet.* 1415b35–37). Aristotle adopts this approach in his protreptic address in the first three chapters of Book IX. If he intends to bring about a friendship between the philosophically inclined and the politically powerful, he needs to inculcate a friendly disposition in his philosophically inclined audience, as they have an instinctive disdain for the traditional customs and authority of the city. To prepare the philosopher for the possibility that those in power may not be receptive or appreciative of his advice, Aristotle seeks to ground the philosopher in his community, or to tame his hubristic demeanor. He does so in the first three chapters of Book IX, first by humbling his reader, indicating that the value his philosophically inclined audience places on his advice may be mistaken. Second, he reminds his audience that those in power and the political community more generally have certain claims that ought to be taken seriously. Finally, almost as if by way of last resort, Aristotle appeals to the philosopher's superiority, entreating him to be patient with those who, because of their limited capabilities, are unable to recognize either the benefits of the advice or the good character of the one who bestows the advice. It is only after this protreptic address that Aristotle turns in chapters 4 through 6 to explaining that his audience should befriend those who seem noble and courageous.

Aristotle begins his address by suggesting that the philosopher who provides political advice with the intention of conferring a benefit may deserve some sort of repayment from the one who receives the advice. However, the issue of repayment is a difficult one, as it is not evident what could possibly count as adequate repayment for the benefit of learning "the political art" and becoming a "good citizen."[30] It would perhaps not be surprising that the philosopher, in recognition of the value of his benefit, might feel slighted either if the benefit he bestows remains unrecognized or if the repayment does not appear to be adequate.[31]

To forestall the sullen and bitterly ironic reaction of a philosopher who, in response to rejection, retreats to his own private realm to criticize the political community, Aristotle first humbles his reader by calling into question the worth of his advice. He forthrightly states that in the absence of an express agreement of the gift's worth, the one who receives the gift—or advice—ought to assess its worth in determining repayment. The rationale, according to Aristotle, is that "many things are not valued equally by those who possess them and by those who wish to receive them, since *what is one's own* and what one gives *appears* to everyone to be worth a great deal" (*NE* 1164b17–19; emphasis added). The reference to "one's own" (οἰκεῖα) is the second of two references in the totality of the *Ethics* in which "one's own" is contrasted with philosophy or the truth. The first reference occurs in Book I, where Aristotle states that philosophers may have to "do away with even one's own things" to preserve the truth (*NE* 1096a14–16).[32] The statement follows an explanation of the difficulty of inquiring into the "universal [good]" (*NE* 1096a11). Such an inquiry is difficult, he notes, "because the men who introduced the forms are friends" (*NE* 1096a13–14). I take this to mean that although Aristotle views those who introduced the forms as "friends," he will nevertheless criticize their theory in his pursuit of the truth. Thus, while gaining a truthful account of things may be difficult, Aristotle leaves us with the impression that such an account of things is possible. The second reference to "one's own," which occurs here in Book IX as part of Aristotle's protreptic address, seems to pull back on the idea that one will ever be able to achieve a full, truthful account of things and reminds the philosopher that he may be mistaken as to the worth of his teaching.

In this way, Aristotle humbles his audience. Not only may his philosophical readers be mistaken about the worth of his teaching or advice, but Aristotle suggests that his readers ought to entrust the assessment of the worth of their advice to those to whom the advice is directed. Aristotle thus calls into question his readers' capacity to attain complete objectivity. Even his philosophic readers, he suggests, may have a preference for what is "one's own," or

for their own teaching. Ever so subtly, Aristotle suggests that his readers may not be impartial as to the worth of their teaching and that the love of "one's own" may cloud their assessment of their teachings' worth.

In chapter 2, having humbled his audience, Aristotle continues his protreptic address by suggesting to his reader that he owes something to the political realm. He does so by raising the question of what obligations one has to one's father. Ought one "render everything to one's father and obey him in everything"? (*NE* 1164b22). The claims of ancestral authority are raised in light of the preceding discussion regarding the advice rendered by the philosopher—that is, the philosopher and his penchant for innovation are weighed against the claims of established authority and custom. Similar political questions are raised in conjunction with the claim of the ancestral: Must one "serve a friend more than a serious man" and "must one repay a favor to a benefactor rather than give away something to a comrade"? (*NE* 1164b26–28). Each of these questions raises the issue of how one ought to be disposed toward the claims of "one's own" and toward the claims of philosophic truth.[33]

In dealing with these questions, Aristotle proceeds delicately, employing a paromologia—a rhetorical device whereby one concedes an audience's point of view before raising important objections to this point of view—to convince the audience. Indeed, Aristotle initially provides an answer that would not shock his more philosophically inclined readers:

> That someone ought not to give back everything to the same person is not unclear; nor is it unclear that, for the most part, he must repay good deeds more than gratify his comrades, just as a person must pay back a loan to someone he owes, more than he must give away something to a comrade. (*NE* 1164b30–34)

This answer provides philosophically inclined readers with precisely what they would expect: not everything is owed to the ancestral or

to the established authorities; the good ought to take priority over one's comrades; and the repayment of a loan (i.e., repayment for the philosophic advice one has received) ought to come before one undertakes to give any gift to one's comrades. Truth takes precedence over political and familial loyalties.

No matter how axiomatic this answer may seem to his audience, Aristotle immediately calls it into question. Perhaps, suggests Aristotle, "not even this is always so" (*NE* 1164b34). What follows is a somewhat cryptic example regarding ransoms. Ought a person who has been ransomed from pirates pay in return the ransom to his ransomer? Aristotle indicates that while the general rule holds that an obligation is incurred, the obligation is relieved under certain circumstances. For example, if a person owes his ransomer money while at the same time his father is being held ransom, he ought to ransom his father first (*NE* 1164b3–1165a3). On its face, Aristotle's example is not overly controversial; if one's father is in danger, one ought to help one's father before settling one's debts. However, by using the example of ransoming one's father, Aristotle elevates the claim of the ancestral and suggests that the philosopher's axiomatic preference for the good over the ancestral may not always be warranted.

Last, Aristotle appeals to his reader's superior position relative to those to whom he gives advice. If his reader will be neither humbled nor persuaded by the claims of the established political authorities, perhaps Aristotle can appeal to his reader's hubris. He writes, "Sometimes the repaying of a previous service is not even equal—when someone benefits a person he *knows* (εἰδώς) to be serious, but the repayment is to one whom the serious person *supposes* (οἴεται) to be corrupt" (*NE* 1165a4–7; emphasis added). Ann Ward interprets this passage to mean that "the requirements of justice do not always hold in our relations with bad men, to whom we should not repay good deeds."[34] She goes on to interpolate that Aristotle intends to "raise doubts concerning our obligations to our father," should he be a "bad man." [35] While Ward rightly points out that Aristotle is raising the question of conflicting obligations, she does not account for the different terms—(εἰδώς

and οἴεται)—that Aristotle employs. In the scenario posited by Aristotle, the service is rendered by a knower (i.e., a philosopher), who has a correct assessment of the recipient's character, whereas the recipient (i.e., a political authority), though serious, has only an opinion of the philosopher's character. Through an appeal to the philosopher's superior knowledge, Aristotle seeks to exhort him to be patient with those to whom he gives advice, as they may be incapable of recognizing either the soundness of the advice or the philosopher's character and may be under the false impression that the philosopher is corrupt.

Only after having called into question his philosophically inclined audience's axiomatic preference for the good over the ancestral and after having exhorted the philosopher to be patient with those who lack knowledge does Aristotle make clear the implications of his teaching: "Honor too we owe to parents, just as to the gods—though not every honor. For we do not owe the same honor to a father as to a mother; nor, in turn, do we owe them the honor proper to a wise man or general" (*NE* 1165a24–26). As Ward notes, "Aristotle . . . suggests that although we owe honour and affection to our parents as the source of our bodily being, albeit in distinct ways, we also owe persons honor and affection if they are wise."[36] We might add here that according to Aristotle, we also owe honor and affection to those, such as generals, who are politically powerful. Thus, Aristotle finally raises the notion that honor may be due to a wise man—that is, someone who gives advice. But he mentions the possibility of such honor only after he has elevated the claims of the ancestral and only in conjunction with the honor owed to a general. The chapter concludes by noting that while a relative assessment of what honor belongs to each relation is difficult, "one must not, on this account, give up the attempt but rather make the relevant distinctions, to the extent possible" (*NE* 1165a34–36). Aristotle thus remains coy about what honor is, in fact, owed for the philosophic advice rendered.[37]

In chapter 3, Aristotle continues the theme of the obligations that exist among relations. Having in the previous chapter cautiously presented his belief that members of the political community have

an obligation to the ancestral, Aristotle now introduces the far more radical contention that the philosopher himself may have certain obligations toward the political community. Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the philosopher will likely have an instinctive aversion to the idea that he has obligations to the political community, Aristotle introduces the topic tentatively. He begins by simply reiterating the relatively uncontroversial assertion that friendships based on what is useful or pleasant tend to dissolve when they no longer serve the purpose for which they were entered. However, the focus soon shifts to the more difficult—and for the philosopher, perhaps, more controversial—question of whether a friendship based on the good can be dissolved if the character of one of the parties undergoes a change: "If someone accepts another person as good, and that other becomes corrupt or seems so, must he still love him? Or is it not possible, if indeed not everything is loveable but only the good?" (*NE* 1165b12–15).

Aristotle has, of course, already prepared his reader for the answer to this question by suggesting in the previous two chapters that the ancestral is loveable. If the good and the ancestral are distinct—as they usually (perhaps always) are—this would imply that the ancestral is loveable *despite* its being distinct from the good. In this way, Aristotle has tacitly signaled his answer: while the good may be preeminently loveable, the philosopher owes something to the ancestral as well. This comes to light most clearly in the hypothetical friendship presented by Aristotle in which one individual stays the same while the other "greatly surpasses him in virtue" (*NE* 1165b23). Ought the more virtuous individual treat the one who has remained the same as a friend? Or, alternatively, if an individual comes to greater awareness of the good and thereby recognizes the flaws and failings of the city in which he was raised, how ought he respond to the city that raised him? Should he actively seek to undermine the conventions and opinions that hold the city together? In contrast, Aristotle argues that while friendship may no longer exist in such situations, the philosopher still owes something to his former friend.[38] Rather than altogether dismissing one's former friend, "one ought . . . to remember the life lived

together with him" and on this basis "render something to those who were once friends" (*NE* 1165b33–36). Thus, even in the event that the distance becomes so great as to dissolve the friendship, Aristotle nevertheless finds that something is still owed.

In short, the first three chapters of Book IX present a sustained attempt by Aristotle to convince his reader of the need to respect the traditional political authorities. First, Aristotle seeks to humble his reader, suggesting that his philosophic views may not accurately capture the truth of the matter. Next, he turns to the respect that is owed to political authorities. Rather than leaving the reader with the impression that one always ought to prize philosophic contemplation and a concern for the good over and above the opinions and conventions of the city, Aristotle suggests that this rule does not always hold true. Last, almost as if in the recognition that simply humbling his reader and raising the claims of the traditional political sources of authority may not work on some of his more willful readers, Aristotle straightforwardly appeals to his readers' hubristic belief in their own superiority and counsels them to be patient with those who lack knowledge. All this forms part of a rhetorical effort to convince his readers that different relations are owed different honors and that these obligations exist even in the event that his readers so surpass those around them in virtue as to dissolve the former friendship.

The Need for Friends

Having introduced the possibility of an individual so surpassing his friend in virtue that the two can no longer remain friends, Aristotle turns in chapter 4 to the question of whether it is possible for such an individual to be a friend to himself. While this question is no doubt provocative, it seems to be a logical development from the previous chapter. If one's superiority to those around him is so great that he can no longer remain friends with them, then perhaps such a person can fulfill his desire for friendship by being a friend to himself. This topic is introduced by noting that five attributes appear to be most characteristic of friendship: (1) wishing and doing things that are good (or at least appear good) for the sake of the

other, (2) wishing that the friend exist and live for the friend's own sake, (3) going through life together, (4) choosing the same things as the friend, and (5) sharing in life's sufferings and joys (*NE* 1166a1–10). Aristotle goes on to state somewhat tersely that these five characteristics can all pertain to oneself. He writes, "Each of these [attributes] belongs to the decent person in relation to himself, and . . . he stands in relation to a friend as he does to himself—for the friend is another self" (*NE* 1166a29–32). Aristotle's famous statement that a friend is "another self" (ἄλλος αὐτός) is somewhat curious and does not receive much in the way of elaboration.

Much of the scholarship that focuses on the rhetorical quality of the *Ethics* has taken Aristotle's curious description of the friend as an ἄλλος αὐτός to mean that at this point, Aristotle is referring to the friendship one can have "with oneself" based on the composite nature of human beings (*NE* 1166a34–b2).[39] What these accounts overlook, however, is that Aristotle's description of how the second of the five characteristics of friendship applies to oneself—wishing that a friend exist and live—contains a compact discussion of what it means to exist:

> He also wishes that he himself live and be preserved, and especially that [part of himself] with which he is prudent. For existence is a good to the serious person, and each wishes for the good things for himself. Yet no one chooses to possess every good by becoming another—as it is, the god possesses the good—but rather by being whatever sort he is; and it would seem that it is the thinking part that each person is or is most of all. (*NE* 1166a18–23)

A serious person, argues Aristotle, finds his existence to be both desirable and good, and as a result, he will seek to *preserve* his existence. By invoking the notion of preservation, which hinges on the virtue of prudence (φρόνησις), Aristotle focuses on man's existence as a mortal entity—that is *as a human being*. No one, he tells us, would choose to possess every good by becoming another. Just as a god would not stoop to become mortal to attain the

characteristically human virtue of prudence, so the philosopher does not wish to concern himself with merely human affairs. Nevertheless, in contrast to the god, the philosopher is human and, as such, needs to concern himself with merely human affairs, if only to ensure his own preservation. By emphasizing prudence, Aristotle reminds us that even the individual who is preeminent in virtue is merely human and, as such, needs to preserve his existence.[40] In the very argument in which the friend is famously declared to be "another self," Aristotle seeks to tame the philosopher by reminding him of his humanity and of the fact that his virtue does not constitute the *whole* of virtue. In this way, Aristotle reveals to the philosopher that he may in some sense need a friend who has the virtue of prudence.[41]

Together, chapters 3 and 4 point toward a difficulty. On the one hand, chapter 3 raises the possibility that the philosopher may be so vastly superior to others that he is incapable of friendship with them. On the other hand, chapter 4 reiterates the philosopher's limited nature as a human being and strongly suggests that he is nonetheless in some sense in need of a friend. What ought the magnanimous philosopher to do in such a situation? It seems that the only path forward would be to seek out a *potential* friend.

Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to identifying *who* the philosopher ought to become friends with. The transition from chapter 4 to chapter 5 confirms that this is, indeed, Aristotle's intention. At the end of chapter 4, after having warned that the base person seeks to spend time with others only so as to escape his own misery, Aristotle tells the reader he must "flee corruption with the utmost effort and attempt to be decent, since in this way he would both be disposed toward himself in a friendly way and become a friend to another" (*NE* 1166b27–29).[42] In turn, chapter 5 focuses on goodwill (εὔνοια), which Aristotle defines as "the beginning of friendship" (*NE* 1167a3). Aristotle begins chapter 5 by distinguishing εὔνοια from friendship proper. While εὔνοια is similar to friendship, it differs in that it "arises suddenly" and is "without intensity or longing" (*NE* 1166b34–1167a3). Peter Hadreas argues convincingly that εὔνοια is best rendered in English as the "recognition of another's worthiness."[43] Aristotle emphasizes that this recognition

is a necessary precursor to friendship and that if it is "prolonged over time and [is] carrie[d] over into the habit of living together . . . [it] becomes friendship" of the highest kind (*NE* 1167a13–14). Aristotle is explicit that εὔνοια, or the recognition of another's worthiness, may become the grounds on which a friendship can be started, but friendship itself requires time and trust.

Aristotle concludes chapter 5 by indicating to whom the philosopher might look in search for a potential friend. He writes, "On the whole, goodwill arises on account of virtue and a certain decency, whenever someone appears to another as *noble or courageous* or some such thing, just as we said in the case of competitors as well" (*NE* 1167a18–21; emphasis added). Thus, Aristotle suggests that when looking for a potential friend, his philosophically inclined audience ought to seek out one who appears to be noble or courageous. By pointing to the noble (καλός) or courageous (ἀνδρεῖος), Aristotle seems to be directing his audience to those who can be said to embody or protect the ideals of the *polis*, or those who have an authoritative political role. Philosophically inclined individuals will complement such individuals and together they will be able to accomplish great good.

The introduction to chapter 6 further underscores the importance of complementarity in friendship. Aristotle notes that "like-mindedness" (ὁμόνοια) "appears to be a mark of friendship" (*NE* 1167a22). However, he quickly clarifies that this like-mindedness does not pertain to just anything but must concern matters of common advantage and action—one might say matters concerning politics. As a result, he states that "those who are of like mind concerning the things in the heavens" are not friends (*NE* 1167a26). Those concerned with speculative matters will not become friends solely on account of their theoretical agreement.[44] As Lorraine Pangle notes, "It would seem to be only in response to some problem or need . . . that the crucial element of friendship, sharing in choices, comes into play."[45] True friendship, Aristotle intimates, requires some level of differentiation.

That complementarity, or differentiation, is a key ingredient to friendship is borne out by the example that Aristotle chooses to

illustrate the importance of like-mindedness in friendship. The citizens of Mytilene, he notes, were like-minded when they resolved to have Pittacus rule. Each Mytilenean citizen agreed that the good should rule, and this like-mindedness among them contributed to the common good. In contrast, like-mindedness based on identicality, for example, "when each person wishes that he himself rule," results in "civil faction" (*NE* 1167a 30–35). By stressing the complementarity of the partners in a friendship, Aristotle makes clear that friendship is marked not by identicality but by a like-mindedness that concerns "what is advantageous," that it aims at "what has been resolved in common," and that it pertains to "matters of action" (*NE* 1167a26–30). Aristotle informs his philosophically inclined audience that by building on latent goodwill, and by spending time with one another, it is possible for them to develop friendship with those who hold power.

Friendship and the Common Good

So far, I have made the case that for Aristotle, a friendship between the philosophically inclined and the politically powerful can redound to the common good. However, it is perhaps not yet clear what concrete benefits can be had through an alliance of wisdom and power. Aristotle's example of the Mytileneans intimates that the friendship he seeks to cultivate has implications for the political realm more generally and is capable of reducing "civil faction" by cultivating a sense of ὁμόνοια among the citizenry. David Cohen notes that "*stasis*, the disintegration of a political community into rival warring factions, was the specter which haunted classical Greek political theory."[46] With this example of the Mytileneans, Aristotle suggests that ὁμόνοια, the solution to the problem of faction, is in some way tied to the friendship between the statesman and the philosopher.

How, precisely, the alliance between wisdom and power is related to the cultivation of a sense of ὁμόνοια among the citizenry is taken up at length in the *Politics*. Touching briefly on Aristotle's *Politics* will help us understand Aristotle's conception of political life and will enable us to outline how friendship between the

philosopher and the statesman can solve the problem of faction.[47] In Book II of the *Politics*, Aristotle discusses at length the difficulty that the problem of faction poses to the unity of the city.[48] The city is of necessity made up of heterogeneous groups or interests, and there is the ever-present possibility that these parts will put their own interests, or what they perceive to be their own good, above the common good of the city. The solution to the problem of faction, Aristotle argues, cannot be simply institutional, but must instead affect the character and desires of the citizens.[49] As a result, he intimates at various points that the most effective means to counter the problem of faction is through the establishment of a proper educational system (*Pol.* 1266b32–35; *Pol.* 1283a24–26). It is precisely this system of education that Aristotle establishes in Books VII and VIII of the *Politics*. Through the city's education, the citizens will develop a proper sense of moderation, which will prevent corrosive self-interest from destroying the integrity of the city (*Pol*. 1340a5–7). As a result, through the establishment of an educational system, the philosopher and the statesman provide a great benefit for the city: stability and peace.

Of course, while peaceful coexistence among the city's inhabitants is a necessary good and is of great benefit to the city, this is not the ultimate purpose or telos of the city. In his treatise on friendship in the *Ethics*, Aristotle suggests that on its own such existence is more fit for "cattle" than "human beings" (*NE* 1170b14). Instead, for human beings, "living together" consists in "sharing in a community of speeches and thought," so that one may come to "share in [a] friend's perception that he exists (συναισθάνεσθαι ὅτι ἔστιν)" (*NE* 1170b10–13).[50] John von Heyking explains that this shared perception—συναίσθησις—"consists of mutual intellectual perception of the good."[51] On this basis, he argues convincingly that the purpose of education in Books VII and VIII of the *Politics* is to bring about this shared perception (συναίσθησις) of the good.[52] Von Heyking points out that while the philosopher may practice leisure in the highest and most authoritative sense, the political counterpart to this leisure is developed through education and poetry and culminates in the city's festivities.[53] Thus, the

friendship between the statesman and the philosopher, which results in the establishment of an educational system, enables the citizenry to engage in leisure as well, albeit in a less intense manner than the philosopher.

Book VIII of the *Ethics* intimates the great political benefits that can be had through the alliance of wisdom and power, while at the same time exposing the difficulty of achieving such an alliance because of the divergent dispositions of the philosophically inclined and the politically powerful. In turn, the first six chapters of Book IX of the *Ethics* compose a protreptic address in which Aristotle attempts to convince his philosophically inclined audience to befriend those who are politically powerful. Through a series of rhetorical moves, Aristotle humbles his readers, raises the claims of those who are politically powerful, and finally appeals to his readers' philosophic superiority, all in an effort to convince his philosophically inclined readers to care for the political realm. While Aristotle suggests that the resulting friendship will be able to orient the practice of politics to the common good, he does not expressly state in this rhetorical address *how* such an orientation will be brought about. Instead, the method by which the common good might be achieved is made clear in his discussion of education in the *Politics*.

Conclusion

The purpose of this essay has been to expose the way in which Aristotle employs the art of rhetoric in Book IX of the *Ethics*. While much scholarship has been devoted to the use that Aristotle makes of rhetoric in presenting a defense of the philosophic life to his nonphilosophic readers, my analysis makes clear that a significant section of the *Ethics* is directed to his philosophically inclined readers. The foregoing interpretation indicates that we need to devote particular attention to parsing out precisely whom Aristotle is addressing in the differing sections of the *Ethics*. As I have argued, Book IX is devoted to convincing his philosophically inclined audience to be mindful both of their need for friendship with those who hold power and of the great benefits that can be

had through such a friendship. While it would be wrong to conclude on this basis that Aristotle views the life of politics to be equal to the leisurely life of philosophy—indeed, Aristotle's claim as to the superiority of the philosophic life in Book X seems to preclude such a conclusion—my interpretation implies that it is equally misleading to view Aristotle as having an "exclusivist" understanding of happiness, according to which the life of philosophy is incompatible with the life of politics. Philosophy, Aristotle intimates, must concern itself with politics and will have the effect of ensuring that the *polis* can partake in a level of leisure as well.

Notes

1. See, e.g., Stephen R. L. Clark, *Aristotle's Man: Speculations upon Aristotelian Anthropology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); W. F. R. Hardie, "Aristotle on the Best Life for a Man," *Philosophy* 54, no. 207 (1979): 35–50; Carnes Lord, *Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982); Stephen Salkever, "Taking Friendship Seriously: Aristotle on the Place(s) of *Philia* in Human Life," in *Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought*, ed. John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008).
2. J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); John M. Cooper, *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kathleen V. Wilkes, "The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle's Ethics," *Mind* 87, no. 348 (1978): 553–71.
3. Aristide Tessitore, *Reading Aristotle's "Ethics": Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Ronna Burger, *Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates: On the "Nicomachean Ethics"* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Thomas L. Pangle, "The Rhetorical Strategy Governing Aristotle's Political Teaching," *Journal of Politics* 73 no. 1 (2011): 84–96.
4. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1356a1–36. All references to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are to the Roberts translation in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) (hereafter cited as *Rhet*.).
5. Pangle, "The Rhetorical Strategy," 84–96.
6. In contrast to philosophers, whose lives are "characterized by a radical questioning of all conventional beliefs and opinions," these "gentlemen"

(καλός κἀγαθός) "embody the highest aims of the polis," and their lives are "circumscribed by social, political, and moral conventions." Tessitore, *Reading Aristotle's "Ethics,"* 17–19. See also Richard Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's "Ethics"* (Albany: State University of New York Press 1993); Gerald M. Mara, "The Logos of the Wise in the Politeia of the Many," *Political Theory* 28 no. 6 (2000): 835–60; Thomas W. Smith, *Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle's Dialectical Pedagogy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).

7. Tessitore, *Reading Aristotle's "Ethics,"* 20.
8. See, e.g., Robert C. Bartlett, "Aristotle's Introduction to the Problem of Happiness: On Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics*," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 3 (2008): 677–87.
9. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094b7–11. All references to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* are to the Bartlett and Collins translation. Aristotle, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1094b7–11 (hereafter cited as *NE*).
10. Scholars who embrace the "exclusivist" reading of the *Ethics* argue that Aristotle's conclusions regarding the happy life in Book X are simply inconsistent with his statements in Book I (e.g., Cooper, *Reason and Human Good*, 155), or they emphasize the fact that Book I is simply a "sketch" or "outline," which is to be filled in later (e.g., Hardie, "Aristotle on the Best Life for Man," 35; Tessitore, *Reading Aristotle's "Ethics,"* 21.
11. Tessitore, e.g., relates that Aristotle's "subsequent demotion of the life of moral virtue in light of the superior happiness afforded by the contemplative pleasures of philosophy is perhaps less strange and less jarring because it is prefaced with a consideration of friendship." *Reading Aristotle's "Ethics,"* 95. Others, such as Ronna Burger, point to Aristotle's concluding description of friendship in Book IX, in which he explains that some individuals choose to "philosophize together" (συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν) (*NE* 1172a5), to suggest that friendship ought to be developed between philosophers in pursuit of the truth. "Hunting Together or Philosophizing Together: Friendship and *Eros* in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," in *Love and Friendship: Rethinking Politics and Affection in Modern Times*, ed. Eduardo A. Velásquez (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2003), 37–60, at 51. This is an important point and suggests that philosophy is itself an endeavor that requires friendship. This article posits that a significant portion of Aristotle's discussion in Book IX of the *Ethics* is devoted to encouraging philosophers to develop friendships with statesmen and that there is great benefit in doing so.

12. The inclusivist conclusion I reach does not call into question Aristotle's prioritization of the contemplative life over the political life of moral virtue, but it does suggest that the contemplative life is compatible with the political life of moral virtue. In this regard, my conclusion is similar to that of Stephen Salkever, who argues that a "well-lived human life" cannot be reduced to either philosophic contemplation, politics, or even friendship but that it requires all three. "Taking Friendship Seriously," 67. See also Eric Voegelin, who argues that the polis is "based on the *philia*, the friendship, between men; and *philia* is rooted in the realization of the true self." Thus, the realization of the "true self," or of human excellence, culminates not simply in contemplation but also in the flourishing of the *polis*. *Order and History*, vol 3, *Plato and Aristotle* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 339. For an account of the philosopher's dependence on the *polis*, see Delba Winthrop, *Aristotle: Democracy and Political Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019).
13. The question concerning the best way of life, or the dispute between the active life and the contemplative life, was a familiar one in ancient Greece. See E. R. Dodds, ed., *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 275. Political hostility toward philosophers is well documented, and charges of impiety were brought against multiple philosophers, including Aristotle himself. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 5.5–8; Peter Ahrensdorf, "The Question of Historical Context and the Study of Plato," *Polity* 27 no. 1 (1994): 113–32. Less appreciated is the extent to which some philosophers went out of their way to criticize established customs and authorities. Diogenes Laertius relates that many philosophers challenged the established customs and authorities of the time, while the more outspoken of them would hold the authorities in outright disdain (Laertius, *Lives* 6:38–40 and 9.61–65).
14. In separating the first six chapters of Book IX from the rest of the *Ethics*, I do not claim that these chapters are the only section of the *Ethics* in which Aristotle addresses his philosophically inclined audience. I propose that these six chapters together form a rhetorical address directed toward his philosophically inclined audience to take the claims of the politically powerful seriously. Joe Sachs explains that while the friendships considered in Book VIII are all friendship within a single variety of friendship (i.e., friendship of utility, friendship of pleasure, and friendship of the good), the friendships to be discussed in Book IX

"involve mixtures across the kinds, such as friendships for use on one side and pleasure on the other." *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs (Indianapolis: Focus, 2002), n. 252. The friendship between the statesman and the philosopher will initially be a mixed friendship. While the statesman has use for the philosopher (cf. 1158a27), it may not be immediately clear to the philosopher what he stands to gain from friendship with the statesman. Aristotle seeks to convince the philosopher to recognize the latent goodness inherent in the statesman. After chapter 6, Aristotle begins an investigation into the way the philosopher might be able to actualize this latent goodness, such that their relationship might develop into a true friendship, or a friendship of the good. Aristotle follows this with an adumbration of the political effects their friendship might have (cf. 1170b11–14). In this way, the rhetorical address discussed in this article is transitional to, and yet foundational for, the political regime more generally.

15. See, e.g., Tessitore, *Reading Aristotle's "Ethics,"* 74; Smith, *Revaluing Ethics*, 195; Kathryn Sensen, "On the Nature of Friendship in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," in *The Arts of Rule: Essays in Honor of Harvey C. Mansfield*, ed. Sharon R. Krause and Mary Ann McGrail (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2009), 43.
16. Ann Marie Dziob, "Aristotelian Friendship: Self-Love and Moral Rivalry," *Review of Metaphysics* 46, no. 4 (1993): 798.
17. Patrick Cain and Mary Nichols, "Aristotle's Nod to Homer: A Political Science of Indebtedness," in *Socrates and Dionysius: Philosophy and Art in Dialogue*, ed. Ann Ward (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2013), 61.
18. J. David Velleman, "Sociality and Solitude," *Philosophical Explorations* 16, no. 3 (2013): 324–35.
19. The entire line from which Aristotle's citation is drawn provides further credence to this interpretation: "When two go together, one discerneth before the other how profit may be had; whereas if one alone perceive aught, yet is his wit the shorter, and but slender his device." Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. A. T. Murray, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 10:220–30.
20. Homer. *Iliad*, 10:247.
21. Homer, *Iliad*, 10:465–540.
22. Some scholars have pointed to the violent nature of the *doloneia* to suggest that Aristotle's citiation to the *Iliad* is meant subtly to call into question his encomium to friendship. Burger, e.g., relates that the "bloody night raid" is "a strange choice if one wanted to pick out a

single instance to illustrate as clearly as possible how companionship necessarily foster's noble deeds!" "Hunting Together or Philosophizing Together," 39–40. While it is true that in an unqualified sense, the deeds of Diomedes and Odysseus cannot be described as simply good, this whole episode must be viewed from a political perspective. The night raid advances the political objectives of the Akhaians and can therefore be said to be in service of the common good.

23. See Allan David Bloom. "Interpretive Essay," in *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 311.
24. On whether equality is a necessary precondition for Aristotle's virtue friendship, see Daniel P. Maher, "Contemplative Friendship in *Nicomachean Ethics*," *Review of Metaphysics* 65, no. 4 (2012): 771. Thomas W. Smith argues that equality is not a necessary precondition for friendship. *Revaluing Ethics*, 195–203. Suzanne Stern-Gillet argues that Aristotle's virtue friendship presupposes equality. *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 44. The problem of equality is exacerbated here by the high status Aristotle assigns to the σπουδαῖος, "the serious man." See Richard Avramenko, "The Gnostic and the *Spoudaios*: Aristotle, Voegelin and the Drama of Being," *Political Science Reviewer* 41, no. 1 (2017): 75–99.
25. *NE* 8.7–8.8, e.g., deals with friendships between those who are unequal. See esp. *NE* 1159a1–6. Similarly, *NE* 8.13 deals with accusations and blame that can arise in friendships, and *NE* 8.14 deals with differences that arise "in friendships based on superiority" (*NE* 1163a24).
26. This friendship is, strictly speaking, a homogeneous friendship, as both parties seek what is useful. Michael Pakaluk asserts that Aristotle likely introduces this example by way of contrast with the types of friendship that are to follow. *Nicomachean Ethics: Books VIII and IX*, trans. Michael Pakaluk (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1998), 149.
27. Some commentators have interpreted Aristotle's discussion regarding the giving and receiving of benefits as concerning what the philosopher is owed for his beneficence. See, e.g., Lorraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 132–35. In contrast to my interpretation, Pangle does not view Aristotle as engaging in a protreptic address meant to convince the philosopher of his need for friendship. See also Daniel P. Maher, "Friendship and Teaching Philosophy in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.1," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 87 (2013): 271–83. Maher posits that the relationship Aristotle seeks to cultivate is one between teacher and student.

28. Plato, *Protagoras and Meno*, trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), *Protagoras* 319a4.
29. Pangle similarly argues that Aristotle views the philosopher as "the benefactor par excellence." However, rather than drawing the conclusion that Aristotle intends to discuss friendship between philosophers and those who hold power, she simply relates that for Aristotle, the paradigmatic "virtuous friendship is . . . that between a philosopher and student." *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, 136.
30. Precisely what it means to teach someone "the political art" and how to become a "good citizen" is not made entirely clear at this point, but Aristotle intimates at various points in the *Ethics* that it involves actualizing the potential of an aspiring ruler so that he may become a statesman worthy of honor (*NE* 1168a19–22, 1170b11–14, 1180b29–1181a13). In addition, Aristotle makes clear that the philosopher might also provide more utilitarian benefits for the politician. See Aristotle, *Aristotle's Politics*, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 1259a5–35 (hereafter cited as *Pol.*).
31. The issue of repayment is complex, and Aristotle remains—perhaps purposefully—vague in discussing the issue. Initially, he notes that the gift of philosophy is invaluable, and as such the repayment cannot be satisfied by either money or honor. The true philosopher, Pangle accordingly relates, "has little hunger for the things for whose sake people crave money, and surely no delusions about the value of honor." *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, 134. Nevertheless, Aristotle notes that "if the giver receives as much as the recipient is benefited (or however much in return the recipient would have given in choosing the pleasure involved), the giver will have received what was merited from the recipient" (*NE* 1164b10–13). The meaning of this somewhat abstruse statement is not immediately revealed, but at present it suffices to note that Aristotle suggests that repayment depends, in part, on the efficacy of the philosophical advice rendered.
32. Aristotle states numerous times throughout the *Ethics* that the life of virtue may require the sacrifice of other things of "one's own" as well, including material goods (*NE* 1169a17–22), one's life (cf. *NE* 1120a 26–27, 1124b8–9), or one's reputation and honor (*NE* 1169a30–34). In this way, friendship involves an act of self-giving that needs to be governed by the virtue of prudence. The philosopher needs to know which gift is suitable for different occasions. When it comes to his relationship with the city, the philosopher will need to pay attention to the diverse humors at work in the city. If the political order is healthy, his gift should of necessity be different than when it is unhealthy (cf. *NE* 1165b13–23).

33. Ann Ward, *Contemplating Friendship in Aristotle's Ethics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016), 120–23; Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, 135–37; Delba Winthrop, "Aristotle and Theories of Justice," *American Political Science Review* 72 no. 4 (1978): 1214.
34. Ward, *Contemplating Friendship*, 122.
35. Ward, *Contemplating Friendship*, 122.
36. Ward, *Contemplating Friendship*, 122.
37. Aristotle's coyness in this regard stands in stark contrast to Plato's portrayal of Socrates in the *Apology*, where he states—perhaps facetiously—that he ought to be honored in the Prytaneum. See Plato, "Apology" in *Four Texts on Socrates*, trans. Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University West, 1984), 36e–37a. The question of whether Socrates can be described as a benefactor depends in large part on the worth of his teaching or his conversations with his interlocutors. Of course, Socrates himself claimed not to teach anything, except erotics (*Lysis* 204b–c). Søren Kierkegaard was of the opinion that the purpose of Socrates' method of investigating his compatriots' opinions was to show them the latent errors within them. According to Kierkegaard, Socrates' only response to his interlocutors' answers was "to suck out the apparent content by means of the question and thereby to leave an emptiness behind." *The Concept of Irony: With a Continual Reference to Socrates*, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36. David O'Connor relates that Socrates' education in erotics or desire "did not produce virtue or even reform in the interlocutor." "Socrates as Educator," in *A Companion to Ancient Education*, ed. W. Martin Bloomer (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2015), 88. For a contrary view see Dana Villa, *Socratic Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). Aristotle's belief concerning the philosopher's status as benefactor will ultimately depend on what he views to be the philosopher's contribution to the common good.
38. Richard Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 138.
39. See, e.g., John Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London: Meuthen, 1900), 413. Burnet concludes that Aristotle's argument at this point is "purely dialectical." Both Lorraine Pangle and Aristide Tessitore raise the question as to whether Aristotle views such a friendship as meaningful, but both maintain that Aristotle holds such friendship as possessing a "certain plausibility" (Tessitore, *Reading Aristotle's "Ethics,"* 84; Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, 153). For a contrary

perspective see Fred Schollmier, *Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and Poltical Friendship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 53–62; Alexander Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, vol. 2, 4th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1885), 290.

40. For an excellent discussion concerning the extent and limits to which the god functions as a paradigmatic ideal for individuals, see Richard Bodéüs, *Aristotle's Theology of the Living Immortals,* trans. Jan Edward Garrett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 168–78.
41. Aryeh Kosman notes that the term *another self* also appears in the *Eudemian Ethics*, where Aristotle states, "To be a friend means to be, as the saying goes, another Heracles, that is, another self" (*NE* 1245a30–35). Kosman explains that the phrase *another Heracles* was a common expression that was first applied to Theseus after he helped Jason and Meleager in getting rid of the Calydonian boar that had been terrorizing the community. The expression conveys the sense that "Theseus is virtually as good as Heracles if you need a certain task done." On this basis, Kosman concludes that in describing a friend as "another self," or "another Heracles," Aristotle intends to characterize friendship as an act of collaboration in a task, rather than as identicality. "Aristotle on the Desirability of Friends," *Ancient Philosophy* 24, no. 1 (2004): 147–48.
42. Aristotle reminds his audience that it is only by first bettering himself that an individual will become friends with another.
43. Peter Hadreas, "Εὔνοια: Aristotle on the Beginning of Friendship," *Ancient Philosophy* 15, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 398.
44. Aristotle's statement raises the question of whether two philosophers will be capable of friendship. In Book I, Aristotle notes that he and Plato are friends, but he quickly indicates that it is not necessarily on the basis of their shared philosophic insight (*NE* 1096a11ff). For a contrary perspective finding the basis of Aristotelian friendship to be shared philosophic dialogue, see Burger, "Hunting Together or Philosophizing Together," 37–60; Burger, *Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates*, 183–89.
45. Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, 157.
46. David Cohen, *Law Violence, and Community in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 25.
47. I discuss the relationship between sunaisthetic friendship, faction, and the purpose of political life at greater length in a forthcoming book, *Aristotle's Quarrel with Socrates: Friendship in Political Thought*.
48. Book II's concern with the unity of the city is made clear near the beginning of the book: "It is necessary that all the citizens either share in everything, or in nothing, or in some things but not in others. Now

it is evident that to share in nothing is impossible. . . . But of the things in which there can be sharing, is it better for the city that is going to be finely administered to share in all of them, or is it better to share in some but not in others" (*Pol.* 1260b37–1261a3). Aristotle goes on to critique Socrates' proposals in the *Republic*, according to which the city is made one by having all things in common (*Pol.* 1261b10–1262b36). Aristotle explains that this would have the opposite effect of that intended, as it would destroy the "care" that holds cities together (*Pol.* 1261b33–41).

49. Aristotle argues, e.g., that Phaleas's proposal to level all property in the regime so that things are equal would not reduce social faction. The causes of faction are not material but are rooted in man's desire, and as a result, he concludes that in order to avoid social faction, "one ought to level desires sooner than property; but this is impossible for those not adequately educated by the laws" (*Pol.* 1266b30–32).
50. April Flakne argues that Aristotle's discussion of συναίσθησις is the peak of Aristotle's inquiry into friendship, and of his teaching on ethics more generally. "Embodied and Embedded: Friendship and the Sunaisthetic Self," *Epoché* 10, no. 1 (2005): 37–63.
51. John von Heyking, *The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 57. See also Kosman, "Aristotle on the Desirability of Friends," 135–54. Kosman argues against the idea that a friend must be identical to oneself and links the concept of συναίσθησις with the importance of complementarity in friendship.
52. Von Heyking, *The Form of Politics*, 57–65.
53. In making this argument, von Heyking draws on the work of Oddone Longo, who explains that civic festivals occurred "at a time specified according to the community calendar, and in a special place expressly reserved for this function. . . . These rituals were understood to be celebrations of the *polis* and of its ideology." "The Theater of the Polis," in *Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in Its Social Context*, ed. John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 15–16. For a full accounting of the way in which civic festivals enable the citizens to engage in συναίσθησις, see von Heyking, *The Form of Politics*, esp. chap. 2.