The Political Science Reviewer • Volume 48, Number 1 • 2024

Eric Voegelin and Martin Heidegger on the Anaximander Fragment

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Introduction

Parallels in Eric Voegelin and Martin Heidegger's thought have often been noted, yet comparatively little scholarship explores the relation between the two. What is available generally provides broad overviews of these two thinkers' work rather than close comparisons of their thinking on specific texts.[1] The Anaximander fragment provides an intriguing opportunity for such a close analysis for several reasons. First, it is a rare instance where Heidegger touches on an explicitly political concept: *dike* (justice or order). Second, both thinkers spend a considerable amount of effort working on this text throughout their careers. Finally, they both interpret it as an important early statement on the fundamental nature of human being. Central themes for both Heidegger and Voegelin are on offer in Anaximander's thought. It is the argument of this paper that given their respective interpretations of the Anaximander fragment, Voegelin and Heidegger exhibit a striking convergence in terms of their philosophical outlook. However, Voegelin takes a crucial extra step in his analysis: he uses the insights on order gleaned from the fragment in structural analyses of other such fundamental statements on human existence. This extra step is essential if such philosophical insights are to have any value beyond purely philosophical concerns. Voegelin achieves a fuller understanding of Anaximander's philosophical insights by drawing on the data of historical experiences of dike to gain a more concrete grasp of how it functions within history. Extending the analysis in this way is the decisive element that differentiates these

two thinkers. It is this commitment to the concrete praxis of political order in history that allows Voegelin to avoid the dangers inherent to philosophical abstractions when applied to political subjects. As Hannah Arendt has pointed out, Heidegger made his "abode . . . outside the habitations of men," which rendered his practical judgment deficient.[2] Voegelin's approach offers a remedy for this concern.

While exploring these interpretations of the Anaximander fragment is of interest for historians of twentieth century thought, the issues raised here are broader. A careful reading of these two interpretations of the Anaximander fragment will help readers of any discipline recognize the dangers of applying metaphysical abstractions to politics. Indeed, observations like these may help toward a better understanding of why a brilliant philosopher like Heidegger was unable to avoid (or later apologize for) his association with the Nazi regime. There are also separate but important implications here in light of recent purely "metaphysical" critiques of modern politics.[3] A complete interpretation of the whole of political reality (philosophical, practical, historical, etc.) is essential for all scholars who engage in political debate.

This thesis will be explored in three stages. First, I examine some of the difficulties inherent to this project through an examination of the existing scholarship. These difficulties are, to some extent, addressed by the micro-level analysis afforded by their respective interpretations of the Anaximander fragment. Next, I examine Heidegger and Voegelin's respective readings of the fragment. Finally, I conclude with an analysis of the broader meaning of their treatments of Anaximander's text.

Difficulties of Comparing Voegelin and Heidegger

The paucity of material juxtaposing these two thinkers is understandable. Comparing their thought presents several difficulties. Primary among them is Voegelin's evident distaste for Heidegger's unrepentant Nazism. Voegelin was a fierce critic of Nazi ideology, writing several books condemning it in the 1930s despite the threat this posed to his career and personal safety.[4] This resulted in a

lifelong reticence to engage with Heidegger's philosophy. As one of his students has pointed out, "[O]ne could not really get to square one with Professor Voegelin on the subject of Heidegger."[5] This reticence became a common theme in Voegelin's work. In his later correspondence, he is sometimes dismissive of Heidegger, while at other times admitting familiarity with Heidegger's work.[6] Voegelin does mention Heidegger at various points in his own published work. For example, in *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, he names Heidegger as the culminating figure in the modern Gnostic strain of philosophical speculation:

> Gone are the ludicrous images of positivist, socialist, and super man. In their place, Heidegger puts being itself, emptied of all content, to whose approaching power we must submit. As a result of this refining process, the nature of gnostic speculation can now be understood as the symbolic expression of an anticipation of salvation in which the power of being replaces the power of God and the parousia of being, the Parousia of Christ.[7]

Here Voegelin draws broad conclusions regarding Heidegger's thought after analyzing only a few passages from just one of Heidegger's books.

Another difficulty is the notoriously opaque nature of these two thinkers' philosophies. Heidegger's writing is among the most recondite in the Western tradition. Despite his disdain for philosophical jargon, Voegelin's later thought approached Heidegger's in terms of conceptual difficulty. Both pushed the limits of language in articulating their ideas, making their texts difficult to approach without significant intellectual commitment. This may go some way in explaining why Voegelin seems never to have made the effort to fully understand Heidegger's philosophy.[8]

Finally, Heidegger's idiosyncratic approach to the analysis of philosophical texts makes any comparison on his terms difficult. For Heidegger all philosophical questions boiled down to the "question of being." This results in a constantly recurring critique

of philosophers who do not share this approach. Despite these difficulties, there are some who have tried to compare his work with Heidegger's.[9] Yet what has been missing from the conversation is a concentrated analysis of these two philosophers and their convergence and/or divergence on more granular-level issues. The Anaximander fragment provides a great opportunity to better situate the relation between these two thinkers.

There are three reasons why this is so. First, both of these thinkers were drawn to this text independently during the middle phase of their careers. Heidegger's infatuation with early Greek philosophy is evident for anyone familiar with his work. This is particularly true of his middle and later writings, when his preoccupation with primordial "thinking" led him to seek out the earliest texts in the Western tradition. Voegelin's fascination with the pre-Socratics emerged in the second volume of *Order and History*, where he chronicles the breakdown of order in the Greek world. It remained an abiding interest in his later work as he continued to refine his interpretation of the meaning of *noesis*. Further, both Heidegger and Voegelin glean concepts integral to their thinking from Anaximander's fragment. Heidegger's essay on Anaximander touches on many of the key concepts of his later philosophy, foremost among them "thinking" as an "appropriation" or "Event" through and with Being as "presencing."[10] Voegelin highlighted the text as an important precursor to later differentiations of noetic consciousness. According to Barry Cooper, "[T]he significance of the Anaximander fragment [for Voegelin] can hardly be overstated. It is the earliest philosophical expression of the process and structure of reality."[11] Finally, and most importantly, the Anaximander fragment provides a rare opportunity to examine Heidegger's thinking on what can be read as a political concept: dike; that is, justice or order.[12]

Heidegger's Reading

Heidegger's essay begins with what he calls the "more literal" translation of the fragment: "But that from which (*genesis*) things arise also gives rise to their passing away (*phthora*, perishing), according

to what is necessary; for things render justice (dike) and pay penalty to one another for their injustice (*adikia*) according to the ordnance of time."[13] He reads *genesis* and *phthora* in terms of what he calls "presencing," a central aspect of his critique of traditional metaphysics. According to Heidegger, "The fragment speaks of that which, as it approaches, arrives in unconcealment, and which, having arrived here, departs by withdrawing into the distance."[14] Here, he is referring to his idea of the "truth of being"—that is, the manner in which Being presents "beings" (meant here in terms of the Latin *ens* or "that which is").[15] In this sense, Being is the "clearing" where beings come to presence and withdraw. Being, in its presencing of beings with and through man, simultaneously withdraws itself. Since it is not a thing (that is, "no-thing" or "Nothing"), whenever a being presents itself, Being necessarily withdraws. To think of Being is to think of this clearing, which itself contains nothing. That is, it is an absence of things.[16] For the later Heidegger, man and Being are jointly wrapped up in this "event" or "appropriation" (*Ereignis*), where beings "come to presence" through Being. This event is not possible without either man or Being.[17]

Given this, Heidegger interprets Anaximander's genesis and phthora as the limits that determine the justice of lingering: "If what is present stands in the forefront of vision, everything presences together: one brings the other with it, one lets the other go. What is presently present in unconcealment lingers in unconcealment as in an open expanse."[18] This lingering between the genesis and the phthora, this lingering of that which is, is Anaximander's way of bringing the event to language. Anaximander's *apeiron*, then, is the limitless, the leftover when beings "slip away . . . as a whole."[19] Thus, for Anaximander, the "Being of beings" (that is, the manner in which beings come to presence) is the lingering: "What is presently present lingers awhile. It endures in approach and withdrawal. Lingering is the transition from coming to going; what is present is what in each case lingers." The beings that linger awhile in this sense are what Anaximander is referring to as "the things": "Τὰ ἐόντα (*Ta eonta*) names the uniform manifold of whatever lingers awhile."[20]

Dike is the primary subject of the second clause of the presumably "authentic" part of the Anaximander fragment, on which Heidegger accordingly focuses: "according to necessity; for they pay one another recompense and penalty for their injustice."[21] Heidegger wonders, "[H]ow [does] . . . Anaximander experience the totality of things present; how does he experience their having arrived to linger awhile among one another in unconcealment?" He concludes, "The fragment's last word gives the answer."[22] This last word is *adikia* or injustice.

Heidegger continues, "The fragment clearly says that what is present is in *adikia*, i.e., is out of joint. . . . [That is,] what is present as such, being what it is, is out of joint."[23] Whatever exists through presencing, then, is out of joint. Later, Heidegger asserts that "[e]verything that lingers awhile stands in disjunction. . . . The disjunction consists in the fact that whatever lingers awhile seeks to win for itself a while based solely on the model of continuance. Lingering [is] persisting."[24] Does this mean that it is somehow wrong for beings to be? Is continuance or lingering or persisting always considered injustice? No: "What belongs to that which is present is the jointure of its while, which it articulates in its approach and withdrawal. In the jointure whatever lingers awhile keeps to its while. *It does not incline toward the disjunction* [i.e., injustice] *of sheer persistence.*"[25] This presencing that is taking place in the jointure (i.e., in the simultaneous presencing of beings and withdrawing of Being) need not incline toward sheer persistence, but when it does, injustice is the result. Beings that linger in their while and pass away into withdrawal do so according to a principle of order:

> The jointure is order. Dike, thought on the basis of Being as presencing, is the ordering end enjoining Order. Now it is only necessary that we think this capitalized word capitally—in its full linguistic power. The enjoined continuance does not at all insist upon sheer persistence. It does not fall into disjunction; it surmounts disorder.[26]

The phrase that originally read "for they pay one another recompense and penalty for their injustice" is now translated as "they, these same beings, let order belong by the surmounting of disorder."[27] This means that when Anaximander's fragment is understood in terms of presencing and Heidegger's "truth of being,"

> those beings that linger awhile in presence, stand in disorder. As they linger awhile, they tarry. They hang on. For they advance hesitantly through their while, in transition from arrival to departure. They hang on; they cling to themselves. When what lingers awhile delays, it stubbornly follows the inclination to persist in hanging on, and indeed to insist on persisting; it aims at everlasting continuance and no longer bothers about dike, the order of the while.[28]

Thus, the Being of beings, as Heidegger construes Anaximander's understanding of it, is based on an Order that dictates the length of the while during which beings might justly continue in presencing. This Order depends on other beings within the whole. Each being must reck or pay heed to other beings according to Order. It is only when beings pay heed to other beings that such Order can emerge: "Insofar as beings which linger awhile give order, each being thereby lets reck belong to the other, lets reck pervade its relations with the others."[29]

A crucial question thus arises: What determines this Order of lingering? How is Order projected onto beings by being? For Heidegger this means asking how we are to translate "κατὰ τὸ χρεών" (*kata to chreon*, "according to necessity"). Heidegger renders this term *der Brauch*, which is translated to English here as "usage." Yet more is at play here than usage in a purely utilitarian sense: "'Usage,' as the word that translates as τὸ χρεών [i.e., *der Brauch* or usage], should not be understood in the current, derived senses. We should rather keep the root-meaning: to use is to brook [*bruchen*], in Latin *frui*, in German *fruchten*, *Frucht*."[30]

The invocation of the Latin frui here is interesting. Yet more interesting is that Heidegger fully acknowledges that he understands frui through an Augustinian lens. He cites a passage where Augustine asserts that "the happy life may be found [when] that which is best for man is both loved and possessed. For what else is meant by enjoyment but the possession of what one loves? But no one is happy who does not enjoy what is supremely good for man."[31] In *De doctrina christiana*, which Heidegger also cites here, Augustine writes that "[t]o enjoy (*frui*) something is to hold fast to it in love for its own sake."[32] This suggests that by usage he means something like the loving possession of the supreme good for its own sake, which is a startlingly uncharacteristic move for Heidegger.

He continues by connecting this usage as frui to the apeiron: "usage, enjoining order and so limiting what is present, distributes boundaries. As τὸ χρεών it is therefore at the same time apeiron, that which is without boundary, since its essence consists in sending boundaries of the while to whatever lingers awhile in presence."[33] Usage is the giving of limits by the apeiron, which is the limitless from which beings originate and pass away. For Heidegger, this seems to refer to the totality of beings present to man as Dasein, rather than "that which constitutes presence as such in general" or the Nothing.[34] In addition to the obvious association of the apeiron or limitless as the Nothing, this suggests that Heidegger sees the apeiron as a fullness worthy of loving for its own sake, which dictates the justice or injustice of lingering.

Next, Heidegger associates usage with Order: "Order is κατὰ τὸ χρεών."[35] In other words, Order is apeiron, which is also usage. In acknowledging that Order can be thought of in terms of the apeiron, Heidegger further acknowledges the fullness of meaning inherent in usage as frui. Yet the limitless aspects of apeiron should not be forgotten here either. Insofar as Heidegger aims to interpret the Anaximander fragment as a reflection on Being as presencing, this must mean that presencing is irreducibly associated with Dasein's experience of beings as they are presenced from the Nothing. Yet Heidegger also seems to be asserting that ascertaining

Order is possible only within the horizon of usage/frui. There is thus an interplay between the apeiron as Nothing and the apeiron as the positive principle of Order for Heidegger.

To sum up: in order to provide a sense of the meaning of Order, Heidegger interprets Anaximander's fragment as an interplay between things and the apeiron using the conceptual framework of Augustine's frui. This construal of usage in terms of frui speaks to an important addition to Heidegger's understanding of Being as presencing from the Nothing. That is, there must be some sort of interplay between the limitless aspect of the apeiron and its fullness in terms of usage as frui. In other words, to begin to ascertain the terror of the Nothing, one must have a sense of the whole within which he or she stands. This is the crucial point of connection with Voegelin, to whom I now turn.

Voegelin's Reading

Voegelin's translation of the Anaximander fragment reads, "The origin (*arche*) of things is the apeiron. . . . [I]t is necessary for things to perish into that from which they were born; for they pay one another penalty for their injustice (*adikia*) according to the ordinance of Time."[36] Voegelin is more direct in divulging what he wants his reader to take from Anaximander's text: "To exist means to participate in two modes of reality: (1) In the apeiron as the timeless *arche* of things and (2) in the ordered succession of things as the manifestation of the apeiron in time."[37] Voegelin is careful to delineate what he understands by Anaximander's juxtaposition of the two modes of reality: "one must beware of identifying . . . life and death as that of human beings, or the things (*ta onta*) as inorganic objects, organisms, men or societies, and so forth." Neither reality can be explained solely on its own terms; any interpretation of reality that does so steps outside the "justice of Time."[38]

Within this whole, each mode unfolds through participation in the other: "Reality in the mode of existence is experienced as immersed in reality in the mode of non-existence and, inversely, non-existence reaches into existence. The process has the character of an In-Between reality, governed by the tension of life and

death."[39] The apeiron is the non-existent realm with which things are somehow wrapped up, with the two modes of apeiron (i.e., non-existence and existence) comprising the whole.[40] Included in Voegelin's reading of Anaximander's dictum is the idea that "man can neither conquer reality nor walk out of it, for the apeiron, the origin of things, is not a thing that could be appropriated or left behind through movements in the realm of things. . . . [N]o turning away from the apeiron, or turning against it, can prevent the return to it through death."[41] Man is always already existing in this interaction between things and the apeiron.

Man's realization of his simultaneous participation in both modes of reality is constitutive of his consciousness. On Voegelin's reading of Anaximander, man *is* insofar as he becomes aware of this simultaneous happening and tension between these modes of reality. To experience both modes and to try to articulate the experience in symbols (though this articulation can never fully capture the totality of the event) is to engage with reality in its full noetic possibility. Those who engage in this experience and are able to communicate a shade of its meaning through symbols demonstrate the event of participation in both the mode of things and the apeiron.[42] The phthora and genesis of the apeiron invite man into deeper levels of noetic differentiation through the experience of their inevitability.

Parallels with Heidegger are evident here. From the get-go Voegelin identifies the two aspects of the meaning of the apeiron: it is both that from which things emerge *and* the "ordered succession of things" in time.[43] Voegelin, like Heidegger, differentiates an interplay between the apeiron as the limitless and some sort of fullness. The philosophical insight, then, is quite similar. But this convergence is only the beginning for Voegelin. He takes a crucial further step: he weaves the insight into his reading of historical experiences of order so that he can identify structural similarities across time. To better describe how he does this, it will be important to explain a few of his central concepts before proceeding.

In earlier articulations of the structure of reality and man's place in it, Near Eastern and Egyptian societies did not

differentiate between the transcendent beyond and the cosmos. For them, symbols like the *Okeanos* or Ocean represented the limits of the cosmos, where the "ends of the earth" met with the place of the afterlife.[44] Similarly, the gods were conceived as what Voegelin calls "intracosmic" gods, meaning they were believed to be connatural with the elemental forces that drove events on earth. The cosmos, the physical world, and man's existence interpenetrated each other so comprehensively that no delineation of these various structures in reality was needed beyond the myth. Anaximander is a transitional figure out of this more "compact" structure into a more "differentiated" one in which various different modes of reality become apparent.[45] The symbols of phthora, genesis, and apeiron allow a more differentiated consciousness to develop: "The reality experienced and articulated in the dictum comprehends the apeiron, the things, the relation between apeiron and things, and the relation among the things. What has not yet become articulate as an area of reality is the noetic consciousness in which the dictum emerges as the luminous symbol of reality."[46] Anaximander's symbolization is thus a precursor to what will unfold in the work of Plato:

> The symbolism of a movement that transcends reality while remaining within it is not senseless, for reality is not a field of homogeneous extension but is aetiologically and directionally structured. There is first of all the articulation of reality into the two modes of being, of the Apeiron and of thinghood, which are known to man inasmuch as he experiences himself as existing not completely in either the one or the other of the two modes. . . . Hence, there is a difference of rank between the two modes of being, with the Apeiron being "more real" than the things. This tension of existence toward reality in an eminent sense becomes conscious in the movements of attraction and search analyzed by Plato and Aristotle. And finally, the consciousness of tension is not an object given to a subject of cognition but the very process in which reality becomes luminous

> to itself. The Apeiron and the things are not two different realities in a static relationship one toward the other; they are experienced as modes of being, or as poles of a tension within the one, comprehensive reality.[47]

Plato's philosophy is therefore rooted in Anaximander's insight. The later philosopher articulates the "In-between" structure of reality, juxtaposing the apeiron and "the One" as two poles, the movement between which constitutes the human psyche. This structure constitutes for Plato the place where the transcendent beyond, or *epekeina*, and the material world interact. Anaximander expresses in a more compact form the structure of noetic participation in limitless, eternal being. It is just one historical articulation of the intelligible structures of consciousness that constitute man's participation in the mystery of being.

Thus, Voegelin views history as a collection of more or less differentiated articulations of the structure of reality. "Plato's image of Being before the event is dominated by the Anaximandrian symbolism of the apeiron. The things (*ta eonta*) emerge from the apeiron and return to it; they exist under the law of *genesis* and *phthora*, of Becoming and Perishing."[48] When Anaximander experiences the phthora and the genesis of the apeiron, he is experiencing what Plato will come to describe using a richer, more differentiated set of language symbols. The identification of these structural parallels across history are hallmarks of Voegelin's "empirical" method: symbolizations of the structure of reality provide the evidence needed to identify the structures that have been identified in the various symbolic articulations. This will provide criteria for analyses (and counteranalyses) of other systems of symbolization.[49] The abstract metaphysical insight cannot stand on its own.

We are now in a better position to understand how Voegelin conceives dike's function through Anaximander's text. The inevitability of the genesis and phthora results from the ordering force of dike. Voegelin writes that in Anaximander's fragment,

> "The things" are clearly conceived as a universe with an ordered process. And the order, as the legal terminology shows, is conceived after the model of a lawsuit in which justice is administered—the decree of Time rules "the things" out of existence, back to where they came from, so that other things may have being for their allotted time.[50]

The principle of order, the coming to being and the perishing to the apeiron, happens according to an intelligible process. It is up to persons, through participation and symbolization, to articulate it. Without awareness of other such expressions, the process itself would be unintelligible.

Dike thus cannot be understood outside of its particular manifestations as it is conceived in various symbolizations: "history is the process in which eternal being realizes itself in time . . . [and] philosophy brings the differentiated knowledge of this process to consciousness."[51] One need only think of "eternal being" as apeiron to see that Voegelin's words here are yet another manifestation of Anaximander's compact insight. By that crucial step beyond Heidegger's analysis, Voegelin draws his understanding of this complex of structures as they play out in and through the process of the "order of history." This is what is meant by Voegelin's grandiose pronouncement in the preface of *Israel and Revelation*: "The order of history emerges from the history of order."[52]

Conclusion

Heidegger's acknowledgment of the centrality of the Augustinian frui for an understanding of the meaning of order coincides with the reading that Voegelin offers in his analysis. For both, Anaximander articulates the justice of order according to the interplay of things and the apeiron, where apeiron is conceived as both the limitless *and* the ordering principle (or arche) of the interplay. Both aspects of the apeiron are essential elements of the structure. However, Voegelin saw that it is essential to identify how persons experience this conception of order and express its

meaning in history. He provides his readers with a sense of the way in which order comes about in human existence by providing a framework for understanding how others across time have addressed similar basic issues of human existence. This is the decisive step that differentiates these two thinkers. Although their philosophical understanding of the text overlaps in important ways, Voegelin's extra step of situating Anaximander's text in history and analyzing the various articulations of Anaximander's insight is decisive.

Exploring the sources of political order requires this extra step of leaving one's own abstract reflections and entering into history of similar reflections. This does not mean that what is learned in philosophical meditation is simply left behind. Rather, Voegelin shows that it means gauging the meaning of such reflections in their interaction with temporal reality in its various historical modes. Without this extra step of empirically situating one's own reflections, disastrous results may follow, as Heidegger's tragic political engagements show.

Appendix A—Anaximander's Fragment Greek Text[53]

> ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, **διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας** κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν.[54]

The passage in bold is the section most widely believed to consist of the actual words of Anaximander.[55] Heidegger agrees with this sentiment. However, as he notes in "The Anaximander Fragment," Heidegger analyzes the whole passage "on the basis of the strength and eloquence of their thought, as secondary testimony concerning Anaximander's thinking."[56]

Appendix B—Heidegger's Translations

In the essay examined in this paper Heidegger focused on the part of the fragment that begins "κατὰ τὸ χρεών," as noted in Appendix A. At the end, he offers his translation:

> . . . along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder.[57]

Appendix C—Voegelin's Translation

"The origin of things is the apeiron. . . . [I]t is necessary for things to perish into that from which they were born; for they pay one another penalty for their injustice according to the ordinance of Time."[58]

Notes

1. See, e.g., David Walsh, "Voegelin and Heidegger: Apocalypse without Apocalypse," in *Eric Voegelin and the Continental Tradition: Explorations in Modern Political Thought*, ed. Lee Trepanier and Steven F. McGuire (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011); David Walsh, "Editor's Introduction," in *Anamnesis: On the Theory of History and Politics*, ed. David Walsh, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 6 (Columbia: University of Columbia Press, 2002); Michael Henry, "Voegelin and Heidegger as Critics of Modernity," VoegelinView, January 2, 2017, https://voegelinview.com/voegelin-heidegger-critics-modernity; Paul Kidder, "Voegelin, Heidegger, and the Configuration of Historical Ontology," VoegelinView, January 11, 2017, https://voegelinview.com/voegelin-heidegger-configuration-historical-ontology.
2. Hannah Arendt, "Heidegger at Eighty," in *Thinking without a Bannister* (New York: Schocken Books, 2018), 426.
3. See, e.g., D. C. Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017).
4. Eric Voegelin and Ellis Sandoz, *Autobiographical Reflections* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 41; Eric Voegelin, *Race and State*, trans. Ruth Hein, ed. Klaus Vondung, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 2 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997); Eric Voegelin, *The History of the Race Idea: From Ray to Carus*, trans. Ruth Hein, ed. Klaus Vondung, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 3 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998).
5. Kidder, "Voegelin, Heidegger, and the Configuration of Historical Ontology," 1.
6. Myron Jackson, "A Night in Heidelberg: Voegelin's Letters on Heidegger," VoegelinView, April 18, 2012, 2, https://voegelinview.com/a-night-in-heidelberg-pt-1.

7. Eric Voegelin, "Science, Politics and Gnosticism," in *Modernity without Restraint: The Political Religions, The New Science of Politics, and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, ed. Manfred Henningsen, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 5 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 276.
8. Walsh, "Voegelin and Heidegger: Apocalypse without Apocalypse," 172.
9. E.g., Walsh highlights important areas of overlap. Similarly, Hughes highlights convergence between Voegelin's notion of consciousness and Heidegger's *Dasein*. Kidder lays the groundwork for a "Voegelinian" analysis of Heidegger's philosophy, arguing that it is possible to bring the two into conversation, albeit only on Heidegger's terms. Gebhardt and Myron have also made notable efforts at comparison. See Walsh, "Editor's Introduction," 25; Glenn Hughes, *Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), 12; Kidder, "Voegelin, Heidegger, and the Configuration of Historical Ontology"; Jürgen Gebhardt, "Heidegger, Voegelin, and the Human Predicament," VoegelinView, May 1, 2012, https://voegelinview.com/heidegger-voegelin-and-the-human-predicament; Michael Henry, "Voegelin and Heidegger as Critics of Modernity," VoegelinView, January 2, 2017, https://voegelinview.com/voegelin-heidegger-critics-modernity; Myron Jackson, "A Night in Heidelberg: Voegelin's Letters on Heidegger," VoegelinView, April 18, 2012, https://voegelinview.com/a-night-in-heidelberg-pt-1.
10. Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 271.
11. Barry Cooper, "Reduction, Reminiscence and the Search for Truth," in *The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics*, ed. Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 329.
12. This term is closely associated with *phthora* and *genesis*, as will be explained below. Martin Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in *Early Greek Thinking* (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1984), 20; Eric Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age*, Order and History, vol. 4 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1974), 174.
13. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," 20.
14. Heidegger, 31.
15. Throughout this section I follow Heidegger's convention in capitalizing *Being* to denotes its status as a technical term in Heidegger's thought.
16. Martin Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), 445.

17. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," trans. Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray, in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), 217, 234; Martin Heidegger, "What Is Metaphysics?," in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 82ff. Others provide helpful amplifying interpretations of the term: Iain Thomson avers that the term is "Heidegger's name for the *rapprochement* between human beings and Being by which intelligibility takes place." Malpas calls it the "disclosive happening of belonging," which is composed of "the ideas of happening, gathering/belonging, and revealing/disclosing." He adds further that "a sense in which Heidegger talks of the Event as something that 'happens' to us—something in which we are 'taken up' and 'transformed.'" Polt, in an exhaustive analysis, finds a sevenfold "definition" of the term that explains it in its various manifestations throughout Heidegger's later corpus. See Iain Thomson, "The Philosophical Fugue: Understanding the Structure and Goal of Heidegger's Beiträge," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 34, no. 1 (2003): 61; Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 217–18; Richard Polt, "Ereignis," in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (New York: Wiley, 2007), 383.
18. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," 37.
19. Heidegger, 54.
20. Here, Heidegger uses a more archaic form that he derives from his analysis of a Homeric text to make his point. For present purposes readers can think of it as the ἐστι of the Anaximander fragment. See appendices for the Greek text of the fragment and Heidegger's translations. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," 37.
21. Heidegger, 40.
22. Heidegger, 40–41.
23. Heidegger, 41.
24. Heidegger, 42–43.
25. Heidegger, 43 (emphasis added).
26. Heidegger, 43–44.
27. Heidegger, 44.
28. Heidegger, 45.
29. Heidegger, 47.
30. Heidegger, 53.
31. St. Augustine of Hippo, "The Way of Life of the Catholic Church," in *The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life*, The Fathers of the Church, vol. 56 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 6.

32. St. Augustine of Hippo, *On Christian Teaching*, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 9.
33. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," 54.
34. Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, ed. Ingeborg Schüßler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 154.
35. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," 54.
36. Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age*, 174.
37. Voegelin, 174.
38. Voegelin, 175.
39. Voegelin, 174–75.
40. For a helpful discussion of the paradox of consciousness and the centrality of participation for Voegelin's thought as a whole, see Robert McMahon, "Eric Voegelin's Paradoxes of Consciousness and Participation," *Review of Politcs* 61, no. 1 (1999): 117–39.
41. Voegelin, *The Ecumenical Age*, 215.
42. It should be noted here that noetic philosophy is not the only way for reality to be experienced. Prophets or mystics can experience a pneumatic form of participation in the divine. See Eric Voegelin, *Order and History, Volume 1: Israel and Revelation*, ed. Maurice P. Hogan, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 1 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 39–50.
43. Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age*, 174.
44. Voegelin, 202.
45. Voegelin, *Israel and Revelation*, 51; Eugene Webb, *Eric Voegelin, Philosopher of History* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 299–301. See also Glenn Hughes, "Voegelin's Question of the Ground," VoegelinView, February 14, 2011, https://voegelinview.com/question-of-the-ground-pt-1.
46. Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age*, 215.
47. Voegelin, 215–16.
48. Eric Voegelin, "The Beginning and the Beyond: A Meditation on Truth," in *What Is History? and Other Late Unpublished Writings*, ed. Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 28 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990), 221.
49. "Empirical" is placed in quotes here to demonstrate its conceptual incommensurability with the term as broadly understood in the sciences and humanities today. Voegelin meant the term in the sense of Greek *empeira*, which is usually rendered in English as "experience." As opposed to its more broadly accepted meaning, it is understood by Voegelin to include human experiences insofar as they can be conveyed

through symbols. See Barry Cooper, "Eric Voegelin, Empirical Political Scientist," in *The Restoration of Political Science and the Crisis of Modernity* (Lewiston, NY: Edward Mellen, 1989).

50. Eric Voegelin, *Order and History, Volume 2: The World of the Polis*, ed. Athanasios Moulakis, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 15 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 306.
51. Eric Voegelin, "Eternal Being in Time," in *Anamnesis: On the Theory of History and Politics*, ed. David Walsh, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 6 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 313.
52. Voegelin, *Israel and Revelation*, 19.
53. Notably, Heidegger examines only the Diels-Kranz 12B1 fragment, whereas Voegelin includes the 12A9 passage.
54. Anaximander, "Fragments of Anaximander," in *Early Greek Philosohpy, Vol. 2: Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, Part 1*, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 282–84.
55. John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: A & C Black, 1920), 54.
56. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," 30.
57. Heidegger, 57.
58. Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age*, 174.