

Augustine and Political Friendship as *Metaxy*

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Political Friendship as *Metaxy*

Interest in friendship as a central category for political analysis comes at a time of widespread doubt about liberalism's central premise that pursuing self-interest generates political harmony.¹ The Right typically doubts liberalism's ability to generate civic virtue and publicly minded citizens who serve the common good, while the Left claims consent veils sinister interests of the powerful instead of constituting legitimacy.

Criticism of liberalism's central premise began almost as soon as John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* was published, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Sparta-inspired ideal serving as the most influential criticism. In the twentieth century, John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (1971) inspired a generation of debate between liberals and communitarians, with many of the latter inspired by premodern, usually Aristotelian accounts of community and virtue. A recent variant of that debate draws on Aristotle's understanding of friendship as a salve for liberalism's alleged shortcomings. What these ancient and modern criticisms share is skepticism that self-interest or even egoism can generate harmony for the entire society or that the pursuit of one's own good can produce goods for all. To be sure, the argument that private vices generate public benefits rarely draws such a sharp distinction between the two alternatives.

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Instead this problem is usually expressed as some version of enlightened self-interest that is ready to suppress personal advantage to some degree to obtain mutual benefit.² However, this revision may not be enough to avoid criticisms that it serves oligarchy.³ Recent commentators on Aristotelian friendship have also contributed to this discussion by highlighting the continuity between self-love and friendship rather than seeing the two as necessarily opposed.⁴

While Aristotle provides a considerable storehouse of insight for political theorists thinking about political friendship, this essay considers Augustine's unique contribution to an understanding of political friendship that addresses some of these contemporary concerns while providing a more differentiated account of the kind of regime of friendship for which Aristotle prayed and that is also based on the Socratic dictum that committing injustice is the worst evil one can perform. It does so by considering Augustine's understanding of political friendship in terms of what Eric Voegelin called *metaxy*, the "in-between" space between the divine and humans.

Augustine characterizes a people (*populus*) as "an assembled multitude of rational creatures bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love."⁵ President Joe Biden brought this definition to public attention in his Inaugural Address (2021) when he listed the common "objects of love" shared by Americans to address that country's polarization crisis.⁶

Augustine's definition of *populus* must be understood in light of his characterization of human life as the intermingling of the city of God and the earthly city, by which he meant the two primordial loves that constitute human existence, love of God and love of self.⁷ The commonwealth, bound by political friendship, is the primary site of that intermingling, which can be seen in the various ways Augustine characterizes politics in terms of the earthly city and as intimating the city of God. The commonwealth as *metaxy* incarnates both cities and their intermingling, which suggests it is not simply derivative of either one but has its own ontological status as being composed of unique and irreplaceable persons experiencing

themselves as composing a greater whole. By way of illustration, he compares the part-whole relationship of a commonwealth and its citizens to the way individual letters compose a discourse as a greater whole.⁸ Neither the commonwealth nor the discourse can exist without acknowledging the irreplaceability and integrity of its parts—citizens and letters.

Voegelin adopted the idea of *metaxy* from Plato's *Symposium*, in which Eros is portrayed as a demigod who exists in-between gods and humans, immortality and mortality, wisdom and ignorance, perfection and imperfection, time and timelessness, order and disorder, and *amor Dei* and *amor sui* (referring to Augustine).⁹ *Metaxy* expresses human beings' fundamental condition, and Voegelin applied it as a measure against ideological deformations that break the "balance" of the in-between and rendered human beings in terms of the "hypostasized" poles of tension, rendering them either false gods or beasts. In addition to expressing humanity's condition, *metaxy* provides the measure and model by which human beings constitute political communities.

This appropriation for Augustine of Voegelin's Platonic idea of *metaxy* does not paganize Augustine. Augustine appropriated Plato and Platonism for his own purposes. Voegelin regarded Christ's Incarnation and *metaxy* as equivalent symbols.¹⁰ Augustine's primary concern for commonwealths is that they tend to claim divinity for themselves, which aligns with Voegelin's own reasons for appropriating *metaxy* for political analysis. Yet both thinkers show that deformation is itself a symptom of the fundamental movement within *metaxy* that Voegelin describes as immortalization, which takes place at all levels of being. *Metaxy* as being in-between gods and man sets down markers for understanding the manifold goods humanity's political creativity encompasses and excludes. By claiming human beings experience themselves in a primordial community of God, man, world, and society residing in-between the experiences of immortality and mortality, Voegelin and, by extension, Augustine illuminate the goods those enumerated symbols signify coexist with one another within the commonwealth.

When Augustine describes the final ends of humanity in the last four books of *City of God*, he means them to exist not only at the end of time but always, though not always fully present. Book XIX, which is frequently read as the focal point of Augustine's political teaching because of its focus on the intermingling or in-between of the earthly city and the city of God, must be read with what he says about the final ends of humanity at the Day of Judgment (Book XX), the end of the earthly city, Hell (Book XXI), and the end of the city of God (Community of Saints; Book XXII) because they are also present before their final separation.

In characterizing Augustine's commonwealth as *metaxy* and thereby the site where the earthly city and city of God intermingle, I am distinguishing it from his understanding of the church, which he also characterizes in these terms. The prime difference between commonwealth and church is that while Augustine acknowledges both the commonwealth and the church include members of both cities, only the church is fundamentally oriented in its hope for their final separation.¹¹ Conversely, the commonwealth not only perennially endures their intermingling but also abides its obligation to the moral claims of the earthly city, which is a component of the commonwealth. The earthly city, along with its moral claims, is indubitably fallen and deficient in comparison with the city of God. However, in its fallenness and deficiency the earthly city still participates in creation, and therefore it participates—in distorted form—in the fundamental movement in *metaxy* toward immortalization. Put in more Augustinian terms, the earthly city parodies the city of God because it too is part of creation but in a deficient mode of being, as explained further.

My analysis is in three parts. The first part considers the crisis of liberal democracy as a prime example of the failure to consider the commonwealth as *metaxy* by considering the Augustinian genealogy of the private vices, public benefits argument. The reliance of liberalism on a constricted Augustinianism to express the nature of the commonwealth necessitates a reconsideration of how Augustine regarded the political friendship as *metaxy*. The second part considers political friendship of the commonwealth as the

opening toward the ends of the city of God and the earthly city that intermingle within the commonwealth. It analyzes this claim by considering Voegelin's account of *metaxy*. The third part examines Augustine's own way of treating the commonwealth as the place of prudential judgments of both cities that reflects his own view of its unique ontological status within the order of creation.

It is conceded Augustine never seems to have used the term "political friendship." *Politike philia* is of Greek provenance, of course, and the Latin writers, including Cicero, generally did not use the term either. However, Augustine's political vocabulary of *harmonia*, *res publica*, and *populus* owes much to Cicero. One might say he takes that vocabulary and refits it for his own purposes, as he says the Israelites removed gold from Egypt. His endeavor to refit Ciceronian political ideas aims less at Christianizing or "baptizing" them and more at considering the conditions in which those ideas can be actualized. In this sense his approach is closer to Aristotle than to Cicero, though the ends of political life for Augustine are more eschatologically differentiated. Political friendship involves the perennial task of making prudential adjustments between the city of God, which loves God at the contempt of self, and the earthly city, which loves self at the contempt of God.¹² This means any consideration of political friendship must consider how it partakes in the logic of the city of God and in the logic of the earthly city. It must also consider how political friendship constitutes its own logic as fitting for a kind of peace that is part of the created order.

Augustine's Commonwealth and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy

The commonwealth is the nexus of the city of God and the earthly city. Because of this, Augustine can speak of it as both intimating and parodying the city of God: intimating because its naturalness aligns with the city of God's perfection and parodying because the earthly city, like evil, exists only as a deficiency of the good and thus takes its form by perverting the good.¹³ Even so, the commonwealth has its own ontological status because it is constituted as an

arrangement of prudential choices made by persons endeavoring to balance those two logics. By claiming the commonwealth has its own status, I am not saying it exists independently of the individual persons who constitute it. However, just as friends experience their friendship as an expansion of their individual souls, so too citizens coming together in a commonwealth experience an expansion of themselves.

Jürgen Gebhardt comments on the ontological origin of politics among the Greeks in terms of *metaxy*: “The discovery of a realm of being that coincides with the realm of human interaction and culminates in a common or public dimension of activity was the historical event that exposes the very constituent of man’s humanity as it partakes of a more comprehensive structured reality. This event made paramount to men the differentiated realm of being and defined politics in terms of the structure of human existence newly perceived as the tension between order and disorder, fullness and want, mortality and immortality, and time and eternity.”¹⁴ The commonwealth is the constitution of the *metaxy*.

Liberal democracy illustrates how the commonwealth is the nexus of the two cities. The traditional, Lockean, view of liberalism holds that political harmony is generated through self-interest—private vices lead to public benefits. The contemporary crisis of liberalism reflects doubts that self-interest can generate political harmony or virtue.

Less well appreciated is the Augustinian genealogies of the liberal view and that of its critics, as well as how those genealogies distort Augustine’s teachings. The basic idea that private vices make public virtues derived first from the publication in 1671 of Pierre Nicole and Antoine Arnauld’s edition of Blaise Pascal’s *Pensées*, as well as the subsequent publication of Nicole’s own *Essais de morale*, which intervened in Jansenist debates over how Augustine understood sin and charity.¹⁵ John Locke translated three of Nicole’s essays several years before publishing the *Second Treatise*.¹⁶ For Pascal, Nicole, Locke, and others, the Fall was not the disaster Augustine regarded; instead he believed it provided human beings with the opportunity for political creativity to extend

their *libido dominandi* into constructive purposes, and this for some renders Christian charity superfluous.¹⁷ Part of their argument stemmed from Augustine's observations of how the Roman love of honor motivated acts of great sacrifice and propelled Romans to imperial greatness while enabling them to suppress baser desires. Pascal acknowledges humanity's greatness in its depravity: "Man's greatness, even in his concupiscence, [comes] from having known how to derive an admirable system of rules from it and to make it into an image of charity."¹⁸ Humanity's greatness in concupiscence paradoxically enables human beings to produce an image of social and political harmony: "All men naturally hate one another. We have used concupiscence as best as we could to serve the public good. But this is only a pretense and a false image of charity. For at bottom it is only hate."¹⁹

While Pascal's understanding of Augustine was incomplete, it was sufficient for him to remember the love of God and neighbor and to recognize the illusion of fallen man's machinations of political harmony.²⁰ However, Nicole was less careful with Augustine, and it was his argument about the superfluousness of Christian charity for social and political harmony that helped form the Enlightenment.

Two general observations are pertinent. First, the contemporary crisis of liberalism over the capacity of self-interest to generate social and political harmony is a matter of Pascal's observation that "at bottom it is only hate" coming home to roost. Pascal's proclivity to see "at bottom it is only hate" is an early version of today's critical theory or "settler ideology" that claims "invasion is a structure, not an event."²¹ Even so, Pascal follows the example of Augustine's deconstruction of Roman *libido dominandi*. The difference between Augustine (and perhaps Pascal) and today's critical theory is that Augustine also aims to construct, which this essay aims to explain.

Second, Paul Ludwig has observed the eclipse of political or civic friendship in modernity is the result of the Jansenist distortion of the relationship between self-love and other-love, which illustrates the contemporary salience of the Augustinian genealogy of

the private vices, public benefits debate. Ludwig claims Pascal's "Jansenist assumption drove too deep a wedge between self-love and other-love, that might account for part of the eclipse that civic friendship has undergone in liberal theory."²² Ludwig's claim is validated anecdotally by the widespread sentiment in our culture that self-interest is necessarily something hostile to other-love and something to be distrusted because the self is unworthy of love. Other-love becomes either an unattainable ideal or, cynically, what Pascal calls a *figmuntum malum* that veils self-love's manipulation of the other. Ludwig turns to Aristotle instead of Augustine to demonstrate the alignment of self-love and other-love, and Augustine's understanding of the two has often been considered closer to Pascal's wedge between the two.²³ Even so, Augustine consistently aligns them by arguing the soul's greatness is found in its humility toward God.

This brief sketch of the Augustinian genealogy of the crisis of liberalism attempts to establish two points before turning to Augustine's own account of political friendship. First, it provides a salient example of Augustine's understanding of how political friendship intermingles the logic of the city of God and the earthly city by showing how thinkers attempt to balance sin and charity. Second, the deficiencies of the Pascalian or liberal model of political friendship, which draws from and distorts Augustine, suggest an Augustine properly understood may serve as a corrective.

Commonwealth: Where City of God and Earthly City Mingle

Augustine understands the city of God and earthly city as expressions of the will's directions.²⁴ The former loves God while being contemptuous of one's self, and the latter loves one's self while being contemptuous of God. He locates their intermingling in our souls by locating the two cities within our souls, as well as by characterizing mortal life as a pilgrimage where every step of the way involves choosing whether to be a citizen of one or the other city. Each person bears within them both cities, an insight Pierre Manent describes as Augustine's fully differentiated account of the

political: “[F]or what we have in common that is deepest, what in sum we share that is most meaningful, is the necessity for each to *choose* between the two cities. What we have in common that is deepest and most meaningful is not our passions, or our sentiments, but our actions.”²⁵ The distinction between the two cities is within each of us, instead of between political sides, factions, or nations. No political entity can identify completely with either city of God or earthly city. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn’s famous proclamation regarding the line between good and evil running through each human heart expresses this Augustinian, and anti-Manichaean, insight.²⁶

The citizen of the city of God fundamentally loves justice and, as Socrates says in the *Gorgias*, regards committing injustice as the worst thing one could do.²⁷ The citizen of the city of God chooses eternity at the cost of mortality. Conversely, the citizen of the earthly city chooses immortality using mortal means and inclines more to committing injustice over suffering injustice as a way of ensuring his dominion over the future. Insofar as human beings participate in mortal things, we have obligations to create and preserve mortal things, including a commonwealth that in a fundamental sense expresses love of neighbor. While not to be identified simply with the earthly city, the commonwealth finds itself in a condition of having to utilize mortal means to secure its immortality because it is a multigenerational project—the “eternal society,” as Edmund Burke noted.²⁸

In a passage in *On the Trinity*, Book XIII, that anticipates Dostoevsky’s *Grand Inquisitor*, Augustine puts the matter of justice starkly when he presents Christ’s redemption as the archetype of political action:

But the devil would have to be overcome not by God’s power but by his justice. What, after all, could be more powerful than the all-powerful, or what creature’s power could compare with the creator’s? The essential flaw of the devil’s perversion made him a lover of power and a deserter and assailant of justice, which means that men imitate him

all the more thoroughly the more they neglect or even detest justice and studiously devote themselves to power, rejoicing at the possession of it or inflamed with the desire for it. So it pleased God to deliver man from the devil's authority by beating him at the justice game, not the power game, so that men too might imitate Christ by seeking to beat the devil at the justice game, not the power game. Not that power is to be shunned as something bad, but that the right order must be preserved which puts justice first. How much power, in any case, can mortals have? Let mortals hold on to justice; power will be given them when they are immortal.²⁹

Through the kenotic love expressed in the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, Christ teaches us how to play the justice game instead of the devil's power game. The experience of resistance to tyranny and totalitarian terror in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries demonstrates the urgency of understanding the priority of justice to power, not only to resist tyranny but also to serve as the foundation of just political order. The litany of dissidents and martyrs—Solzhenitsyn, Vaclav Havel, Jan Patočka, the Scholls, Liu Xiaobo, Lin Zhao, Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Dietrich Bonhöffer, Franz Jägerstätter, and Josef Mindszenty—testifies how it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it, which must be the founding principle of a just and decent political order.³⁰ The kenotic love expressed in Liu Xiaobo's slogan "I have no enemies" testifies to the profound opening of the soul to the full range of *metaxy*, including the divine ground that sustains him.

The telos of the justice game is communion with God and the saints in the city of God in a redeemed sunaesthetic friendship: "God will then be known to us and visible to us in such a way that we shall see Him by the spirit in ourselves, in one another, in Himself, in the new heavens and the new earth, and in every created thing which shall then exist; and also by the body we shall see Him in every body to which the keen vision of the eye of the spiritual body shall extend. The thoughts of each of us will also be made manifest to all."³¹

Conversely, the telos of the earthly city consists in the loveless sinner's separation from God and neighbor in second death, whereby the soul, which suffers eternal "fruitless repentance," is unwillingly imprisoned in the body undergoing the pain of eternal hellfire.³² While contrapasso is a concept usually associated with Dante, the suitability of eternal hellfire can be understood in its terms because eternal hellfire is the crystallization of what the lover of earthly glory seeks. Motivated by his *libido dominandi* to rule as Antichrist or the beast of Revelation 20, he seeks empire over the "ungodly city itself, the fellowship of unbelievers who stand opposed to the faithful people and the City of God," which includes "those men who profess the faith but live like unbelievers. For they feign to be what they are not, and they are called Christians not from a true likeness, but from a false image."³³ The Antichrist promises the illusion of a worldly *securitas* and parodic justice and charity through what Augustine in *On the Trinity* calls the devil's "power game" that depends on human beings neglecting their obligations of God's "justice game."

Fire is perhaps the severest of the earthly elements and brings all to earthly dust, which matches the telos as well as fruitlessness of *libido dominandi*, which parodies the city of God. Hannah Arendt famously claimed, with reference to the hellscape of the concentration camps, that modern man's loss of faith in a Last Judgment attracts him to fabrications of Paradise hoped for and Hell he had feared. Augustine's metaxic account of political friendship enables the recollection of what Arendt laments has been lost: "the idea of an absolute standard of justice combined with the infinite possibility of grace."³⁴ Augustine shows the ends to which the two cities aim and the utter disaster that falls on us when we neglect them or believe we possess political control over them rather than they constituting us.

The commonwealth is the site where these two loves compete and intermingle, with the earthly city's aim for immortality or glory using mortal means consisting of its most compelling claim on us. As a cosmion of divine order that Augustine recognizes makes a rightful claim to shelter us against forces of disorder,

the commonwealth aims to accomplish its multigenerational task effectively and everlastingly: “It is beneficial, then, that good men should rule far and wide and long, worshipping the true God and serving Him with true rites and good morals.”³⁵ The commonwealth is necessarily drawn to the logic of the city of God and to the earthly city, which means it must find ways to avoid the self-annihilation of the earthly city, whose “joy . . . may be compared to the fragile splendour of glass: they are horribly afraid lest it be suddenly shattered.”³⁶

Augustine, like Socrates before him, understood the maintenance of the commonwealth could not be conducted righteously, or even effectively or lastingly, if it were not leavened by the love that seeks to avoid committing injustice, even if committing justice leads to death. Yet how does a commonwealth reconcile the love of justice (city of God) that seems neglectful of mortal life with its task of building a multigenerational shelter against forces of disorder?³⁷ Perhaps reasonably, the commonwealth’s defenders view the lovers of justice as irrational or even some kind of death cult motivated to join what Niccolò Machiavelli calls imaginary republics. This is how Rome’s pagan leaders blamed the Christians for Rome’s downfall in 410, and to which Augustine responded with his *City of God*.

Political Friendship as Parody

Sin parodies virtue, as lust parodies love and pride parodies rule by the servant of servants. The commonwealth, which aims at providing peaceful shelter, is founded in fratricide. Romulus kills Remus and Cain kills Abel because neither wishes to share glory with their brother. Cain the settler founds a city, which Abel the shepherd does not do, and Cain’s son Enoch founds one as well. Augustine notes the significance of their names: “Cain, indeed, begat Enoch, and built a city in his name: that is, the earthly city, which is not a pilgrim in this world, but which finds its rest in its own temporal peace and felicity. Now the name Cain means ‘possession,’ which is why, when he was born, either his father or mother said, ‘I have gotten a man from the Lord.’ And Enoch means ‘dedication’; for

the earthly city is dedicated here, where it is built, since the end of what it strives after and desires is here.”³⁸ The earthly city’s essence, as expressed by the names of Cain and Enoch, suggests it is about domineering possession or *Habsucht*, as signaled by Cain’s parents regarding his birth as their exclusive (and despotic) creation. Its dedication and perpetuation through Enoch suggests despotic control over future generations.

If political foundings are fratricidal because of a love of the glory that cannot be shared, the telos of the commonwealth carries out this logic by seeking imperial domination over all. Augustine’s account of the role love of glory and *libido dominandi* play in the Roman Empire is an earlier version of settler ideology’s claim that “invasion is a structure, not an event.” He emphasizes this point by referring to the story of the pirate who responded to Alexander the Great’s asking him why he infests the sea: “The same as you do when you infest the whole world; but because I do it with a little ship I am called a robber, and because you do it with a great fleet, you are an emperor.”³⁹ Charles Norris Cochrane’s *Christianity and Classical Culture* is perhaps the most significant commentary on Augustine’s total critique not just of Roman politics but of the entire ancient way of understanding the world, which was predicated on an ontology of violence that leads to tyrannical empire.⁴⁰ How Augustine moves beyond total critique and to reconstruction or reconciliation is the core of our inquiry into his understanding of political friendship as *metaxy*.

But even in parody, the commonwealth intimates the glorious city of God. Augustine signals this in the lead-up to his reference to Alexander and the pirate when he introduces Book IV, chapter 4, by claiming, “Justice removed, then, what are kingdoms but great bands of robbers?”⁴¹ “Justice removed” constitutes the great caveat to the view that Augustine completely identifies politics with the earthly city because commonwealths ascribe to different types of justice. Justice is rarely ever completely removed because that would entail absolute negation of justice, which is ruled out by Augustine’s view that evil is a deficiency of being instead of a separate substance.⁴²

Instead, different commonwealths express different types of justice, all of them radically imperfect compared with the justice of Christ's archetypal redemption. Or rather, all fall short of the perfect justice embodied in God's "justice game" played through Christ's crucifixion. This understanding enables Augustine to claim Scipio's definition (via Cicero) of a commonwealth in terms presumably of perfect justice means no commonwealth has ever existed.⁴³ Like Aristotle, Augustine wishes to maintain the phenomena of politics in his theoretical accounts, and does so by offering an alternative account of the commonwealth, which he defines as a gathering of rational beings united by common objects of love. The better those objects, the better the commonwealth, and the better its justice.⁴⁴ That he reserves citizenship in any commonwealth to "rational beings" places him in line with ancients, including Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, who regarded political community as the appropriate abode for rational beings. But Augustine's contribution consists in providing a more differentiated understanding of what it means to be a rational being whose *energeia* is confession, along with the nature of the rational being's obligations to God, man, world, and society: "And so we humans, who are a due part of your creation, long to praise you."⁴⁵

Understanding the nature of Augustine's caveat, "justice removed," enables one then to understand how the commonwealth can imitate or partake in the city of God. The shelter offered by the commonwealth intimates both the shelter offered by the churches during the collapse of Rome and the eternal shelter offered by the city of God.⁴⁶ The liberty enjoyed in the commonwealth implies the perfect liberty of the glorified.⁴⁷ The friendship of the commonwealth is an image of the perfect, sunaesthetic friendship of the glorified, as indicated earlier.

Augustine's ideal of Christ the paradigmatic founder and statesman fulfills the ancient ideal of founder by transforming it.⁴⁸ Socrates again provides the ancient precedent for Augustine's understanding. Socrates refers to himself as the true statesman because he teaches that committing injustice is the worst thing one can do, and worse than suffering it.⁴⁹ For this reason Plato has him

propose in the *Republic* rule by philosophers because they most of all can best bear the burden of having injustice done unto them by having to rule instead of philosophizing all the time. In the name of justice, Socrates accepts rulership without everlasting glory because he regards mortal goods, including life, wealth, and glory, as less important than doing justice. The true statesman, according to Socrates, is the perfection of humanity whose example demonstrates the intrinsic goodness of the cosmos that is hospitable to the rule of justice over injustice. Unresolved in Socrates, however, is how the powerlessness of the philosopher achieves the perfection of the cosmos. The perfection of the cosmos occurs when transformed by the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Christ, something Socrates could not have foreseen but Augustine, in his description of God's "justice game" in Christ, seems to have regarded as the perfection of Socrates's paradoxical wisdom.⁵⁰

Recall Augustine's caveat regarding "justice removed," when comparing the commonwealth, or rather empire, with Alexander's pirate. We are validated in treating this statement as a caveat because in his previous chapter Augustine claims, as noted above, the benefits of good men ruling far and wide and practicing true worship (*latreia*).⁵¹ How Augustine integrates *latreia*, or worship of God, with good rulership—not really the relationship between church and state—extends beyond the scope of this essay, but it suffices to note that Augustine regards *latreia* as a political problem because political friendship is metaxic, in-between immortality and mortality, while paradoxically moving toward immortality.⁵² Like Aristotle, Augustine thought the commonwealth cannot achieve its purpose without attention to the ultimate ends of human being that political friendship intimates but can never fully possess.

Political Friendship as *Metaxy*

Augustine's political and social vision consists of a set of concentric circles of friends, loosely construed and ranging from closest to furthest: to family, city, to human society across nations, and "to the universe itself, which we call heaven and earth, and to those whom philosophers call gods, whom they hold to be a wise man's

friends.”⁵³ However, it is neither cosmopolitan nor the universal church as “*totus Christus*” because as creatures our scope of action is limited by time and space, by our mortality: “[T]he order of this concord is, first, that a man should harm no one, and, second, that he should do good to all, so far as he can.”⁵⁴ Human beings find themselves within a web of relationships and customs, and we enact our love of God and neighbor through them and as responses to the particularities of every case. Prudence determines the identity of those neighbors “human society itself gives him readier access to them, and greater opportunity for caring for them.”⁵⁵ Friendship binds people together by the sharing of common objects of love that they themselves embody.

Todd Breyfogle captures the mediation of political friendship when he paraphrases Augustine’s definition of a people as a multitude of rational creatures bound by common objects of love: “A people, we might paraphrase, is an assembly of creatures using their reason to understand their linkages to the whole by virtue of their creation and by conventions of their own design.”⁵⁶ Their common objects of love is the substance of their concord: their customs, aspirations, and constitutional principles. The particular modes of transmitting them characterize the plurality of peoples and customs in the world. Certainly Augustine subverts or relativizes the basis for our particular relationships, and undermines any claim to their being natural, by claiming that our neighbor is the one who happens to be near, “as if by lot”: “[S]ince you cannot take thought for all men, you must settle by lot in favour of the one who happens to be more closely associated with you in temporal matters.”⁵⁷ Unlike moderns like Tocqueville and Manent who are haunted by the hollowing out of mediating institutions in the shadow of universal abstract principles, Augustine takes the multiplicity of customs and nations as given, and as places where persons creatively respond with love of God and neighbor in particular places and temporal sequencing. Even so, he shows he is aware of the danger of such hollowing when, citing Paul, he warns that those who fail to care even for their own are “worse than an infidel.”⁵⁸ The purview of our care is the *oikeiōsis*, and doing

“good to all, so far as he can,” begins with those within one’s purview.⁵⁹

By opening up spaces for justice in the political community, Augustine thinks, love of God and neighbor makes it possible for political friendship to become more of what our created nature meant it to be because the parts of the city—persons—are greater than the whole. This is the significance of his central claim, which so many readers overlook—namely, that the city of God and the earthly city are in each soul. Each person bears within them the city that transcends their particular political community.⁶⁰ Despite appearing to describe the pilgrim’s attitude toward political friendship in bare utilitarian terms, Augustine waxes lyrical about political friendship when, referring to Cicero, he describes political friendship as *harmonia* or *concordia*.

In *City of God*, Book II, Augustine approvingly quotes Cicero’s *De Re Publica* (Scipio is the speaker):

Among the different sounds of lyres and the voices of singers, a certain harmony must be maintained which the cultivated ear cannot bear to hear disrupted or discordant; and such harmony, concordant and consistent, may be brought about by the balancing of even the most dissimilar voices. So too, when the highest, lowest and, between them, intermediate orders of society are balanced by reason as though they were voices, the city may embody a consonance blended of quite dissimilar elements. What musicians call harmony in singing is concord in the city, which is the most artful and best bond of security in the commonwealth, and which, without justice, cannot be secured at all.⁶¹

Later in book XIX Augustine reformulates Scipio’s definition of a commonwealth in terms of justice as shared objects of love, but he will retain the musical imagery for *concordia*.⁶² The musical imagery applies to his encounter not just with Greek and Roman political philosophy but also with biblical wisdom. In describing the psalms of King David, he claims that “the rational and measured

arrangement of diverse sounds in concordant variety suggests the compact unity of a well-ordered city.”⁶³

Augustine makes two major claims by using the musical analogy. First, the musical analogy expresses a part-whole relationship. This relationship is not simply one whereby the part is a “mere part” with no ontological reality apart from the whole. It differs from Aristotle’s view that no citizen is apart from the polis, nor actor apart from the plot. Rather, for Augustine the part is indeed of the whole, but the whole is correspondingly included in the part, anticipating Jacques Maritain’s personalist rendering of the common good as a trinitarian “whole of wholes.” This can be seen in Augustine’s refashioning of the political whereby the city of God and the earthly city intermingle in each soul. This means that the human person reaches beyond the scope of the political community because they bear with it the eschatological community that each city signifies.

Augustine’s view of the whole being included in the part structures his understanding of the household and its relationship with the political community.⁶⁴ Instead of justifying the Roman conceptions of patriarchy, whose primary aim is to perpetuate the father’s name, Augustine subversively describes the good *paterfamilias* as one who will desire and pray that all members of their households “may all come to that heavenly home.” The first concern of the Roman *paterfamilias* was the perpetuation and glorification of his name and the family lineage, which is the cult of the hearth upon which the ancient city is founded. The Roman *paterfamilias* is the core of the earthly city as the settled city. In biblical terms, Cain is the first *paterfamilias* because he is the first settler and because he views his progeny as an image of himself.⁶⁵ Augustine subversively omits the hearth and defines the *paterfamilias*’s care of the household to be the transmission of the faith in the heavenly city.⁶⁶ The *paterfamilias* is obliged now to give up his domination over the future and acknowledge that the good of the members of his household is the freedom they pray to enjoy in the heavenly city. Augustine indicates that the *paterfamilias* needs to calibrate this transmission to the civic peace, but he leaves no doubt that the

latter owes its existence to the former: “A man’s household, then, ought to be the beginning, or a little part, of the city.” The household and the persons who reside inside are a part, but as just its beginning. The end is in the beginning, especially when the beginning contains within it that which transcends the end, and that end (civic peace) is intended to benefit the person.

In spelling out the significance of Augustine’s musical imagery for political friendship, Todd Breyfogle notes that it is no mere image but the proper way of expressing the intersection where the intermingling of a person’s natural desires (for bodily integrity and mental integrity) and the mores the person inherited from history takes place, Augustine’s version of the Greek paradox of *physis* and *nomos*. Prudence is the characteristic virtue that tends to this intermingling because it expresses the skill of choice-making in particular circumstances: “The art of living, necessarily in ensemble, is thus an unrehearsed virtuosic performance, an experiment and improvisation—individually and collectively in social life—in which our conception of the final good shapes and is shaped by the way of life by which we pursue it. Social life is both the locus of self-awareness and the space of learning to correct our conduct. In short, social life is the studio or recital hall of virtue.”⁶⁷

Breyfogle’s reference to improvisation is noteworthy because that signifies the form that *concordia* and *harmonia* takes in Augustine’s political thought. Liberty means that harmony is not imposed from above by a tyrant or dictator. Rather, optimally, and when a people love the highest things, *concordia* is achieved in creative response, a prudential ordering of the mixture between nature’s desires and the mores a people have inherited according to their shared understanding of the good life in accordance with justice.

Augustine compares the friendship of a commonwealth with the musical psalms. Breyfogle’s characterization of this city as improvisation can further be refined by noting how Augustine understood improvisation as musical form. Carol Harrison demonstrates that psalms exhibit “jubilation,” a spontaneous and wordless cry or shout of joy that expresses what words cannot express. It is the defining characteristic of song for Augustine, an image of the

eschatological joy the saints will experience in the city of God in their delight in God who is love:

It arises from labour—the pregnant woman, the worker in the vineyard, the peasant gathering grapes or taking in the harvest. It arises from the attempt to contain and confine what the singer knows and feels in measured verse and articulated words. It arises from the effort to somehow express the immensity and wondrous, awe-inspiring generosity of God’s gifts. It arises from the struggle to articulate what is ineffable—and then, suddenly, we are set free: the *jubilis* escapes, explodes—and is brought forth in wordless cries, finally expressing the unknowable, ineffable riches of God’s grace and majesty by returning them to Him in joy, love and praise.⁶⁸

In uttering a wordless word of thanks, *jubilis* is the profoundest expression of the friendship and love that unites the community that utters it.⁶⁹ People today frequently refer to their favorite music as the “soundtrack of their lives,” to which Augustine’s reference to jubilatory song in everyday lives—picking grapes, harvesting, giving birth (!!)—testifies. It is neither high nor low music, though Augustine at times compares *jubilus* with the act of belching: “Give vent to the inarticulate expression of your joys, belch out (*eructate*) all your happiness to him. What kind of belching will there be after the final feasting, if even now after a modest meal our souls are so deeply affected?”⁷⁰ Indeed, *jubilus* derives from the root *io*, which serves as an exclamation in various languages.⁷¹ Harrison claims it is hard to find a modern musical analogy but considers a few, with improvisation being their common denominator:

Scat singing—the random, exuberant, expressive sound which uses the whole range and timbre of the voice in jazz singing; yodelling or folk-singing—where the voice rises and falls in waves—sometimes in shouts—of wordless sound; the waves of clashing voices in Ethiopian liturgical

singing; the melismatic improvisations of Orthodox chant; the extemporaneous, improvised ornaments, cadenzas and variations of classical, instrumental and vocal music; the non-verbal, inspired utterances of glossolalia or speaking in tongues are perhaps the closest we can come to guessing what the *jubilus* must have sounded like.⁷²

These examples are more exuberant than the staid Christian hymn singing that formed the imagination of the modern European nation.⁷³ They illustrate how the *harmonia* of the commonwealth as a “whole of wholes” derives from a vision of citizens freely associating together in the mode of joyful improvisation.

Conclusion

These reflections on the musical form of political friendship for Augustine reflect the best type of commonwealth that human beings might be capable of while they are pilgrimaging between the earthly city and the city of God. This reading presents the most differentiated account of how political friendship for Augustine is *metaxy* in which citizens associate with one another as irreplaceable parts who together constitute a whole in which each part is greater than that whole. This is the result of the justice game having priority over the power game, to use Augustine’s terms, without ignoring the obligations of the latter. The current skepticism toward liberalism’s ability to generate political harmony out of self-interest or vice is in part the result of deluding ourselves that the power game can generate harmony on its own without attending to the justice game. This does not mean political friendship does not involve self-interest but only acknowledges that the exercise of self-interest involves a self that itself cannot be bought or bartered according to the power game. Liu Xiaobo notes this by acknowledging that the middling virtue of liberal democracy is predicated on the self-giving whose souls constitute it.⁷⁴ Churchill’s observation of the Sermon on the Mount as the “last word on ethics” was noted as an instance of recognizing that priority, and one he observes, despite his

criticisms of pacificism, that generally promotes peace more effectively than other codes of conduct.⁷⁵ The politics of persons implied by the doctrine of human rights is another instance of the metaxic heights leavening its depths.⁷⁶

For Augustine the best chance at practicing political friendship comes by attending to the practices of the justice game while being cognizant of all the slippery ways the power game manifests itself to us, especially when those ways manifest as illusory versions of the justice game. Clarification of political friendship as *metaxy* can assist in the important task of cultivating political friendship in its full amplitude.

Notes

1. See the essays in *Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought*, ed. John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko (University of Notre Dame, 2008); and *Friendship in Politics: Theorizing Amity in and Between States*, ed. Preston King and Graham M. Smith (Routledge, 2018).
2. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. James Schleiffer, (Liberty Fund, 2010), II.ii.9.
3. Plato, *Republic*, trans. Joe Sachs, (Focus Publishing, 2007), VIII.500c—555b; Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, trans. R. W. Dyson, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), II.20.
4. Lorainne Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship* (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Paul Ludwig, *Rediscovering Political Friendship: Aristotle's Theory and Modern Identity, Community, and Equality* (Oxford University Press, 2020). See also my *The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship* (McGill-Queens University Press, 2016).
5. Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, XIX.24, 960. I analyze this definition in *Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World* (University of Missouri Press, 2001), chap. 3.
6. Joseph R. Biden, "Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.," The White House, January 20, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/>
7. Augustine, *City of God*, XV.1.
8. Augustine, *City of God*, IV.3, XVII.14; John von Heyking, "Disarming, Simple, and Sweet: Augustine's Republican Rhetoric," in *Talking Democracy: Historical Perspectives on Rhetoric and Democratic*

- Deliberation*, ed. Benedetto Fontana, Cary J. Nederman, and Gary Remer (Penn State University Press, 2004), 163–86.
9. Eric Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, vol. 6 of the *Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*, ed. David Walsh (University of Missouri Press, 2002), 324–30; “Experience and Symbolization in History,” in *Published Essays, 1966–1985*, vol. 12 of *Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*, ed. Ellis Sandoz, (Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 119–23 (hereinafter CW 12); Jarosław Duraj, *The Role of Metaxy in the Political Philosophy of Eric Voegelin* (Peter Lang, 2021); Plato, *Symposium or Drinking Party*, trans. Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage and Eric Salem, (Focus Publishing, 2017), 202e–203a.
 10. “This valiant attempt of the *patres* to express the two-in-one reality of God’s participation in man, without either compromising the separateness of the two or splitting the one, concerns the same structure of intermediate reality, of the *metaxy*, the philosopher encounters when he analyzes man’s consciousness of participation in the divine ground of his existence. The reality of the Mediator and the intermediate reality of consciousness have the same structure.” “Immortality: Experience and Symbol,” CW 12, 79; Eugene Webb, *Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History* (University of Washington Press, 1991), 233.
 11. Kimberly Baker, “Augustine’s Doctrine of the *Totus Christus*: Reflecting on the Church as Sacrament of Unity,” *Horizons* 37, no. 1 (2010): 7–24.
 12. Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, XV.1.
 13. For a comprehensive account of the parodying nature of the earthly city, which also allows for viewing politics as a natural good, see Veronica Roberts Ogle, *Politics and the Earthly City in Augustine’s City of God* (Oxford University Press, 2020). Michael Lamb’s *A Commonwealth of Hope* (Princeton University Press, 2022) presents the most recent and comprehensive account of the alignment or naturalness of the aims of political friendship with the city of God.
 14. Jürgen Gebhardt, “The Origins of Politics in Ancient Hellas: Old Interpretations and New Perspectives,” in *Sophia and Praxis: The Boundaries of Politics*, ed. J. M. Porter (Chatham House, 1984), 2.
 15. Paul A. Rahe traces Nicole’s influences on Enlightenment political and economic thought: Paul A. Rahe, “Montesquieuv’s Anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism,” *History of European Ideas* 37, no. 2 (2011): 128–36; and *Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville, and the Modern Prospect* (Yale University Press, 2009), 42–46, 88, 95–140, 154–89, 272; Pierre Nicole, *Essais de morale, choix*

- d'essais introduits et annotés par Laurent Thirouin* (Encre Marine, 2016).
16. Pierre Nicole. *Discourses on the being of a God, and the Immortality of the Soul; of the Weakness of Man; and Concerning the Way of Preserving Peace with Men: Being some of the Essays Written in French by Messieurs Du Port Royal*. Render'd into English by the Late John Lock, Gent printed and sold by J. Downing in Bartholomew-Close near West-Smithfield, 1712. See Jean Yolton, ed., *John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais of Pierre Nicole in French and English* (Voltaire Foundation, 2000).
 17. Whether prelapsarian human beings practiced politics or whether politics results from the Fall and therefore originates in sin is a disputed question for Augustine scholars. Robert Markus, in *Saeculum: History and Theology in St. Augustine* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), provides the classic argument for *propter peccatum*, whereas I attempt to demonstrate the case for prelapsarian politics for securing natural human goods in *Politics as Longing in the World*, chap. 2.
 18. Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. Roger Ariew (Hackett, 2004), 32 (S150/L118).
 19. Pascal, *Pensées*, 66 (S243/L210).
 20. Jean-Louis Quantin, "Jansenism," in *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, ed. Karla Pollmann and Willemien Otten (Oxford University Press, 2014). Eric Nelson traces another line of Augustinian debate concerning Pelagianism in his account of liberalism in *The Theology of Liberalism: Political Philosophy and the Justice of God* (Belknap, 2019).
 21. See Adam Kirsch, *On Settler Colonialism: Ideology, Violence, and Justice* (Norton, 2024).
 22. Ludwig, *Rediscovering Political Friendship*, 135.
 23. Oliver O'Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine* (Wipf & Stock, 2006 [1980]).
 24. Augustine, *The City of God*, XV.1.
 25. Pierre Manent, *Metamorphoses of the City: On the Western Dynamic*, trans. Marc LePain (Princeton University Press, 2013), 276.
 26. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, III–IV*, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (Harper & Row, 1975), 615.
 27. "Gorgias," in *Plato "Gorgias" and Aristotle "Rhetoric,"* trans Joe Sachs (Focus, 2009), 469b.
 28. Edmund Burke, "Considerations on the Revolution in France," in vol. 2, *Selected Works of Edmund Burke* (Liberty Fund, 1999), 120.

29. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, 2nd ed., trans. Edmund Hill, O. P. (New City Press, 1991/2015), 13.13.17, 358. Hill characterizes this passage as “Augustine presenting the redemption as an archetypal model of political action, in which justice is uncompromisingly placed before power,” n36.
30. On Liu Xiaobo, see my “Self-Giving and the Constitution of Political Order: The Case of Liu Xiaobo,” *Perspectives on Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2023): 51–59.
31. Augustine, *City of God*, XXII.29, 1177–78. On the term *sunaisthesis*, see my *The Form of Politics*, chap. 2. I apply this Aristotelian term to Augustine, whose theological considerations have their experiential analogue in his lifelong and profound practices of friendship.
32. Augustine, *City of God*, XX.21.3, 9.
33. See Augustine, *City of God*, XX.7, 9. On modern compassion as a parody of charity, see Daniel J. Mahoney, *The Idol of Our Age: How the Religion of Humanity Subverts Christianity* (New York: Encounter Books, 2018).
34. Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism* (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979), 446–47.
35. Augustine, *City of God*, IV.3, 147.
36. Augustine, *City of God*, IV.3, 146
37. Winston Churchill, who had primary responsibility for preserving the multigenerational cosmion of Great Britain, provides some insightful comments on the Sermon on the Mount’s apparent prescription for pacificism. Rather than prescribing pacificism, and especially in the case of resistance to Nazism, Churchill instead seems to have regarded the Sermon the “last word in ethics” because it is the condition of ethics, not ethics itself, nor political ethics. See my *Comprehensive Judgement and Absolute Selflessness: Winston Churchill on Politics as Friendship* (St. Augustine’s Press, 2018), chap. 2.
38. Augustine, *City of God*, XV.17, 668; XV.1.
39. Augustine, *City of God*, IV.4, 148.
40. Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine* (Liberty Fund, 2003 [1940]).
41. Augustine, *City of God*, IV.4, 147.
42. See Augustine, *City of God*, XII.2–5.
43. Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.21.
44. For details, see my *Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World*, chap. 4.
45. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Maria Boulding (New City Press, 2012 [1997]), I.i.1, 39.

46. Augustine, *City of God*, I.34.
47. “In the heavenly city, then, there will be freedom of will. It will be one and the same freedom in all, and indivisible in the separate individuals.” Augustine, *City of God*, 22.30. As Étienne Gilson explains, freedom here will be “the spontaneous movement of a will which has been changed and liberated, a will which henceforth tends wholly towards God. Man is truly free when he sees to it, that the object of his delight is precisely liberty.” Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (Cluny, 2020 [1988]), 231.
48. Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), chap. 3.
49. Plato, *Gorgias* 469b.
50. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, 13.13.17, 358.
51. Augustine, *City of God*, IV.3, 147.
52. See my *Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World*, 175–80.
53. Augustine, *City of God*, 19.3; Todd Breyfogle, *Creativity, Liberty, Love and the Beauty of Law* (Bloomsbury, 2018), 47.
54. Augustine, *City of God*, 19.14.
55. Augustine, *City of God*, 19.14, 941–42.
56. Breyfogle, *Creativity, Liberty, Love and the Beauty of Law*, 45.
57. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, I.62.
58. Augustine, *City of God*, 19.14, citing 1 Timothy 5:8.
59. Joseph Clair, *Discerning the Good in the Letters and Sermons of Augustine* (Oxford University Press, 2016).
60. “[N]ot only, therefore, is there a structural parallel between ‘whole’ and the unit: in addition, the ‘whole’ is in some sense present within the unit, because the unit exists in a position fully defined by the unfoldings of the infinite sequence.” John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 405.
61. Augustine, *City of God*, 2.21, citing Cicero, *De Re publica*, II.69. According to James E. G. Zetzel, Augustine’s *City of God* is the only place where this paragraph is preserved. See Cicero, *On the Commonwealth and On the Laws*, trans. James E. G. Zetzel (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 57n91. See also Augustine, *City of God* 19.24. See also 4.3 and 19.13 and Heyking, “Disarming, Simple, and Sweet,” 181–85.
62. Augustine, *City of God*, 19.24.
63. Augustine, *City of God*, 17.13, 802.
64. Augustine, *City of God*, 19.16.

65. Augustine, *City of God*, 15.17. By seeing Cain as an image of the earthly city, Augustine would likely find common ground with this statement by Friedrich Nietzsche:

An institution is never, ever founded on an idiosyncrasy; marriage, as I said, is not founded on “love”—it is founded on the sex drive, on the drive for property (woman and child as property), on the drive for domination which constantly organizes the smallest unit of domination, the family—a drive which needs children and descendants in order to preserve an achieved amount of power, influence, and wealth even on the physiological level, in order to prepare long-lasting tasks, instinctive solidarity between centuries. Marriage as an institution already contains the affirmation of the greatest, most enduring form of organization: if society itself cannot vouch for itself as a whole up to the most remote generations, then marriage has no meaning at all.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of Idols*, trans. Richard Polt (Hackett, 1997), 76.

66. Étienne Gilson, by citing Numa Denis Fustel de Coulange’s *La Cité Antique*, draws attention to Augustine’s innovation. Étienne Gilson, *The Metamorphoses of the City of God*, trans. James G. Colbert (Catholic University of America Press, 2020), 5.
67. Breyfogle, *Creativity, Liberty, Love and the Beauty of Law*, 47, referring to Augustine, *City of God*, 19.13.
68. Carol Harrison, *On Music, Sense, Affect and Voice* (T&T Clark, 2019), 145. Harrison characterizes the vision at Ostia shared by Augustine and Monnica, which offers a glimpse of the life of the saints, as *jubilis* (146).
69. On the psychology of song and political friendship in Plato’s *Laws*, see Heyking, *The Form of Politics*, chap. 6. James L. Miller demonstrates the influence of Plato’s choral educational project for early Christians in *Measures of Wisdom: The Cosmic Dance in Classical and Christian Antiquity* (University of Toronto Press, 1986).
70. En Ps 102.8, quoted by Harrison, *On Music, Sense, Affect and Voice*, 132. Elsewhere Augustine refers to the Gospel of John as a belch: “having drunk his fill [of Christ’s mysteries], gave a good belch, and that very belch is the gospel” (*Sermon* 341.5, quoted by Harrison, 127). Harrison reminds the reader that “in some cultures a belch is a necessary and expected mark of satisfaction and thanks: it indicates that someone

is happily replete. This would, of course, make more sense of Augustine's comments" (128n33).

71. Harrison, *On Music, Sense, Affect and Voice*, 145n92, citing James McKinnon, "Preface to the Study of the Alleluia," *Early Music History* 15 (1996): 215.
72. Harrison, *On Music, Sense, Affect and Voice*, 45–46.
73. See Timothy Rosendale, *Liturgy and Literature in the Making of Protestant England* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
74. Heyking, "Self-Giving and the Constitution of Political Order," 56.
75. Heyking, *Comprehensive Judgment and Absolute Selflessness*, 32–34.
76. David Walsh, *Politics of the Person as the Politics of Being* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2016), chap. 7.