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Holiday Satire or Political Dialogue? The Augustinian Dimension of Thomas More's *Utopia*

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Interpreting Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516), or more faithfully, *De optimo reipublicae*,[1] has always been fraught with textual conundrums and historical challenges. Quentin Skinner has demonstrated through a rigorous analysis of More's historical moment that More fits within a broader context of "Ciceronian humanism."[2] Though Eric Nelson moves Thomas More from the neo-Roman tradition into the neo-Greek tradition,[3] both scholars bring *Utopia* firmly into the canon of political thought as opposed to that of satire. The sheer difficulty in pinning down More's thinking has nevertheless led to competing interpretations.[4] To be sure, the satirical features of More's text can neither be ignored nor dismissed.[5] Nevertheless, some affirm the satirist position *in toto*, making *Utopia* out to be a "holiday work," an act of wit rather than a political dialogue.[6] This camp claims that More's text has "no place in the history of political philosophy."[7] Another response to the satirist position has been to overcorrect in another direction and affirm the subterranean political message of More's *De optimo reipublicae* as essentially proto-Marxist.[8] Karl Kautsky, an orthodox,

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"cold-stream" Marxist, praised Thomas More as one of the "two great figures [who] loom[ed] on the threshold of Socialism."[9] Citing Raphael Hythloday's final exhortation to Morus (the character of Thomas More in the dialogue) that *Utopia* is the true commonwealth, Kautsky infers that More's *Utopia* "is the product of the social evils and incipient economic tendencies of the Renascence; and that it is based on living actualities, and not on antiquarian book wisdom."[10] On the contrary, recent scholarly works have emerged to understand More's *Utopia* from his personal biography and especially his devotion to the Catholic Church.[11]

Although we have gained a greater understanding of More's context, his life, and his Renaissance humanism, scholars have long called for an exploration of the "Augustinian dimension of *Utopia*."[12] This article argues that Augustine's *De civitate Dei* (*The City of God*) presents a framework for interpreting More's *Utopia* around one central concern: pride in the polis. This thematic frame is not imposed on the text of *Utopia* from without but illuminated by the historical and biographical accounts of More's work as well as by the internal textual concerns with *superbia* (pride) in the commonwealth of the Utopians. Broadly understood, the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance context were distinctly shaped by the Augustinian tradition—from the Scholastics to the Renaissance humanist concern with the best way of life.[13] Indeed, in Augustine's magnum opus, *The City of God*, he presented a novel response to the question of the best way of life for human flourishing that eventually became "the most authoritative account of the manner in which man should live in the city."[14]

The scholarly articles that explore the influential Augustinian tradition on More from Gerard Wegemer, Martin Raitiere, Athanasius Moulakis, and István Bejczy to Joanne Paul, all leave room for a more sustained treatment of the role of pride (*superbia*) in politics.[15] Gerard Wegemer argued convincingly of the influence of Augustine on More on his concerns of the best way of life—*negotium* versus *otium*. Focusing on book 19, chapter 19, in *De civitate Dei*, Wegemer takes his stand from the Augustinian

modification of the best way of life through the governing principle of Christian charity.[16] Additionally, Raitiere examined the influence of Augustine on More through the two poles of "natural right and patriarchal authority."[17] Athanasios Moulakis has also argued that pride plays a central role in the Utopian commonwealth. However, Moulakis does not draw out the connection between the Utopian concern for pride and Augustine's examination of the effects of pride in the political community. Thus, he effectually cuts off the wellspring from which More draws.[18] István Bejczy claims that the Augustinian dimension of More's *Utopia* can be explored through the idea of the "mixed" character of the city of God among the earthly cities, making the Utopian regime not an ideal regime but a *civitas permixta*. *Utopia* thus confirms the "teachings of Augustine" that the ideal city is impossible in this temporal life.[19] Finally, following Moulakis, Joanne Paul treats More as a unified thinker connecting his religious texts with his Renaissance humanism under the initial interpretive lever of pride. Nevertheless, both Paul and Moulakis do not fully account for More's concerns with pride as rooted in the influence of Augustine.

Considering the contributions of the scholarly literature, there remains space for a sustained treatment of the role of Augustine's understanding of *superbia* as giving shape to the central aim of the utopian regime according to Raphael—ameliorating the perverse political consequences of pride. Since the lectures that More gave on Augustine's *De civitate Dei* have been lost to the exigencies of time, this article contributes to the ongoing debate over the influence of Augustine on Thomas More through an examination of strikingly parallel textual themes and resonances on the effects of pride and its limits. Rather than giving a complete account of the causal connection from Augustine to More, the focus here is on the role of *superbia* in the political philosophy of *Utopia*. Pride for Augustine can never be completely extirpated in a particular earthly city yet must be ameliorated for a republican political community to function well. This article argues that Augustine's concept of pride in *The City of God* presents a framework for interpreting Thomas More's *Utopia* that

illuminates More's pedagogical political philosophy. By affirming More's pedagogical political philosophy, this article navigates through the narrow waters between the Scylla of oversatirizing *Utopia* and the Charybdis of overpoliticizing the Utopian commune to affirm More's proto-Marxist sentiments.[20] Indeed, if one considers the Augustinian interpretive lever of pride in the political community, More's witty satire and his political proposals, which emerge from both the dialogue on retributive justice and Raphael Hythloday's recounting of the Utopian regime, fall into their proper places as opportunities for a psychagogical training on the limits of pride in the political community.

First, this article verifies the historical connection between More and Augustine through the early biographical accounts of Thomas More. In this section, I address one prefatory objection—namely, that the early biographical accounts of More indicate that he never lectured on the later books of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. This objection would make it difficult to argue, as in the third section of the article, that Augustine's examination of the judge in book 19 proves critical for More's critique of pride in political life and his critique of the attempts to achieve the supreme end of human happiness in this life. This critique rides parallel to Augustine's critique of the Stoics on nearly identical grounds. Second, there follows an account of the textual resonances between *Utopia* and *The City of God*, focusing particularly on *superbia*. Third, after accounting for the textual and historical connections, I synthesize a reading of Augustine's *City of God* that elucidates More's *Utopia* as a pedagogical, political dialogue.

The Historical Connection: Thomas More's Lectures on *The City of God*

Thomas More "lectured publicly in London, in the Church of St. Lawrence, on St. Augustine's *De civitate Dei*."[21] Thomas Stapleton, one of More's early biographers, also notes the supposed treatment of the work, not from the "theological point of view, but from the standpoint of history and philosophy."[22] William Roper, Nicholas Harpsfield, Erasmus, and Thomas Stapleton write the

earliest biographical material on Thomas More and highlight these early lectures as a demonstration of More's influence in London.[23] Unfortunately, transcripts of the lectures did not survive the exigencies of time. Nevertheless, More's early biographers emphasize the importance of the lectures from within the intellectual culture of London. Those in attendance were "[a]ll the chief learned of the City of London."[24] From John Colet to William Grocyn, Dominic Baker-Smith finds that More played a key role in a "new trend by which young men and even laymen challenge the complacency of academic theology."[25] The primary audience, mostly young barristers, presents at least one way of speculating about the content of the lectures. As Baker-Smith conjectures, "The law must have appeared as an intriguing negotiation between morality and politics, between the city where Christ is *conditor*, and the secular city where to dominate is to be dominated in turn by *libido dominandi*."[26] Whatever More's motivations were to give the lecture, later scholars will demonstrate the multivalent ways of reading his *Utopia* that connect back to Augustine's *De civitate Dei*.

To fill in the gaps from More's missing lectures, contemporary biographers of Thomas More have supplemented the early biographical accounts with the public records of his time as Lord Chancellor. They mostly address the question of his own Catholic faith and his political persecution of heresy.[27] Akin to the debates over Augustine's treatment of the Donatists, the defenses of More as a virtuous statesman and indictments of his political treatment of Protestants continue to emerge. Here there is no attempt to readjudicate Thomas More's character from an examination of his personal life. However, More's early biographers demonstrate a historical connection between him and Augustine that cannot be denied. Stapleton's account connects Augustine and More and clarifies the content of the lectures. His account is the earliest to emphasize the content of the lectures as pertaining to Augustine's "history and philosophy" as opposed to his theology.[28] Although Stapleton gives readers more detail as to the lectures' contents, we ought to be wary of drawing too much from Stapleton's account.

His biography was written significantly after the earliest accounts of More's life and fifty-three years after More's execution.[29] Stapleton added further information about the lectures that do not persist in Roper's account nor in Erasmus's account. Stapleton thus does not necessarily draw from supplemental historical sources to expand his substantive claim about the content of Thomas More's lectures. Instead, he appears to specify that More lectured on Augustine's "history and philosophy" to preserve a particular image of Thomas More—namely, an image of More that distances his work from that of Erasmus, whose criticisms of the Scholastics troubled Catholic intellectuals of the time who were concerned about the divisions within the church. Frank Mitjans's biography will also call into question Stapleton's additions to the biographical account of More's life.[30]

On the contrary, Ross Dealy argues that Stapleton should be taken as a credible biographer.[31] Indeed, Dealy gains a lot of traction from the phrase "history and philosophy" in Stapleton's biography. Dealy claims that More focused most of his attention on the first five books of Augustine's *City of God* and books 8–10, the first five dealing with philosophy and the latter three dealing with the relationship between pagan philosophy and Christianity.[32] Dealy's project is to articulate More's existential wrestling with the classical problem of *otium* versus *negotium*. He finds the problem's solution in a Stoic affirmation of both ways of life that captures part of More's personal development. Thomas More scholar Gerard Wegemer has also contributed to this characterization of *Utopia* as an investigation into the best way of life.[33] Nevertheless, citing Dealy, an opposing interlocutor may argue that the influence of Augustine on Thomas More's *Utopia* should be restricted to *The City of God*, books 1–5 and 8–10. If Thomas More lectured primarily on Augustine's opening salvo in *De civitate Dei*, why would he have read more to write *Utopia*? This inference and objection would pose difficulties for a re-creation of Augustine's influence on Thomas More. Augustine's most well-treated book for scholarly interpretations of his political thought is book 19—well beyond what Thomas More would have read. The ardent defender

of a political reading of Thomas More's work would have to contend with this objection.

Although compelling on its face, I suspect that to restrict the influence of Augustine's *City of God* on *Utopia* to the opening books of *The City of God* would be a mistake. I respond to this objection substantively by looking at the thematic parallels between Augustine's and More's works respectively, especially on the role of the judge. Though Dealy may be right to argue that Stapleton's phrase "history and philosophy" illuminates the content of More's lectures on Augustine's *City of God*, the textual resonances between *Utopia* and *The City of God* tell a different story. The objection's inference from More's lectures to the text of *Utopia* is dubious at best. The Charterhouse Thomas More may have given lectures with a focus on the first part of Augustine's text, but the ambassador Thomas More wrote *Utopia* with the entirety of *The City of God* in mind.

First, to divide Augustine's work into three neat categories—books 1–5 deal with history, 6–10 with philosophy, and 11–22 with theology—does not account for the rhetorical flourishes and the theological claims that are scattered throughout the text. Dealy cites Augustine's investigation into whether the resurrection of humankind entails that "all are to be men," since God created man prior to woman, as clear evidence that his characterization of *The City of God* accurately divides the text.[34] However, after giving an account of the evils of this life, Augustine reminds the reader of the beauty of the earthly goods of industry, agriculture, navigation, medicine, poetry, oratory, music, science, ingenuity, and knowledge.[35] And all these goods flow from the "natural capacities with which the human mind is adorned in this mortal life, not of the faith and the way of truth."[36] Though rooted in the primacy of God as the fount of all goodness, Augustine maintains a deep admiration and appreciation of the goods of this life. In addition to book 22, book 19 contains the most comprehensive account of Augustine's political philosophy. Many scholars have written on the significance of book 19 and more broadly Augustine's political thought from divergent political traditions and commitments.[37] Although Thomas

More did not have access to this development of Augustinian political philosophies, he did have access to the text itself. More's personal commitment to the question of the best way of life and his own interest in the law would have spurred him onward to read through *The City of God* to some of the more pertinent passages on the supreme good in this life,[38] and also the role of the magistrate—More's own occupation.[39]

Second, the credibility of Stapleton's account of More's lectures is questionable. Stapleton articulated his discomfort with laypeople criticizing clerical practices.[40] According to Frank Mitjans, Stapleton attempts to "distance More from Erasmus" with his biographical account of More's lectures.[41] Looking at the later biography of Ro. Ba., an astute reader sees that the stakes are high for giving an account of More's project. Ro. Ba. claims that More's lecture series proved that he was a "diuine [theologian], a philosopher, and a historian."[42] Stapleton's discomfort with Erasmus's pugnacious critiques of the scholastics led him to reinterpret the methodological approach of Thomas More's lectures. Following Mitjans, this reinterpretation led him to specify that More was not like the other humanists who talked about theology without having proper credentials. Instead, to preserve More's humble image, Stapleton refocused More's lectures to be on "history and philosophy" in *The City of God* instead of theology. For this reason, the claim that More lectured solely on books 1–5 and 8–10 in Augustine's *City of God* is tenuous at best. Thus, to inferentially restrict Augustine's influence on More in the work of *Utopia* to the early books of Augustine would not do justice to More's scholarly and lawyerly acumen.

Third, we must consider the possibility of rediscovering More's lost lectures on Augustine's *City of God*. In this hypothetical, yet possible, future scenario, let us suppose that an archive is found that contains a facsimile of More's lectures, the original copy that he produced, or more plausibly, a set of notes from an attendee. Let us suppose that these notes reveal an outline of More's lectures that indicates he presented only on books 1–5 and 8–10, vindicating Stapleton's account and Dealy's claim about More's lecture.

Must we necessarily deny that Thomas More wrote *Utopia* without the entirety of the *De civitate Dei* in mind? Of course not. Even if More lectured solely on books 1–5 and 8–10, we ought not to conclude that (1) Thomas More did not read all of *De civitate Dei* nor that (2) he neglected the rest of Augustine's magisterial work when he wrote *Utopia*. If the smoking gun were to be discovered, a facsimile of More's lectures for instance, we ought not to conclude that More failed to read all of Augustine's work carefully.

Pride and Politics: The Thematic Parallels Between *The City of God* and *Utopia*

The first section of this article has established that the influence of Augustine's *City of God* on Thomas More's *Utopia* is illuminated by More's lectures on *The City of God* as a young man. Furthermore, the hypothesis that More wrote *Utopia* from within the Augustinian tradition has been prefigured by the examination of the historical connection between Augustine and More from biographical accounts of his life. Since More is now released from the limitations of the first ten books, the task of discovering how More participates in the Augustinian tradition becomes even more challenging. However, the focus here remains on the role that Augustine plays in shaping More's considerations on pride.

Sketching the Political Reading of *Utopia*

In the opening of *Utopia*, the reader finds a fascinating letter by Peter Giles to a statesman and counselor to King Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, Jerome de Busleyden.[43] The correspondence between Giles and Busleyden is published at the beginning of *Utopia* and is not a part of either books 1 or 2 in the actual text.[44] The letter implies that Peter Giles disseminated *Utopia* to counselors and statesmen who might in its pages find something of value for governing the commonwealth. Though the satirist readings would have us read this dissemination of *Utopia* as radiating from a desire of respite from the demanding work of the statesman, Giles's letter contains a different emphasis. Giles writes to Busleyden that "Raphael saw as much in the five years he lived on

the island as can be seen in More's description."[45] Indeed, there are many "wonders" that one finds in More's text, an observation that begins to lend credence to the satirical position.[46] However, Giles notes that these "wonders" for the reader to admire include "the accuracy of [More's] splendid memory . . . or else his good judgement, which traced back to sources of which the common man is completely ignorant of the evils that arise in the commonwealths and the blessings that could arise in them."[47] And Giles concludes by claiming that the text "eminently deserves to be sent forth into the hands of men, especially as commended to the world in the patronage of your name [Busleyden]."[48] The political implications of the letter as informing the judgment of political leaders draws out a political interpretation of the text itself. For if "the primary task of political philosophy is to raise questions in order to understand the human condition and inform judgment and conduct in light of understanding, then *Utopia* must be considered serious indeed."[49] The question thus remains, What might this political interpretation look like?

Another interpretive lens that lends credence to the political reading of the text emerges from an interesting set of additional material included in the text's 1518 publication—the inclusion of a series of prefatory poems on the art of governing.[50] More translated a series of poems from the Greek to the Latin "on two beggars: one blind, one lame."[51] One of these poems stands out as relevant to the argument of this article and is also authored directly by More himself, poem 32.[52] The poem is reproduced here from *A Thomas More Sourcebook* (2004):

> There can be nothing more helpful than a loyal friend, who by his own efforts assuages your hurts. Two beggars formed an alliance of firm friendship—a blind man and a lame one. The blind man said to the lame one, "You must ride upon my shoulders." The latter answered, "You, blind friend, must find your way by means of my eyes." The *love* which unites shuns the castles of *proud* kings and rules in the *humble* hut.[53]

The salient final line for this article reads, "*Alta superborum fugitat penetralia regum, / Inque casa concors paupere regnat amor.*"[54] Love (*amor*) in the poem plays a central role in ruling. Thomas More illuminates the mutual dependence between the ruler and the ruled that both share in the journey of life represented by the two beggars. An interpretive sketch of the poem might also suggest that this mutual dependence is what distinguishes the proud king from the love that rules in the "humble hut." However, we see here a more direct connection between Augustine and Thomas More. Augustine's novelty is to define a people as a "multitude of rational creatures bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their *love*."[55] What one loves, for Augustine, determines one's character.[56] Augustine does not use the same word to describe this "love" (*amor* for More and *diligit* for Augustine) that More uses; Augustine cares not to distinguish between the different Latin words that mean love but to remind the reader that a righteous will is what makes a love good.[57] The love or affection that constitutes the acknowledgment of one's dependence on another mirrors the love that is central to the heavenly city—*amor Dei*. Veronica Roberts Ogle has argued that this distinction between *amor sui* and *amor Dei* is the definitive difference between the earthly city and the heavenly city.[58] By offering oneself sacrificially for a friend, one participates in re-presenting the heavenly city from within the political community.

Additionally, More could very well be drawing on Augustine's critical attitude toward even the nobles who rejoice in their own rule.[59] Augustine seems to elevate a political world where "all kingdoms would be small, rejoicing in concord with their neighbours."[60] The anti-imperialistic rhetoric and emphasis on the humility of Theodosius suggests the smallness of the political community as more natural than *imperium*. In affirmation, More's Utopian republic rests on an island that necessarily limits its population.[61] The Utopian republic thus seems to overlap with Augustine's own emphases in the early books of *The City of God*. The centrality of politics in the poem as rooted in mutually dependent friendship illumines the political nature of More's own text.

If the letters by Thomas More and his fellow humanists, prefatory poems attached to the first printing, and other appendages of the text of *Utopia* point the reader toward taking the text as a political dialogue, what might the political teaching be? Two divergent yet fruitful approaches for generating a political reading of *Utopia* rely on the classical question of the best way of life—*otium* or *negotium*, or *de optimo reipublicae*. Gerard Wegemer argues for the former and Quentin Skinner the latter.

Wegemer claims that More's study of *The City of God* came as an attempt to understand the limits of the political life.[62] Wegemer unites More with Cicero's position that the philosophers must be engaged in the life of the city.[63] Raphael, by contrast, presents a closer ideal to an unreflective Platonic position, since Raphael affirms that philosophers should pursue only the life of contemplation, forsaking the political community.[64] But More does not take Cicero as his primary guide; he takes Augustine instead. Wegemer interprets Augustine to be leveling the aristocratic and perhaps tyrannical nature of a regime oriented solely toward philosophy. Augustine incorporates into the city both the active life and the life of leisure. The key argumentative lever for this move is the role of charity. Wegemer's Augustine gives two regulating principles for the relationship between the active and contemplative life: "[D]o what charity demands and use part of one's leisure to contemplate God."[65] While Augustine maintains that everyone can contemplate God,[66] Raphael and Plato limit the contemplative life to the select few who are capable of its rigorous intellectual demands.[67] Augustine and Raphael posit two different ends of human life and two divergent philosophies of life that cash out in their construction of the political regime. The Christian humanist will enter the "dialectical game" of More's Utopian commonwealth and take what is helpful for their city and discard what is unnecessary.[68]

If Wegemer gives an account of the political reading of More's text from within the tradition of determining the best way of life, Skinner presents a framework for understanding More's *Utopia* as participating in the classic tradition of exploring the "best state of a commonwealth."[69] He begins his inquiry into *Utopia* by highlighting

the investigation as one of the *optimus status reipublicae*.[70] Contra Wegemer, Skinner writes that More "does not begin—as Erasmus does in the *Enchiridion*—by telling us that his topic will be 'the right way of life.'"[71] Instead, "More's concern . . . is purely and simply the best state of a commonwealth in itself."[72] Of course, this observation does not deny that More engages with the question of the best way of life. He merely does not place the best way of life at the center of the investigation into the best commonwealth.

In addition, Skinner notes that the scandal of the Utopian commonwealth is its ability to instruct the Christian nations in the best commonwealth without access to revelation. He writes that "the irony—and the scandal—lies in the fact that we have so much to learn from them [the Utopians]."[73] Indeed, this conclusion depends on Raphael's affirmation of the Utopian commonwealth. Skinner rightly recognizes that Raphael admires the Utopian society as one where "*nihil privati est*"—nothing private abounds.[74] But the elimination of the private is essentially motivated by the desire to extirpate the pernicious effects of pride. "An abhorrence of pride," Joanne Paul writes, remains the "one theme that runs throughout More's *oeuvre*."[75] More writes at the end of book 2 of *Utopia* that "pride does not measure prosperity by her own advantages, but by the disadvantages of others. She would not even wish to become a goddess if there were not others in misery that she could not rule over and scoff at."[76] In each critique of pride, Raphael highlights pride's domination over other persons within a community. Pride usurps the proper relation between the public and the private by elevating private domination over and above the public good. Skinner rightfully acknowledges that *nihil privati est* in *Utopia*; however, the reason for this elimination of the private emerges from the Utopians' lack of pride by nature or their institutional amelioration of pride's less-than-salubrious social effects. Though Wegemer and Skinner disagree on the fundamental purpose of More's text, both scholars point toward reading More's *Utopia* as a political text centered on a Ciceronian humanism that acknowledges the necessity of working within the political to achieve the common good.

Thus far, this article has sketched a historical and textual argument for reading Thomas More's *Utopia* not merely as a work of satire but as a political dialogue that encourages the reader to think deeply on their assumptions about politics. Additionally, here I have recapitulated the argument made by Gerard Wegemer for a political reading of *Utopia* rooted in the question of the best way of life and Quentin Skinner's political reading rooted in the tradition of *optimus status reipublicae*. Although both scholars point toward the political reading of *Utopia*, Wegemer leaves space for the Augustinian realism to be further investigated, and Skinner does not fully plumb the depths of More's political proposals as rooted in his abhorrence of pride—an Augustinian signpost to the reader of the limits of political life. This article now turns to examining the textual resonances between *Utopia* and *The City of God* with a view toward *superbia* (pride).

Augustine and Thomas More on Pride

"Pride," Thomas More writes, "is the very head and root of all sins[,] . . . the mischievous mother of all manner of vice."[77] Raphael Hythloday calls pride a "serpent of Hell [that] creeps through the hearts of human beings and like a suckfish pulls them back and delays them from taking up a better way of life."[78] Eva Brann writes an interpretive analysis of the Utopians as a "people without pride."[79] She analyzes the Utopians as "children of nature" removed from the socializing effects of pride and the Platonic faculty associated with its development—spiritedness.[80] Subsequently, Brann offers a reading of the Utopians not knowing that "serpent from hell" for their lack of original sin.[81] The Utopians know no evil, for they were never created *ex nihilo*, nor do they live within a postlapsarian political world. Their Epicurean nature precludes knowledge of good and evil, including the vice of pride. For Brann, the Utopians have "neither contempt of God nor, as we shall see, contempt of self . . . [for] they are made to inhabit an earthly paradise."[82] As the historian Joanne Paul says, pride "is a vice which necessarily cuts across the bonds which should unite people . . . [and] is the ultimate social, religious, and political problem" for Thomas More.[83]

Similarly, Augustine begins his *City of God* by praising the heavenly city and the virtue of humility. The heavenly city "dwells by faith as a pilgrim among the ungodly, or in the security of that eternal home."[84] Augustine recognizes both the duty of humankind to praise the great Founder of this city, to "defend her against those who favour their own gods" and to "persuade the proud how great is that virtue of humility" bestowed on the most excellent of humankind by God.[85] Augustine's plural set of objectives emerges in the confines of his pastoral duty to shepherd a young Christian, Marcellinus, who encounters resistance to the Catholic Church.[86] In addition, these opening lines in the preface illuminate that Augustine's plural set of objectives requires the use of multiple tools in his rhetorical toolbox to accomplish this task—whether it be a refutation of pagan practices from the Christian perspective, an immanent critique of the Romans and their failure to live up to their founding creed, a theological disputation on the beatific vision, or the pastoral indictment of pride in the political as well as the spiritual life of Christians. All these tools have a role to play in the text, but Augustine proceeds to emphasize the main objective of raising up the virtue of humility. Thus, to ignore the earthly city's "lust for mastery" (*libido dominandi*) would be to implicitly recognize pride as a virtue rather than a vice.[87]

In the Utopian commonwealth, one of the primary objectives is to extirpate the material cause of pride: money and private property. Raphael speaks of the cause of greed as "either fear of want, present in all animal species, or *pride*, unique to humans, who think they acquire glory by excelling others with a *superfluous show of possessions*; but this type of vice can have *no place* whatsoever within the institutions of the Utopians."[88] Since the commonwealth founded by Utopos has no private property, the role of pride is nearly completely extirpated or heavily diminished. Both through the institutional and the customary, the structural and the ethical, the Utopians have attempted to eliminate the conditions by which pride emerges. However, at the outset Augustine's view differs from Raphael's analysis of the Utopian regime; since *libido dominandi* cannot be completely and irrevocably removed from humanity in this life,

perfect justice can be found only in the heavenly city. For now, "we see through a glass, darkly; then, face to face."[89] Raphael, by contrast, suggests that the Utopians have eliminated pride, since pride is the only limitation to the entire "world to adopt the laws of this [the Utopian] commonwealth."[90] Thus, the satisfied Utopians must have removed or severely lessened the effects of pride on their people. This observation demonstrates that Thomas More sees the centrality of pride in reordering the commonwealth toward the good of the other—an Augustinian ode, to be sure.

Augustine's psychagogic humbling of the proud emerges in his examination of the judge in 19.6.[91] With the concerns of the inimical effects of retributive justice in England throughout the dialogue of book 1 of *Utopia* coupled with More's own passion for the law, we can safely speculate that Augustine's examination of the judge would have been quite striking to Thomas More. This examination of the judge is situated within Augustine's critique of the pride of the philosophers who claim to find happiness in this life. "Thus [these philosophers]," Augustine writes, "endeavour to contrive for themselves an entirely false happiness, by means of a virtue which is as *false* as it is *proud*."[92] Augustine reminds his readers of his exordium and his aim in this chapter, "to persuade the proud how great is that virtue of humility."[93] To be happy within oneself is to elevate pride and eliminate the Christian duty of charity—a virtue that cannot be performed within oneself. Pride continues to be the biggest obstacle for both Augustine and More in generating a true sociality.[94]

With this critique in mind, Augustine begins to educate the judge to humility by revealing the epistemic fallibility of their position of authority. He asks: "What of those judgements passed by men upon their fellow-men which cannot fail to be present in cities no matter how peaceful they remain?"[95] Augustine subsequently acknowledges both the necessity of making political judgments and the limitations of these judgments in light of the epistemic position of the judge. These political judgments particularly refer to a magistrate. The wise judge can "never penetrate the consciences of those upon whom they pronounce it" and is "often compelled to seek the truth by torturing innocent people merely because they

are witnesses to the crimes of other men."[96] Even the accused might be subject to torture by a wise judge.[97] But these techniques are all in vain. If the person is innocent, the judge "has tortured an innocent man in order to discover the truth, and has killed him while still not knowing it."[98] This "darkness" of political life, the ignorance of the interior conscience of an individual, makes the necessity of judgment challenging at best and sinful at worst.[99] But the wise judge cannot see how these facts testify to the "wretchedness of man's condition" in this life.[100] Augustine wants his readers to see the limitations of a temporal life in achieving the justice one desires—not that political justice may be misguided or a wrong aim.[101] Turning to God and asking for deliverance from the necessity of political judgment with our own fallible knowledge should be the only response, according to Augustine.[102] Not only is Augustine's critique of the judge of prime interest to Thomas More, but so is his implied critique of Stoicism.[103] Veronica Roberts Ogle notes that "for the Stoics, justice *was* the punishment of crime, and the judge's duty was to administer the law's penalties with strict precision."[104] Put in legal terms, the Stoic judge adheres to a retributivist understanding of justice as opposed to one of rehabilitation. In *Utopia* More drew on Augustine's critique of the asocial consequences of the Stoic position to illuminate the political and spiritual problem of a retributivist account of justice divorced from rehabilitation.

Raphael Hythloday expresses nearly the identical critique of political justice that draws on Augustine's critique of the judge. Raphael criticizes the claim to justice in the way England punishes theft. In book 1 of *Utopia*, More records his conversation with Raphael and his travels with Amerigo Vespucci.[105] But Peter Giles, an interlocutor of Morus and Raphael, interrupts and exhorts Raphael to pursue a life of counseling to a king: "Your learning and your knowledge of various countries and peoples would entertain [the prince]," and more importantly, Peter says, you might "advance your own interests and be of great use at the same time to all your relatives and friends."[106] This exhortation begins a long excursus on why Raphael would not attend to a prince in the fashion of a

courtier.[107] In exchanging "contemplative leisure for active endeavor," Raphael claims, the commonwealth would not be better off.[108] Governance takes a backseat to the driving glory of conquest. Echoing Augustine's hypothetical ideal of the small kingdoms in book 4, chapter 15, of *The City of God*, Raphael finds temporal peace to be central for the maintenance of the commonwealth.[109] In England, he observes, they are punishing thieves with indiscriminate executions by hanging, illuminating a retributivist notion of justice.[110] They even "boast" in their "justice in punishing theft," when "in reality it is neither just nor expedient."[111] Because of the landowners who enclose the workable land of the poor for the pleasure of hunting, "a man of courage is more easily persuaded to steal than to beg."[112] Raphael poignantly concludes that "if you allow young folks to be abominably brought up and their characters corrupted, little by little, from childhood; and then you punish them as grown-ups for committing the crimes to which their training has consistently inclined them, what else is this, I ask, but first making them thieves and then punishing them for it?"[113]

Raphael's charitable interlocutor, a cardinal, encourages him to give an account of his reasonings behind declaring the English legal system to be corrupting political justice. Raphael proceeds to appeal to the Christian exhortation not to take the life of another, the incommensurability of the punishment with the crime, and the lack of expediency in preventing the crime of theft.[114] Augustine's critique of the asocial judge who relishes in a retributivist account of justice influences Thomas More to use Raphael to question the existing retributivist account of justice in England.

The most direct account of pride emerges in the last few pages of Raphael's account of the Utopian commonwealth. Under Raphael's diagnosis of contemporary Europe, he sees that with the perversion of justice the regime is "but a conspiracy of the rich, who are advancing their own interests under the name and title of the commonwealth."[115] George Logan notes that this reference evokes the image of Augustine's *City of God* in book 4, chapter 4, where Augustine decries the commonwealth without justice as merely a band of robbers.[116] Nevertheless, the location of this

problem for Raphael emerges from within the nature of the human heart, to use a Christian image. Raphael defines pride as a "monster" and the "prime plague" that "measures her prosperity not by what she has but by what others lack."[117] Additionally, Raphael highlights how pride would not deign to rule if not to "sneer at and domineer over" others and that "she displays her riches to torment and tantalize the poverty of others."[118] He bombastically continues, "Pride is a serpent from hell that twines itself around the hearts of men, acting like a suckfish to draw and hold them back from choosing a better way life."[119] Finally, he concludes by acknowledging that "pride is too deeply fixed in human nature to be easily plucked out."[120] Since the Utopians have "torn up the seeds of ambition and faction at home, along with most other vices, they are in no danger from internal strife" and their state will likely "last forever."[121] But Morus remains skeptical of Raphael's peroration. Despite "freely confess[ing] that in the Utopian commonwealth there are very many features that in our own societies [Morus] would wish rather than expect to see,"[122] Morus signals to the Augustinian reader that the extirpation of pride from the human soul cannot happen in this life. Instead, the call to humbly acknowledge the limited fallibility of the human spirit leads both to an aspiration to political justice through a self-critical reflective attitude and a self-reflective examination of one's own pride.

Psychagogy and Pride: The Augustinian Tradition and More's Political Dialogue

Eva Brann claims that "all major utopias follow Plato's *Republic* in being essentially 'educational provinces,' transforming Socrates' deliberately imageless program of learning (st. 529) into vivid pictures of ideal institutions of instruction and inquiry."[123] Indeed, for Brann's reading of the *Republic*, "education forms both the political beginning and the philosophical end of the city."[124] To examine the pedagogical elements of Thomas More's *Utopia*, consider a central aspect of Augustine's political philosophy in his use of rhetoric to persuade the proud of the great virtue of

humility.[125] Augustine's use of rhetoric demonstrates a more robust conception of politics than some interpreters who affirm Augustine's position as a kind of "political pessimism" may give him credit for.[126] In a short introductory poem titled *De optimo reipublicae*, More states the purpose of *Utopia* is *nec minus salutaris quam festivus*, "no less beneficial than entertaining."[127] More's poem suggests the text's instructive as well as pleasurable nature. Harkening back to Horace's claim that poetry ought to *docere et delectare*, More discloses the twofold nature of political imagination: instruction and delight.[128] This imagination necessarily reveals the process as educative, for it creates the space by which one reimagines a better embodiment of justice in the future in dialogue with the present. In addition, in the opening letter written by Thomas More to Peter Giles, More writes that "truth in fact is the only thing at which I should aim and do aim in writing this book."[129] But prior to this claim, More expresses his desire in the previous sentences to recount the dialogue with Hythloday with a "casual simplicity" in order to be closer to the "truth."[130] Thus, the ambiguous referent for "truth" comes to the forefront: Either More uses truth to refer to the discovery of the ideal commonwealth, or truth entails an honest retelling of the dialogue with Raphael Hythloday. Prima facie, More refers to the latter: The truth constitutes faithfully retelling the dialogue. For in the second half of the letter, More expresses skepticism about publishing the book because of his readers being so "flat-nosed" that they are unable to "endure the salt of wit."[131] However, the truthful retelling of the dialogue leaves us little in the way of interpreting the text of *Utopia*. To tell the truth of Raphael's travels only raises further questions about whether to take the text in earnest. Rather than reduce the work to its satirical elements, the previous evidence points to the educative impact of reading texts that are rhetorically delightful, engaging, and that also require the active mind to separate the intellectually fruitful from the intellectually barren aspects of the work.

This reading emphasizes how Morus, the interlocutor of Raphael in the dialogue, praises the "indirect approach" to the philosopher who sees the political life as meaningless.[132] Morus

encourages Raphael, the philosopher, to engage in political life, rather than give up on politics and retreat to the self-gratifying pleasures of leisure. For not only is there a philosophy suitable for public life but also public life should not be abandoned. Morus continues, "If you cannot pluck up bad ideas by the root, or cure long-standing evils to your heart's content, you must not therefore abandon the commonwealth. Don't give up on the ship in a storm because you cannot hold back the winds."[133] As George Logan, the editor of the Cambridge edition, notes, the advice given by Morus corresponds with the advice given by Quintilian and Erasmus.[134] Surprisingly, Morus articulates a nearly identical position as Thomas More's in his letter to Martin Dorp. In that letter, More argues from the Ciceronian position to affirm a public form of philosophy—a unity between dialectic and rhetoric.[135] Thus just as More criticizes Dorp's apolitical scholasticism,[136] so too does Morus criticize Raphael's apolitical philosophizing. Indeed, Morus advises Raphael to take the "indirect approach" in the political life to persuade the proud of the virtues of peace and justice. The "indirect approach" takes its bearings from More's Augustinianism and his disputes with the Scholastics. One can see how More demonstrates in the entirety of the text this indirect approach in action by challenging the limited political imagination of the reader and the pride that accompanies one's own beliefs.

The psychagogic effects of reading More's texts are twofold: to highlight the pride of those who hold the ideal commonwealth to be found in the world and to challenge the pride of the reader in ignoring those who cry out for justice. Pierre Hadot illuminated the psychagogical power of Plato, which demonstrated that philosophy was not merely Scholastic "logic-chopping" but a modus vivendi, a quasi-spiritual conversion to pursuing the good, the true, and the beautiful.[137] Veronica Roberts Ogles and Michael Lamb interpret Augustine as in this tradition of pedagogy concerned with turning the soul toward God—akin to Hadot's interpretation of the Platonic emphasis on the healing of the soul, or psychagogy.[138] Thomas More, like Augustine, exhorts the reader to "[p]rove [or test] all things; hold fast that which is good."[139] His work both challenges

those who find pleasure in justice without concern for the common good of humanity through the virtue of compassion and encourages the reader to investigate whether the Utopian way of life is indeed better than life under the political regimes in Europe. By using dialogue, witty satire, and political imagination, he places the reader into an interpretive conundrum: How seriously should we take the work and its characters? Is *Utopia* truly the best commonwealth? Does pride prevent the world from adopting the laws of the Utopian commonwealth, or does its restrictions on liberty create the space for a tyrannical ruling priestly class to take over the regime?[140] More the author of *Utopia* wrote the text as a "fiction through which the truth like medicine smeared with honey, might enter the mind a little more pleasantly."[141] If we consider the Augustinian notion of pride as the interpretive lever for More's *Utopia*, we see that the truth More desires to convey is bound up with the recognition of the pervasiveness of pride in political life and the dangers for the humanist tradition of placing their hope in the active life of the courtier. Augustine and More encourage the readers to be self-critical of their own regimes because of the ever-lurking serpent of pride that steers the commonwealth away from the duty to one's neighbor and toward one's own interests.

Notes

1. Thomas More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, ed. George M. Logan, Robert M. Adams, and Clarence H. Miller (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 40. I alternate between the side-by-side Latin-English edition and the Cambridge third edition, both edited by George Logan. The Latin-English text edition is identified by the title in each footnote. For the rest of the citations to *Utopia*, see Thomas More, *Utopia*, 3rd ed., ed. George M. Logan, trans. Robert M. Adams, in *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
2. Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, vol. 2, *Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 223.
3. Eric Nelson, "Greek Nonsense in More's 'Utopia,'" *Historical Journal* 44, no. 4 (2001): 889–917.
4. For a powerful argument that accuses More of clear-headed obfuscation, see Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: More to Shakespeare* (University of Chicago Press, 1980).

5. See the analysis of rhetorical figures and wit in Andrew Zurcher, *Nec minus salutaris quam festivus*: Wit, Style, and the Body in More's Utopia," in *The Oxford Handbook of Thomas More's "Utopia,"* 1st ed., ed. Cathy Shrank and Phil Withington, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford University Press, 2023).
6. C. S. Lewis, "Play of Wit," in *Twentieth Century Interpretations of "Utopia": A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. William Nelson (Prentice Hall, 1968), 68.
7. Lewis, "Play of Wit"; Peter Iver Kaufman, *Incorrectly Political: Augustine and Thomas More* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Warren W. Wooden, "Anti-Scholastic Satire in Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 8, no. 2 (July 1977): 29.
8. For a reception history of More in Russia, see Frances Nethercott, "Not Just a Light-Hearted Joke: Russian Moreana from the Age of Karamzin to the Rise of Social Democracy and Lenin's 'Stele of Freedom,'" in *The Oxford Handbook of Thomas More's "Utopia,"* ed. Cathy Shrank and Phil Withington (Oxford University Press, 2023).
9. Karl Kautsky, *Thomas More and His Utopia: With a Historical Introduction*, trans. H. J. Stenning (International Publishers, 1959), 1.
10. Kautsky, 247.
11. Ross Dealy, *Before Utopia: The Making of Thomas More's Mind* (University of Toronto Press, 2020); Frank Mitjans, *Thomas More's Vocation* (Catholic University of America Press, 2023).
12. Gerard Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," *Renaissance Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (1992): 115.
13. Gerard Wegemer, *Thomas More on Statesmanship* (Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 129.
14. Ernest L. Fortin, "Political Idealism and Christianity in the Thought of St. Augustine," in *Saint Augustine and the Augustinian Tradition*, ed. Robert P. Russell, O.S.A., Saint Augustine Lecture Series (Villanova University and Augustinian Institute, 1972), 4.
15. See Istvän Bejczy, "More's *Utopia*: The City of God on Earth?," *Saeculum* 46, no. 1 (1995): 17–30; Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 1992; Martin N. Raitiere, "More's *Utopia* and *The City of God*," *Studies in the Renaissance* 20 (1973): 144–68.
16. Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 120; See also "*Quam ob rem otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis*" (True charity makes human beings undertake political activity). Augustine, *City of God, Volume VI: Books 18.36–20*, trans. William Chase Greene (Harvard University Press, 2007), 19.19.

17. Raitiere, "More's *Utopia* and *The City of God*," 168.
18. Athanasios Moulakis, "Pride and the Meaning of *Utopia*," *History of Political Thought* 11, no. 2 (1990): 241–56.
19. Bejczy, "More's *Utopia*," 19.
20. A similar project by Joanne Paul excavated More's political thinking by wielding in a novel way the religious and polemical texts of Thomas More. See Joanne Paul, "Beyond *Utopia*: Thomas More as a Political Thinker," *History of European Ideas* 50, no. 3 (2024): 353–69.
21. Thomas Stapleton, *The Life of Sir Thomas More*, trans. Philip E. Hallett (Burns, Oates, and Washburn, 1928), 8–9.
22. Stapleton, *The Life of Sir Thomas More*, 9.
23. See letter 999 in Desiderius Erasmus, *The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 993 to 1121*, ed. Peter G. Bietenholz, trans. R. A. B. Mynors, vol. 7 of *Collected Works of Erasmus* (University of Toronto Press, 1987); William Roper, *Life of Sir Thomas More*, facsimile (Ignatius Press, 2002); Stapleton, *The Life of Sir Thomas More*; William Roper and Nicholas Harpsfield, *The Lives of Saint Thomas More* (J. M. Dent & Sons, 1963).
24. Roper, *Life of Sir Thomas More*, 6.
25. Dominic Baker-Smith, "Who Went to Thomas More's Lectures on St Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*?," *Church History and Religious Culture* 87, no. 2 (2007): 148.
26. This observation also prefigures the way that Gerard Wegemer and Quentin Skinner will interpret More's *Utopia* as an investigation into the classical question of the best way of life and as an investigation into the question of the best commonwealth. Baker-Smith, "Who Went to Thomas More's Lectures?," 155.
27. Richard Marius, *Thomas More: A Biography*, new ed. (Harvard University Press, 1999); Peter Ackroyd, *The Life of Thomas More* (Knopf Doubleday, 1999).
28. Stapleton, *The Life of Sir Thomas More*, 8–9.
29. Baker-Smith, "Who Went to Thomas More's Lectures?," 146–47.
30. Frank Mitjans, *Thomas More's Vocation* (Catholic University of America Press, 2023).
31. Ross Dealy, *Before Utopia: The Making of Thomas More's Mind* (University of Toronto Press, 2020), 57.
32. Dealy, *Before Utopia*, 55–56, 58–60, 65, 68.
33. Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 1992.
34. See Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 22.17; and also Dealy, *Before Utopia*, 58.

35. Augustine, *The City of God*, 22.24.
36. Augustine, *The City of God*, 22.24.
37. For an interpretation of Augustine's positive account of political life, see Michael Lamb, *A Commonwealth of Hope: Augustine's Political Thought* (Princeton University Press, 2022). For a defense of Augustine's virtue of humility in politics, see Mary M. Keys, *Pride, Politics, and Humility in Augustine's "City of God"* (Cambridge University Press, 2022). For a defense of Augustinian liberalism, see Paul J. Weithman, "Toward an Augustinian Liberalism," in *The Augustinian Tradition*, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (University of California Press, 1999). For a defense of Augustine's political pessimism, see Peter Iver Kaufman, *Incorrectly Political: Augustine and Thomas More* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).
38. See 19.1–5 in Augustine, *The City of God*.
39. See 19.6 in Augustine, *The City of God*.
40. Mitjans, *Thomas More's Vocation*, 179.
41. Mitjans, *Thomas More's Vocation*, 179.
42. Ro. Ba., *The Lyfe of Syr Thomas More, Sometymes Lord Chancellor of England*, ed. Elsie Vaughan Hitchcock, trans. Philip E. Hallett (Oxford University Press, 1950), 23:16–19; Mitjans, *Thomas More's Vocation*, 180.
43. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 25.
44. A correspondence between Thomas More and Peter Giles was published in the first edition in 1516 as "Preface." This letter is not identical to the correspondence between Giles and Busleyden.
45. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 27.
46. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 27.
47. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 27.
48. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 29.
49. Moulakis, "Pride and the Meaning of *Utopia*," 246.
50. Thomas More, *A Thomas More Source Book*, ed. Gerard B. Wegemer and Stephen W. Smith (Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 233.
51. More, *A Thomas More Source Book*, 233.
52. More, *A Thomas More Source Book*, 233.
53. More, *A Thomas More Source Book*, 234. Emphasis added.
54. More, *A Thomas More Source Book*, 234n11.
55. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.24; "*Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus*." Augustine, *City of God, Volume VI*, 19.24.
56. Augustine, *The City of God*, 14.28, 19.24.
57. "*Recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor et voluntas perversa malus amor*," Augustine, *The City of God, Volume IV: Books 12–15* (Harvard

University Press, 1966), 14.7. In 14.7 of *De civitate Dei*, Augustine argues that the Latin word used for love in the "Holy Scriptures" (14.7) should not have a negative connotation per se—as does the word *amor* for the Romans. Instead, he argues that the biblical texts distinguish the different words for love only as it pertains to the righteousness of the will, since both *diligere* and *amor* are used to describe good and evil actions. I suspect that Augustine uses *diligere* in 19.24 to signal to the reader the binding character of the esteem that a people have for a shared object. With the root *ligare*, or "binding," the same as the root for law (*lex, legis*), Augustine reserves the strongest form of love not for the political community but for the passion for the self and the all-encompassing love (*amor*) for God, especially when he describes the order of love, *ordo amoris*, in 15.22 of *The City of God*. He recovers the Latin word *amor* as an elevating virtue of pious Christians in reordering one's life to God in 14.7. Although 14.7 directly describes the use of love in the Scriptures, his later argument in the chapter that love is good insofar as it has a right will (*recta voluntas*) might be better understood as applying more broadly to the *vita socialis* and the life of faith.

58. See Veronica Roberts Ogle, "The Status of Politics: Rereading *City of God* 19 in Light of Augustine's Sacramental Vision," in *Politics and the Earthly City in Augustine's "City of God,"* 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
59. Augustine, *The City of God*, 4.15.
60. Augustine, *The City of God*, 4.15.
61. More, *Utopia*, 43.
62. Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 1992, 116.
63. Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 1992, 118.
64. For Cicero's critique of this quasi-Platonic position, see Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Cicero: On Duties*, 1st ed. ed. E. M. Atkins, trans. M. T. Griffin (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1.28; Griffin and Atkins also note Plato's defense of this position in Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 3rd ed., trans. Allan Bloom (Basic Books, 2016), 347c, 485b–87, 519c–20, 520c–21, 539e–40, 540d–e.
65. Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 1992, 120; Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.4.
66. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.17, 22.24.
67. Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 120–21; More, *Utopia*, 112.
68. Wegemer, "*The City of God* in Thomas More's *Utopia*," 1992, 133.

69. Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 213.
70. Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 214.
71. Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 236.
72. Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 236.
73. Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 240.
74. Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 235.
75. Paul, "Beyond *Utopia*," 3.
76. Thomas More, *Utopia and Selected Epigrams*, ed. Gerard B Wegemer and Stephen W Smith, trans. Gerald Malsbary, Bradley Ritter, Carl Young, and Erik Ellis (Center for Thomas More Studies at University of Dallas, 2023), 101.
77. Thomas More and D. O'Connor, *The Four Last Things* (Art and Book, 1903), 46.
78. More, *Utopia and Selected Epigrams*, 101.
79. Eva Brann, "'An Exquisite Platform': *Utopia*," *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy* 3 (Autumn 1972): 13.
80. Brann, "'An Exquisite Platform,'" 13.
81. Brann, "'An Exquisite Platform,'" 14.
82. Brann, "'An Exquisite Platform,'" 15.
83. Paul, "Beyond *Utopia*," 4.
84. Augustine, *The City of God*, 1.Preface.
85. Augustine, *The City of God*, 1.Preface.
86. Augustine, *The City of God*, 1.Preface.
87. Augustine, *The City of God*, 1.Preface.
88. More, *Utopia and Selected Epigrams*, 58. Emphasis added.
89. Augustine, *The City of God*, 22.29.
90. More, *Utopia*, 112.
91. What follows in this paragraph presumes the standard interpretive account of Augustine's investigation of the judge in *De civitate Dei* 19.6. See John M. Parrish, "Two Cities and Two Loves: Imitation in Augustine's Moral Psychology and Political Theory," *History of Political Thought* 26, no. 2 (2005): 233.
92. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.4. Emphasis added.
93. Augustine, *The City of God*, 1.Preface.
94. Augustine also suggests that God generates the sociality of humankind by making it possible for human beings to create offspring. See Augustine, *The City of God*, 22.24.
95. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.6.
96. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.6.
97. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.6.

98. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.6.
99. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.6.
100. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.6.
101. As Ogle demonstrates, Augustine also wants the reader to acknowledge the power of the *vita socialis* as opposed to the Stoic emphasis on individual *apatheia*. Emphasizing the social condition of humankind leads one toward compassion and a rehabilitation generated by a robust *humanitas*, whereas *apatheia* generates an asocial retributivism that harms both the individual judge and the convicted person. See Veronica Roberts Ogle, "Sheathing the Sword: Augustine and the Good Judge," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 46, no. 4 (2018): 718–47.
102. Augustine, *The City of God*, 19.6.
103. Seneca was already elevated to one of the paradigmatic secular moral philosophers by Dante after we discover him in Limbo, which is rather striking considering Seneca's final choice to die by his own sword. Nevertheless, the attraction to *The City of God* 19.6 for Thomas More could also be the resurgence of Stoic thought during his time, especially in Dante's *Divina Commedia*, Petrarch, and the Renaissance humanists more broadly. Augustine's critique of Stoicism illuminates that how to seek one's final end of happiness in this life is misguided at best—a critique that Thomas More repurposes for his own critique of the Utopian regime at the end of the second book of *Utopia*. In addition to Ogle, Jill Kraye also makes note of Augustine's criticism of the Stoics in 19.6 in "Stoicism in the Renaissance from Petrarch to Lipsius," *Grotiana* 22, no. 1 (2001): 21–45. For a broad history of the reception of Stoicism in the Renaissance, see Ada Palmer, "The Recovery of Stoicism in the Renaissance," in *The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition* (Routledge, 2016); see also Jerrold E. Seigel, *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism* (Princeton University Press, 2015).
104. Ogle, "Sheathing the Sword," 727.
105. More, *Utopia*, 10.
106. More, *Utopia*, 13.
107. During the Renaissance, the courtier became a respected figure in the capacity of adviser to the king or queen. See Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, 1st ed., ed. Daniel Javitch, trans. Charles S. Singleton (W. W. Norton, 2002); Erasmus, *Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria*, ed. Lisa Jardine (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
108. More, *Utopia*, 14.

109. "If men were always peaceful and just, human affairs would be happier and all kingdoms would be small, rejoicing in concord with their neighbours." Augustine, *The City of God*, 4.15.
110. More, *Utopia*, 16.
111. More, *Utopia*, 21.
112. More, *Utopia*, 20.
113. More, *Utopia*, 21.
114. More, *Utopia*, 21–23.
115. An annotation in the text included in the publication reads "Reader, note well!," indicating More's warning to his audience of the dangers of wealth. More, *Utopia*, 111.
116. More, *Utopia*, 111n147.
117. More, *Utopia*, 112.
118. More, *Utopia*, 112.
119. George Logan notes that the ancients believed the suckfish could alter the course of a ship. Again, the long-standing image of the "ship of state" seems to be in the background here. If pride is the suckfish, and the commonwealth the ship, it is pride that steers the commonwealth into the rocky shoals. More, *Utopia*, 112.
120. More, *Utopia*, 112.
121. More, *Utopia*, 112.
122. More, *Utopia*, 113.
123. Brann, "'An Exquisite Platform,'" 15.
124. Brann, "'An Exquisite Platform,'" 15.
125. Augustine, *The City of God*, 1. Preface. For an articulation and a defense of Augustine's virtue of humility, see Keys, *Pride, Politics, and Humility in Augustine's "City of God"*.
126. For a defense of Augustine's politics, see esp. Lamb, *A Commonwealth of Hope*.
127. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 2–3.
128. Horace was well known to the Renaissance humanists. See More's "Letter to Brixius" (1520) in Thomas More, *The Essential Works of Thomas More*, ed. Gerard B. Wegemer and Stephen W. Smith (Yale University Press, 2020), 456–72; Donald Gilman, "Teaching the Truth: Thomas More, Germanus Brixius, and Horace's 'Ars Poetica,'" *Moreana* 42, no. 4 (2005): 43–66; For a broader overview of the influence of Horace, see Michael McGann, "The Reception of Horace in the Renaissance," in *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*, 1st ed., ed. Stephen Harrison (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
129. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 31.

130. More, *Utopia*: *Latin Text and English Translation*, 31.
131. More, *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation*, 37.
132. More, *Utopia*, 37.
133. More, *Utopia*, 37.
134. More, *Utopia*, 37n86.
135. More, *Utopia*, 36nn82–83; See also "Letter to Martin Dorp" (1520) in More, *The Essential Works*.
136. In his defense of Erasmus's *In Praise of Folly* (*Moriae Encomium*, 1511), More articulates the necessity of dialectic and rhetoric by emphasizing that the power of rhetoric comes from rational conjectures. After all, "not the least of philosophers had reason to think dialectic and rhetoric as closely akin as a fist and a palm, since dialectic infers more concisely what rhetoric sets out more elaborately, and where dialectic strikes home with its dagger-like point rhetoric throws down and overwhelms the opponent with its very weight," in More, *The Essential Works*, 394.
137. Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, with Arnold I. Davidson and Michael Chase (Blackwell, 1995).
138. Ogle, "The Status of Politics"; Lamb, *A Commonwealth of Hope*, esp. chap. 7.
139. 1 Thessalonians 5:17 (KJV).
140. For one of the earliest works that questions the credibility of Raphael as morally tyrannical, see R. S. Sylvester, "'Si Hythlodaeo Credimus': Vision and Revision in Thomas More's *Utopia*," *Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 51, no. 3 (1968): 272–89.
141. In a letter to Peter Giles, More responds to the question swirling around the text of *Utopia* about the veracity of the tale. In the letter More affirms that he sets out to recount the truth of Raphael's tale. However, More then proceeds to wield irony to undermine the truth of this assertion. More states that if he were to write a work of fiction like *Utopia*, he would signal to his audience by giving "hints to the more learned" about its fictitious nature. More proceeds to give examples of the kinds of rhetoric he actual uses in the text. Thus, one can infer that he writes in earnest; with the use of rhetorical fiction Thomas More lets the truth emerge. See More, *Utopia*, 115.